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Summary
In different ways both academics and politicians are asking similar questions about 
the future of the Asia-Pacific: Does it still make sense to talk of narchy” and 
egemony” a time when co-operative systems are developing? What are the 
implications in any such trends led by a group of small states, especially those of 
ASEAN if these are stable states with complementary assets and interests and 
legitimate governments committed to economic development? International 
relations theory, especially in the security field, is built on a narrower empirical 
foundation. Some of the traditional theories (realism) make a universal claim that 
power is both the means and end of international politics. Others address questions 
relevant only to the Great Powers. Other theory, such as neo-liberalism, argues that 
International co-operation, meaning co-ordinated and joint initiatives between 
actors, has the potential to provide a new basis for international security. To 
illustrate the range of security and economic interactions in the Asia-Pacific region, 
this thesis examines the causal influence of the various interactions between 
economics and security in the region in general, and on ASEAN and Taiwan co­
operation in particular.
This thesis therefore seeks to highlight some of the important issues concerning 
international co-operation between weak states in a debate of both theoretical and 
practical significance. Furthermore, expanding the case of ASEAN-Taiwan co­
operation in the Asia-Pacific context helps to provide an analysis of the independent 
and dependent variables, and allows for greater generalisability of results. 
However, since mid-1997, the ASEAN system in Southeast Asia, which used to be 
characterised as the most co-operative and highly developed regional system and 
was very valuable for theory-building and testing, has become less certain as the 
Asian economic crisis has weakened its spirit of co-operation. Does it signal the 
impractical concept of egional solutions to regional problems”? Or does it mark 
the beginning of egional awareness” that draws regional states together? The 
answer still depends heavily on the policies and initiatives of major individual 
players in international co-operation.
INTRODUCTION
Co-operation is, in many respects, the neglected other side of the coin of conflict. In a non- 
Westem regional context like the Asia-Pacific, little consideration has been historically 
given to the subject of international co-operation. Although many scholars have noted that 
international relations is not a zero-sum game, thus implying that there are certain elements 
of co-operation in international relations, they tend to emphasise the conflictual aspects and 
ignore the actual or potential co-operative dimensions of international relations, as 
expressed, for example, in co-operative solutions to political conflict and security problems, 
political co-operation through economic interdependence, and co-operative approaches to 
international security. Thus it is important to study co-operation because it can provide a 
valuable alternative to the present conflict orientation of international studies. In addition, it 
should also be stressed that it is essential to study international co-operation because it can 
be a valuable mechanism through which the world can deal with major problems and issues 
that transcend any one nation state or bloc of nations. In this respect, international co­
operation provides both a means to address global problems and a process for changing 
attitudes toward other states.
Most of the dominant theoretical approaches to international co-operation lead towards 
liberalism. Co-operation theory has become one of the three most prominent theoretical 
approaches to international political economy, together with functionalism and 
transnationalism.1 The realist approach to international political economy focuses mainly 
on how national power has shaped the relations among specific states and how the 
distribution of power has determined the shape of the international system. This is not to
1 Stephen Krasner, “The Accomplishments of International Political Economy,” in Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds.. International Theory: Positivism and Beyond 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 110-114.
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suggest that realists care little about international co-operation. Indeed, they do believe that 
international co-operation is possible. In some circumstances, realism may generate co­
operation more effectively than liberalism. For example, the balance of power idea needs 
more sophisticated policies to co-operate with alliances, and a hegemonic stability approach 
could encourage co-operation in an international order in which violence could be reduced 
and prosperity could be increased.2 But neo-realists tend to argue that international co­
operation is harder to achieve and more difficult to maintain because of structural 
constraints. In view of the attention to relative power that the anarchical system forces on 
states, it is possible but very difficult for states to engage in co-operation.3 In other words, 
anarchy discourages co-operation because it requires states to worry about the relative gains 
through co-operation with others and the possibility that adversaries will cheat on 
agreements.
In the case of the Asia-Pacific region, the history of international co-operation is not 
strong, but there is evidence of significant improvement. The recent Asian economic crisis 
may have set the co-operative process back, but it is necessary to look the co-operative 
process as a longer term. Interestingly, its primitive model of international co-operation is 
based on a group of small states without leadership. More importantly, their “collective 
self-reliance” has become a prototype for the incoming regional institutions to follow suit. 
In this regard, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether international co-operation is 
possible between actors without a hegemon. The central argument is that that international 1
1 See, for example, Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 32-46.
1 See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), pp. 104-7; Joseph M. Grico, “Anarchy and the Limits of Co­
operation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Security, 
Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 498-500; Jack L. Snyder, Myths o f Empire: Domestic 
Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 10- 
13.
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co-operation is dependent on actors’ interests and not on hegemons. In some cases, 
international co-operation emerges between actors, and this may increase mutual gains. In 
other cases, international co-operation may emerge between adversaries, but when threats 
increase, the dynamics of co-operation diminishes. Therefore, this research seeks to 
transcend both the realist and liberal impasses about international co-operation. It offers a 
broader view to develop an in-depth understanding of international co-operation within the 
Asia-Pacific region in general, and of Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation in particular, through 
an examination of both the dynamics of economic co-operation and the possible effects on 
regional stability of Taiwan-ASEAN relations. It also argues that identities are dependent 
on interests. By exploring issues of identity and interest bracketed by neo-realism and neo­
liberalism, it is hoped to show that a more sociological approach can lead to new 
interpretations of international politics.
MAJOR APPROACHES OF THE THESIS
This thesis engages with two levels of analysis: One is the unit level—Taiwan. The other is 
the system level—ASEAN. The thesis will discuss these two levels individually and will 
then explore how they mutually interact. Two major approaches, in this regard, are used to 
highlight the study of this thesis. One is rational choice, the other functional co-operation. 
Each has its virtues and limitations. Generally, two powerful analytic techniques, game 
theory and rational choice, are viewed as the basis of co-operation theory and can be used to 
examine many different issues. Game theory helps to explain preferences in a two persons 
pay-off matrix as an explanation of how more co-operative behaviour can be induced. It is 
based upon a realist perspective. Both realist and liberal theories share a commitment to 
rationalism, a meta-theoretical tenet which portrays states as self-interested, goal-seeking
3
actors whose behaviour can be accounted for in terms of the maximisation of individual 
utility. Hence, actors are said to be rational.4 However, for both realists and liberals the 
most important source of uncertainty in international co-operation, as noted above, is 
international anarchy. Indeed, if we were to assume that all actors or human behaviours are 
fundamentally absurd or neurotic, then there would be no theory at all, either of games or 
any other social phenomena.
From the perspective of a rationalist approach, the assumption that players’ 
preferences are fairly stable and that all players tire eager to “win” motivates the rules of 
theory construction. Because individuals behave rationally, there will be no “zero-sum 
games,” and mutual co-operation for common interests can thus be reached.5 Consequently, 
rules and norms will soon become guidance devices which are designed to simplify choices 
and direct a decision-maker to make a rational choice. In this sense, it is useful to take such 
an approach as a point of departure. Through close interactions between individuals, a 
collective behaviour without explicit attention would be paid to the problems that occur at 
various levels. Hence the rational choice approach can be seen as a “goal-directed choice 
theory.”6
The rational choice approach has many uses and virtues, but critics cast doubt on the 
approach’s relevance to the real world, which is said to be too complex and too dynamic to 
be understood in terms of such a simplified model. Duncan Snidal, for example, argues that 
if actors in the system change their preferences too soon, the explanation would degenerate 
into fluctuations in preferences. Then the approach would fail to proceed any further. In
4 See, for example, Steven Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 138- 
140. Also in James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1995), pp. 11-13.
’ Ibid.
6 Martin Hollis and Steven Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 144-49.
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this respect, the purpose of rational choice theory is to discourage all too easy, and therefore 
empty, explanations of social behaviour.7 Furthermore, although the rational choice 
approach makes assumptions about the content of interests, they are typically seen material 
by as power or wealth. When confronted with various options, the state (agent) picks the 
one that best serves its objectives and interests. Under such circumstances, norms and social 
structures can constrain the choices and behaviour of self-interested states, which operate 
according to a logic of consequences.8 Apart from this, the approach is not designed to 
explain identities and interests, the reproduction and transformation of which is a key 
determinant of structural change. For that reason, the rational choice approach is at best 
heuristic and at worse reductionist.
Despite all this, Robert Axelrod argues that “the real advantage of the rational-choice 
assumption is that it often allows deduction,” but that it is inappropriate to use the rational 
choice approach by itself. Moreover, the approach is basically designed to provide advice 
for decision-making by informing decision-makers of what they ought to do in order to 
achieve their objectives and prescribing strategies to accomplish what is maximally possible 
in a given situation.’
Another major approach used in this thesis is functionalism. System-level theories of 
international relations, much favoured in the discipline, are essentially of two sorts. One is 
structural, the other functional. Functional approaches have been concerned largely with 
such factors as spillover. Two types of spillover, according to Linda Cornett and James A. 
Caporaso, appear in functionalist theory. The first is integration, which transmits from
7 Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Co­
operation Under Anarchy (New Jersey, N. Y.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 25-57.
* See, for example, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies o f Rational Choice Theory:
A Critique o f Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 
chap. 2. Also in James Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), chap. 2.
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sector to sector. The second consists of a movement from economic issues to political ones. 
In contrast to neo-realism, in which anarchy is fundamentally a given and the goal of 
survival is to a large extent implied by anarchy, functionalism sees anarchy as problematic 
and attempts to make variable. Rather than addressing the immediate sources of national 
insecurity, the functionalist approach calls for transnational co-operation in technical areas, 
primarily social and economic, as a first step. Then, habits of co-operation learned in one 
technical area will spill over into others. Functionalism, in this regard, can be seen both as 
an analysis and a prescription.* 10 Western Europe is the pre-eminent example of the 
application of functionalist principles to the development of an integrated community.
Again, a functionalist approach has its limits. As a theory of peace and world order, 
functionalism does not take into account some important political realities. In particular, 
functional undertakings and political affairs can not be separated completely, and the 
solution of economic and social problems can not be divorced from political considerations. 
Most importantly, whether the authority and competence of transnational institutions can 
readily be expanded at the expense of national governments is, therefore, highly 
contentious. In other words, “spillover” is but one possible variety of expansion or growth 
during international integration.
In view of this, any observation is basically preceded by a question, a problem, something 
theoretical, that carries expectations. But this is not to suggest that all knowledge is subject 
to bias regardless of the difference between facts and hypotheses. Rather, it is to suggest 
that all knowledge is based upon both subjective confidence and objective truth, despite the 
fact that some conclusions or inferences from “evidence” most often than not go beyond the
“ Robert Axelrod, The Complexity o f Co-operation: Agent-Based Models o f Competition and 
Collaboration (New Jersey, N. Y.: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 4.
10 Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso, “‘And Still It Moves! ’ State Interests And Social 
Forces in the European Community,” in James N. Rosenau and Emest-Otto Czcmpicl, cds.,
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information given. Thus, the environment does not instruct policy-makers, it challenges 
them. The implication, accordingly, is that theories are crucial and necessary for learning. 
And in any social context, consensus over theories is also important because knowledge, if it 
is subject to bias, is not a sufficient condition for learning.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part (Chapters One to Four) introduces 
several theoretical debates in international relations and the philosophical considerations 
which bear on them. Chapter One begins by looking at the theoretical debates between 
realism (neo-realism) and liberalism (neo-liberalism). Since it is impossible to cover every 
unfolding theoretical debate, the analysis focuses selectively on what are arguably the most 
vital subjects, especially international anarchy, the security dilemma, the balance of power 
and international co-operation. Chapter Two defines the meaning of region in this thesis. 
Although a more common definition of the Asia-Pacific region includes the states of North 
America, Australasia, Northeast and Southeast Asia, the region may be a multiple 
understanding defined somewhat narrowly by regional and external powers. Furthermore, 
we need to ask: Is the region in transition? If so, to what extent has it been transformed? Or, 
is it only a continuity of the legacy of the Cold War? Extensive investigation is made into 
different components of the region to which co-operation might apply, APEC and EAEC for 
example, and the emphasis is on the degree of economic cohesion of the region as a major 
factor in any attempt to consider international co-operation.
Chapter Three examines the ASEAN phenomenon. It is argued that ASEAN has proved 
to be an unique but successful example of co-operation for confidence-building among
Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge:
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governments with a corresponding political outlook in the Third World, particularly within 
regions where disputes among regional states remain unresolved. However, the recent 
economic crisis and the aspiration for enlargement of ASEAN have weakened member 
states’ spirit of co-operation. The thesis therefore considers the questions: What are the 
major characteristics of ASEAN? What are the implications of ASEAN achievement in the 
security sphere? Is it a security community, or just an intra-mural security regime based on 
a set of international norms? And what are the major challenges to ASEAN? Chapter Four 
looks at the ASEAN-centred ARF. As a multilateral security forum intended to cope with 
the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era, the ARF is based in practice on ASEAN-style 
consensus. It started without any grand design and its purpose was stated ambiguously. 
However, three stages—confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict 
resolution—were agreed in the second session in 1995. As a form of multilateral security 
dialogue, it is argued that the ARF has a remit for regional problem solving. However, so 
far, the major regional security concerns—the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and the South 
China Sea—have not been addressed in the Forum. There are undeniably a lot of 
constraints on the activities of the ARF. In particular, this thesis discusses the questions: Is 
the ARF an appropriate venue for regional states to address their security concerns? Or is it 
the product of power struggle among major powers? Should the ARF give way to the Asian 
or Asia-Pacific Forum?
The second part of the thesis consists of Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five examines 
the role of a state actor, Taiwan. Richard Rosencrance once wrote that a trading world in 
which trading states were able to do better through a strategy of economic development than 
powers could achieve more than through the old strategies of military power and 
intervention. He suggested that through mechanisms of industrial-technological
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 236-43.
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development and international trade, states could transform their positions in international 
politics and win new rewards in an interdependent world. If military power remains a key 
concept in this world, so too are things like foreign trade and economic management." 
Taiwan role, in a sense, reflects such a reality even though the country lacks universal 
diplomatic recognition. This chapter starts by considering Taiwan’s role in terms of 
theoretical legitimisation and international political reality, and goes on to discuss the 
intense contradictions in Taiwan’s relations with its adversary—mainland China before 
analysing Taiwan-US-PRC triangular interactions. The use of a rational choice approach is 
focused on how Taiwan’s political and economic transformation, which is identified as an 
independent factor, has accelerated its search for international co-operation. In this regard, 
Taiwan’s prospects in the future, especially its relationship with the PRC, will depend more 
on economic than military capabilities. Chapter Six offers an analysis of how the economic 
dynamics of international co-operation between actors can spill over to politically related 
areas and can thus produce national and regional stability. The key issues here are: What 
will be the likely impact of the PRC factor on Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation? Can ASEAN 
balance its policies towards Taipei and Beijing? How has the recent economic crisis drawn 
ASEAN, Taiwan and regional states together?
The conclusion provides a summary o f the preceding chapters’ main arguments. It 
suggests that Western viewpoints on international co-operation are largely applicable to the 
non-western world, though it is not necessary to accept them all. Furthermore, it seeks to 
show that if states extend their positive identification with the welfare of others, then the 
dynamics of collective interests and identity may ensue. Accordingly, if “anarchy is what
" Richard Rosencrance, The Rise o f the Trading Stale (New York: Basic Books Inc, 1986), 
ch. 1.
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states make of it,”12 as Alexander Wendt argues, then regional co-operation in the Asia- 
Pacific “can be what the states of the region may make of it.” From the perspective of 
Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation, what is not clear is whether their economic relations will be 
seen as an important pillar for maintaining regional stability in general, and as an 
intermediary between Taipei and Beijing in particular. But what is clear is that continuous 
economic co-operation between the two states is certainly in their mutual interests.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that as the economic crisis in Asia has occurred quickly and 
with little warning, the political as well as social stability of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and South Korea have become a major issue of concern in the region. The 
international credibility o f ASEAN would inevitably be undermined if its spirit of co­
operation drained away under the impact of economic adversity, membership enlargement 
and increasing bilateral tensions between its members. Although the strategic implications 
o f the crisis are far from clear, the underpinning of regional cohesion seems to favour two 
regional powers, the PRC and Japan in particular, as well as the US. And whether the idea 
“regional solutions to regional problems,” which once prevailed in the region, is more an 
Asian myth or an aspiration remains to be seen.
12 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 395-421.
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CHAPTER I
AN ANALYSIS OF CONTENDING THEORIES
Just as the Cold War had obvious and profound impacts on the academic field of 
international politics, so did the end of it. From an historical point of view, it is 
premature to speculate about what these latter impacts will be, but international 
relations theory must be constantly ready to be puzzled by international phenomena 
which have arisen in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. As 
Bruce Russett has pointed out, “social scientists sometimes create reality as well as 
analyse it.” '
Accordingly, an analysis of contemporary international relations theory focussing on 
major conceptual debates is not to suggest that this prism is adequate for capturing all 
the controversies in recent theoretical discourse. It is merely meant as a way to capture 
the key cleavages and to highlight common concerns and issues. In order to make the 
relevance of these theoretical movements to real-world events clear, we need to look 
briefly at the thinking that now motivates the diversity of opinion about realism 
paradigm and its critique.
1. 1 THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY
Undoubtedly, the most contentious aspect of the definition of the term “international 
system” is the notion of control over the system. A prevalent realist paradigm among
' Bruce Russett, “Can a Democratic Peace Be Built?” International Interactions, Vol.
18, No. 3 (1993), p. 280.
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scholars of political science is that the essence of international relations is precisely the 
absence of control. In contrast to domestic politics, international politics is said to 
operate in a condition of anarchy: there is no government and legitimate authority to 
regulate the behaviour o f the actors, and no underlying consensus among members of 
the international system on acceptable goals or even, on occasion, on how 
disagreements should be resolved. Power competition (struggle) thus becomes a 
normal phenomenon in contemporary international politics, and the existence and 
destiny of states are deeply affected by their own means rather than by international 
policies.2 3 In other words, states have a very high degree of autonomy in their 
international relations in that they accept very few international obligations in either 
conventional or customary law. Most significantly, the international system comes into 
existence when states start to coact, and international anarchy becomes inevitable 
because self-interest is the principal force shaping the actions o f  states. ' Therefore, not 
only are states sovereign, but they also maintain a high degree of policy autonomy by 
not enmeshing themselves in a large number of international regimes, especially not in 
a regime that restricts their ability to use military force.
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics, the most prominent effort to 
develop a model of “structural” realism, has tended to define the structure of the 
contemporary international-political system by raising three propositions: the system is 
anarchic and decentralised rather than hierarchical; the system is composed of similar 
sovereign units, and there is a distribution of capabilities among units in the system;
2 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, 
revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. brief ed., 1985), part 
two; E. IT Carr, The Twenty Years ’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (London: Macmillan Press, 1939), pp. 97-106.
3 Stanley Hoffmann, The State o f  War: Essays in the Theory and Practice o f 
International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 54-87. See also Martin Wight, 
Power Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2nd ed.,1986), pp. 100-104.
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and the structure of the system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities 
across the system units.4 For Waltz, the structure of the international system is very 
different from the structure of the domestic political system. In the domestic system, the 
organising principle is hierarchy; while in the international system the operative 
principle is anarchy. Accordingly, Watt’s observation is that “the texture of 
international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat 
themselves endlessly.” He then predicts that the end of bipolarity will lead to a further 
repetition of the patterns of competition, and that the basic structure of world politics 
still remains anarchic.5
Hedley Bull also assumes that the international structure is fundamentally anarchic, 
but he has argued that the stark dichotomisation of organising principles between 
hierarchy and anarchy oversimplifies, and thus can not sufficiently characterise the 
international system or explain its dynamics. In a society of states, he acknowledges, 
members do develop institutions and procedures not found in a system of states to 
manage or resolve conflicts among themselves, although both a system of states and a 
society of states are structurally anarchic.6
Robert Gilpin also regards himself as a realist, but he has different views from Waltz 
as he himself explains: “ Waltz starts with the international system and its structural 
features in order to explain aspects of the behaviour of individual states. I start with 
individual state actors and seek to explain the emergence and change of international 
systems.”7 In his book War and Change in World Politics Gilpin, unlike Waltz,
4 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, pp. 79-101.
5 Ibid., p. 66. See also in Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International 
Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993),pp. 44-79.
6 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics (London: 
Macmillan Press, 2nd ed., 1995), pp. 44-50 and ch. 3.
7 Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” International 
Organisation, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), p. 288.
13
stresses the high levels of technological development and economic interdependence 
among states which have had a remarkable impact on states’ behaviour. But he insists 
that the nature of international relations still remains unchanged, and that “the past is 
not merely prologue and that the present does not have a monopoly on the truth, we 
have drawn on historical experience and insights of numerous earlier writers.”8
Barry Buzan holds the same view as Waltz in terms of the core assumptions of 
modem realism, but his study People, Stales and Fear also attempts to cope with some 
of the criticisms levelled at Waltz’s theory by focusing on the dynamics of system 
change. Buzan argues that an increasingly interdependent global market economy has 
contributed to the movement towards what he terms "mature anarchy”, a more stable 
form of international anarchy which reflects a decline in military conflict as the system 
progresses and an increase in economic well-being as the world economy becomes 
more interdependent. However, Buzan indicates that states will be severely penalised 
by loss of their independence, or probably by their loss of existence, if they fail to 
protect their own vital interests.9
John J. Mearsheimer, another pessimistic realist, argues against any possibility of 
international peace. He maintains that the major problem of international politics is its 
anarchic nature, in which all states will seek to maximise their power in order to 
survive. From an historical point of view, Mearsheimer believes that a multipolar 
system war is more likely than a bipolar system. First, the number of conflicts is likely 
to increase because the existence of more than three major powers makes co-ordination
8 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), pp. 211-215.
9 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies 
in the post-Cold War Era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2nd ed., 1991), pp. 174- 
181,261-298. See also Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic o f  
Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), Ch. 9.
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difficult. Second, war is more likely because states overestimate the number of allies 
who will support them in case of rivalry. Third, the ambiguities of international order 
under multipolarity may cause a state to miscalculate the willingness of an old-timed 
opponent. It is, accordingly, his observation that post-Cold War international politics 
will be “back to the future,” and a bipolar system is superior to a multipolar system.10
In short, the core belief of realism is that the basic structure and dynamics of 
international relations have remained unchanged through historical experiences. Four 
assumptions, hence, are encompassed. First, states are the only major actors in world 
politics, and the propensity for power will be the inevitable consequence of anarchy 
he absence of central authority over governments. Second, international anarchy is the 
principal force shaping the motives and actions of states. Third, in anarchy states, like 
human beings, are incapable of learning, and there is no potential for improvement. 
Fourth, war is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts of interest, and, in the final analysis, self- 
help is the only reliable strategy for survival. All the above represents, in Buzan 
term, the timeless wisdom of realism,11 even if, as liberals contend, this wisdom 
necessarily falls short of accurate prediction.
Contrary to past trends in thinking about international politics, a primary generator of 
mutual interests and co-operation among states may now be economic, as well as 
security, interdependence. Unlike the expectations generated by power competition and 
international anarchy, institutionalists accept realism and so-called neo-realism’s 
emphasis on anarchy, state interests, and power, but seek to introduce an institutional 
component to systemic-level analysis. Without questioning the anarchic character of 
international relations, they seek to understand and explain how the spread of
10 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” 
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 14-18.
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information, norms and rules may change international relations.1 2 13 Advocates of this 
approach maintain that variations in global institutions provide incremental explanatory 
power for understanding interstate behaviour. Although most scholars agree that 
realism accounted for these phenomena (the lust for power, struggle for hegemony, a 
pervasive arms race, and obsession with military security) better than did any other 
theoretical perspective, some still argue that the demise of bipolarity utterly confounded 
realism’s expectations and called into question its understanding of the post-Cold War 
world. A traditional version of realism’s history-oriented empiricism also gives rise to 
the question of its validity in predicting the future world. More importantly, the overall 
framework that realists offer provides little guidance for the future.11
In Robert Keohane’s view, anarchy implies a lack of patterned rule, a tendency for 
actors to go their own separate ways without regard for common principles, norms, 
rules and procedures. Keohane shares realism’s assumption that states are rational 
egoists, but he argues that co-operation is consistent with the principles of sovereignty 
and self-help. This is because.
11 Barry Buzan, “The timeless wisdom of realism?” Smith, Booth and Zalewski, eds., 
pp. 47-63.
12 Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Co-operation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and 
Strategies,” in Kenneth A. Oye, Co-operation Under Anarchy (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press), pp. 1-24.
13 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/ Outside: International Relations as Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 104-124; Ken Booth, “Dare not to 
Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future,” in Ken Booth and Steve 
Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 
328-349; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? 
Realist Myths and the New International Realities,” International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 37, 1993, pp. 132-148; Michael Banks, “The International Relations Discipline: 
Asset or Liability for Conflict Resolution?” in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton, 
eds., International Conflict Resolution (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986), pp. 5-27; 
John Gerard Ruggie, “The False Premise of Realism,” International Security, Vol. 20, 
No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 62-70.
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. . . If the egoists monitor each other’s behaviour and if enough of them are 
willing to cooperate on condition that others cooperate as well, they may be 
able to adjust their behaviour to reduce discord. They may even create and 
maintain principles, norms, rules and procedures institutions referred to in 
this book as regimes. . . Properly designed institutions can help egoists to 
cooperate even in the absence of a hegemonic power.14
Therefore, in Keohane’s view, realists failed to understand the extent to which states 
might see their interests served by pooling their sovereignty and voluntarily integrating 
their economies. Western Europe provides a good example that reduces confidence in 
some realists' argument that competition will always supersede co-operation in an 
anarchic system.15 Robert Axelrod bases his view of international co-operation on the 
assumption that states which pursue their own interests may nevertheless work together, 
“despite the reality of anarchy,” he contends, “beneficial forms of international co­
operation can be promoted.”16
John G. Ruggie, another challenger of realism, claims that realism failed to consider 
the shift from medieval international society to the modem system of states, which was 
a transition between different types of international anarchy in which membership of a 
wider Christian society was replaced by the divisive principles of sovereignty and 
territoriality. He thus criticises realist theory as offering only “a reproductive logic, but 
no transformational logic.”17 Meanwhile, Ruggie presents important elements of the 
institutionalist challenge to realism by maintaining that multilateral norms and
14 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, p. 84. See also Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in international 
relations,” International Organisation, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 1-27.
15 Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold 
War,” David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary 
Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 269-273.
16 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Co-operation under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2 (October 1985), pp. 252- 
254.
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institutions will minimise misperceptions and miscalculations between states, and that 
such norms and institutions may improve regional as well as global stability; 
furthermore, they appear to play a significant role in the world system today.17 8 In his 
essay “The Poverty of Neorealism” Richard K. Ashley argues against neo-realism’s 
“scientific” approach by pointing out that it fails to understand the limits of power and 
“thereby deprives political interaction of those practical capacities which make social 
learning and creative change possible.”19 Indeed, “international affairs”, as Brian Barry 
has stressed, “are not a pure anarchy in which nobody has any reason for expecting 
reciprocal relations to hold up. In economic matters, particularly, there is a good deal 
of room for stable expectations.”20
In sum, for some analysts, anarchy has neither good nor bad connotations. Nor does 
it necessarily imply that the prevailing global order is marked by pervasive disarray and 
commotion. Rather, anarchy is employed simply as a descriptive term for the lack of 
centralised authority that stands over national governments and has the capacity, 
including the use of force if necessary, to direct their conduct. For realists, anarchy 
means a lack of common principles and rules; but for the challengers, such an 
implication seems highly questionable. As one scholar puts it, noting the authority that 
attaches to many treaties, international legal precedents, and international organisations, 
“the international system is several steps beyond anarchy.”21
17 John G. Ruggie,” Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a 
Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics, Vol. xxxv, No. 2 (January 1983), pp. 261-285.
18 John G. Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution,” International 
Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 561-562.
19 Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organisation, Vol. 
38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 226-233.
20 Brian Barry, “Do Countries Have Moral Obligations? The Case of World Poverty,” in 
Sterling McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. II (Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press, 1981), p. 30.
21 Robert C. North, War, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 136.
18
1. 2 THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA
For several decades, the dominant realist paradigm largely silenced the post-national 
security views expressed in E. H. Carr’s work, Twenty Years’ Crisis, has been cited 
frequently to reinforce realism’s world view. For realists, the meaning of security was 
subsumed under the rubric of power. Conceptually, it was synonymous with the 
security of the state against external dangers, which was to be achieved by increasing 
military capabilities. This focus on a state-centric definition of security grew out of 
realist assumptions of a sharp boundary between domestic “order” and international 
“anarchy”. As Waltz puts it, “the state of nature is a state of war.”22 Given the lack of 
an international authority with the power to curb states’ aggressive ambitions, states 
must rely on their own capabilities for the achievement of security. As realists have 
acknowledged, this self-help system often results in what they describe as a “security 
dilemma”: what are justified by one state as legitimate security-enhancing measures are 
likely to be perceived by others as a threatening military build-up.23 This action-reaction 
phenomenon can be conceptualised as an escalation of negative leverages applied by 
two or more adversaries in a conflict situation in which each side’s field expectation 
changes with the leverages applied at each step of escalation, and each sid’s 
expectations and intents are not fully known to the other. Logically, under such
22 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 102.
23 John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1959), p. 4; Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military 
Technology and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 77-79; 
Richard Smoke, “National Security Affairs,” in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds.. 
Handbook o f Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), Vol. 8, pp. 
247-362; M. D. Wallace, “Arms Race and Escalation: Some New Evidence”, in J. D. 
Singer, ed.. In Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates o f War Project
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circumstances, it is possible that this process provides the dominant explanation of an 
arms race at one stage, whereas such a development might be regarded as an escalation 
to war at some other stage.
For realists, the security dilemma proposition is essential for the notion that the 
conflictual nature of international politics is due to the anarchic features of the 
international system. As a result, two assumptions may be seen to comprise the 
security dilemma. First, because the international system is anarchic, the governments 
of adversarial states are compelled to choose between abstaining from protecting 
themselves properly against an existing threat and taking measures likely to provoke an 
increased threat. Second, in security dilemmas, governments are convinced that it is 
better to be safe than sorry, and they put protection against immediate threats before 
avoiding the provocation of future ones; when compelled to choose, they prefer 
deterrence to detente. Further, each increment in a major state's military industry or 
armed might in response to perceived threats always engenders a heightened threat to 
any potential adversary. Hence, any one state's efforts to gain “absolute security”, in 
Henry Kissinger's view, will lead to other states’ perception of their absolute 
insecurity.24 *
Since, by definition, there is no way for states to escape this dilemma, an increase in 
one state's security decreases the security of others. The assumption about the nature 
of the security-seeking nature of states is "based on the fact that threats, and 
preparations to meet them, are interrelated in unpredictable and contradictory w ays"''
(Beverly Hill, CA: Sage, 1979), p. 242; Robert C. North, War, ! 'eace, Survival: Global 
Politics and Conceptual Synthesis (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 239-242.
24 Henry A. Kissinger, A Work!Restored: The Polities of t 'onservatism in a 
Revolutionary Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 144-145.
Michael Mandelbaum. The bate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth ( enturies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 
1989), p.255.
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Nevertheless, to some analysts, the security dilemma is a subjectivistic, and not an 
objectivistic, concept. Many question the logic that causes states to engage in the 
behaviour that creates and sustains the security dilemma, arguing that the central issue 
of international relations is not evil but tragedy. States often share a common interest, 
but the structure of the situation prevents them from bringing about the mutually 
desired situation. Robert Jervis has described this syndrome as the “spiral model”, and 
the most vicious form of it is “when commitments, strategy, or technology dictate that 
the only route to security lies through expansion.” The virulence of the security 
dilemma is influenced by whether offensive weapons and strategies can be 
distinguished from defensive ones, and whether the offence is more potent than the 
defence.26 Jervis, however, believes that mutual security is possible if defensive 
policies are more effective than offensive ones. When offensive policies escalate to a 
very costly war, it is rational for states to cooperate with others in order to avoid the 
risk.
To escape this predicament, some scholars call for changes in customary approaches 
to the problem of the security dilemma. In their book Transnational Relations and 
World Politics, Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane put forward the same view as 
Jervis by stressing that it is obviously true that states are likely to prepare for 
confrontation, but they argue that even if states win the confrontations with others, the 
winning may be costly, and “trasnational relations may help to increase these costs and 
thus increase the constraints on state autonomy.”27 Ken Booth has suggested non-
26 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. xxx. 
No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 186-214. See also Rober Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in World Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976)
27 “A Conclusion,” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Robert O. Keohane, eds„ Transnational 
Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 372.
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provocative defence as a strategy to mitigate the old problem of the security dilemma 
and meet the new needs of security interdependence. According to his observation,
We can work towards peace based on mutual defensive supremacy. That is, 
we can replace the idea that defence is the best form of security. Non­
provocative defence seeks to maintain a level of deterrence against aggression 
but to do so in such a way that arms competition would be slowed, crisis 
stability increased, arms reduction encouraged and political accommodation 
improved.28
Even so, the irony is, as Glenn H. Snyder argues, that without the desire or intention to 
attack another, fear still prevails, since no state can really know where the power 
accumulation of others is only defensively motivated, and it is not easy to distinguish 
whether weapon systems are for defensive or offensive purposes.29
Given the assumption that a security game is indefinitely iterated, some contend that 
the traditional version of the security dilemma is too narrow to understand the real 
nature and transformation of international relations. Accordingly, the concept of 
“security dilemma” explains only the former East-West conflict, and is no longer 
sufficient to describe the ongoing co-operative efforts made by the international 
community. Besides, it is still highly controversial whether the concept of security is 
well-defined, because it has been used in many confusing ways. The term itself is in 
general use in international politics and other disciplines, and the dominant concept 
refers to national security, which has mainly been interpreted in terms of military 
capability.
28 “Conclusion: War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace,” Ken 
Booth, cd.. New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: Harper 
Collins, 1991), p. 368. See also Johan Galtung, “Transarmament: from Offensive to 
Defensive Defence,” Journal o f  Peace Research, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1984).
29 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, V'ol. 
36, No. 2 (July 1984), pp. 461-495.
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In fact, in Arnold Wolfer’s words, national security is nothing but an “ambiguous 
symbol that may not have precise meaning at all.”30 Barry Buzan regards it as an 
“undeveloped concept” that “has proved too complex to attract analysts, and has 
therefore been neglected in favour of more tractable concepts.”31 Charles L. Schultze 
even considers it hard to make a precise formulation since “it deals with a wide variety 
of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose 
nature we can only dimly perceive.”32 If, as argued above, the concept of security is in 
precise, then one needs to examine cautiously the referent object of the term.
Apart from this, some states pursue their security by confronting adversaries with 
military build-up; while others seek their security by joining alliances. Some try to be 
"good neighbours”. Whatever strategy states may choose, according to the traditional 
version of national security, the requirements dictate that states maintain military forces 
and a large array of weapons systems adequate to the perceived military threat.
This is not necessarily the case, however, for most challengers of realism, who 
believe that the historical emphasis on military force has contributed to a truncated 
concept of security. Defining national security merely in military terms, as Richard 
Ullman argues, conveys a profoundly false image of reality. Most developing states 
nowadays emphasise the multi-dimesional complexities of the concept, including the 
economic, social as well as domestic dimensions of security." They also believe that 
change will take place only if states realise that they will maximise their gains with co­
operative, rather than disassociative, strategies, and that the surest route to security for
30 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 147.
31 Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, pp. 3-7.
32 Charles L. Schultz, “The Economic content o f National Security Policy,” Foreign 
Affairs. Vol. 51, No. 3 (1973), pp. 528-530.
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one state is to pursue security for all states. States change their behaviours because they 
are interdependent in their security affairs, so that the security of one is strongly 
affected by the actions of the other, and vice versa.3 4 This structure has been defined by 
Keohane as one of complex interdependence.
More significantly, international regimes are said to be the only means of 
overcoming the security dilemma, and of ensuring that all participants are allowed to 
confirm their non-hostile intent. This concept implies rules, norms and expectations 
that not only permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others 
will reciprocate but also form a co-operation that ignores more than following short-run 
self-interest.35
In short, the evolution of the security paradigm and the changes from “national 
security” to “international security,” each based on distinctive theoretical and political 
assumptions, are closely linked to the evolution of the international system and the 
progress of its interpretation. In each phase, one finds competing interpretations 
(realism vs. its challengers) based on contradictory voices of the nature of man and the 
behaviour of states. As time advances, historical experience will show which 
interpretation prevails and why.
1. 3 THE BALANCE OF POWER: A UNIVERSAL LAW?
33 Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 
(Summer 1983), pp. 129-135.
34 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics 
in Transition (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), ch. 1.
35 Stephen D. Krasner, “Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous 
variables”, International Organisation, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 185-205. See 
also Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System Toward a 
Theory o f the World Polity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 31-37.
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What is the balance of power? What are the necessary conditions for the balance of 
power? Is the balance of power still a valid design in the modem international 
community? These questions are pursued across political and military landscapes, and, 
to a lesser extent, the economic dimension as well. The analysis is accompanied by a 
persistent attention to the dialectic of the weak and the strong, and the existence of 
contradictions within and between ideas about power.
According to Hans J. Morgenthau’s definition, “the aspiration for power on the part 
of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overcome the status quo, leads to a 
configuration that is called the balance of power.”36 Raymond Aron suggests several 
types of peace defined by the distribution of power in each—equilibrium, hegemony, 
and empire. He maintains that “security can only be founded on power or on balance of 
power,” for the traditional paradox of international politics implies that “each 
international unit legitimately suspects the others' intentions.”37 In Quincy Wright’s 
view, the term balance of power is based on the assumption that governments have a 
tendency to struggle both for an increase of power and for self-preservation. He 
emphasises that the balance of power “implies that changes in relative political power 
can be observed and measured.”38 Morton Kaplan proposes a more complex scheme 
based on six types of system, not all of them anarchies: balance of power, loose bipolar, 
tight bipolar, unit veto, universal and hierarchic. Of these six systems, the balance of 
power system receives the most attention. In Kaplan’s assumption, the balance of 
power is not a rule of universal applicability, and it operates only under limited
36 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised by 
Kenneth W. Thompson, p. 183
'’Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory o f International Relations, Translated by 
Richard Howard and Allnette Baker Fox (Malabar Florida: Doubleday & Company, 
1966), pp. 544-545.
38 Quincy Wright, A Study o f  War, abridged by Louise Leonard Wright (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 116-117.
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conditions. Otherwise, the system would be unstable.39 Henry A. Kissinger believes 
that a balance of power works best under three conditions: First, states feel free to align 
themselves with any other states. Second, there are fixed alliances but a balancer sees 
to it that none of the existing coalitions becomes dominant. Third, the cohesion of 
alliances is relatively low so that on any given issue there can be compromises or 
changes in alignment.40
In comparison with the structure of anarchy, Kenneth Waltz has explicated the 
balance of power as a central element in his synthesis, and “if there is any distinctively 
political theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it.” But he 
considers the distribution of power as the shallowest level of system structure and sees 
balance of power as “a frightening, sometimes a bewildering, phrase.”41 Similarly, 
Ernst B. Haas, in the early 1950s, stressed that the term balance of power “is an 
ambiguous notion used in a variety of ways,” for the described system, originating in 
1648 at Westphalia, is not isomorphic with the present international system.42 “The 
trouble with the balance of power,” says Inis L. Clause, Jr., “is not that it has no 
meaning, but that it has too many meanings.” So he warns that the concept of the 
balance of power is extremely difficult to analyse because those who write about it not 
only fail to provide accurate clues as to its meaning but often “slide blissfully from one 
usage of the term to another and back again, frequently without posting any warning
39 For a detailed discussion of Kaplan’s concept of six systems see Morton A. Kaplan, 
System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wily & Sons, Inc., 
1957), pp. 21-53; also in Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics, pp. 50-58.
40 Henry A. Kissing, Diplomacy ( New York: Simian & Schuster, 1994), p. 182
41 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and the War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1954/1959), p. 117 & 199; See also in Waltz’s Theory o f  
International Politics, Ch. 5.
42 Emst B. Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?” 
World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1953), pp. 442-477.
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that plural meanings exist.”43 In Hedley Bull’s words, the term balance of power “is 
notorious for the numerous meanings that may be attached it.”44 However, “it is clear 
that in contemporary international politics there does exist a balance o f power which 
fulfils the same functions in relation to international order which it has performed in 
other periods.”45 Thus, according to his observation, the balance of power serves three 
purposes:
1. To ensure the continued existence of the state system by preventing universal 
empire through conquest. In other words, no one power can predominate;
2. To assist, at the regional level, in maintaining the independence of states; and
3. To facilitate the growth of law and organisation by providing a kind of enforce­
ment by great powers.46
Traditional realists and neo-realists share the same view on the balance of power, but 
they differ in their views of how much choice states have in achieving balance. Realists 
see considerable leeway for states; while neo-realists assume that balances arise 
naturally from the anarchy of the system.47 In either case, failure to achieve balance 
seems rare.
Despite all this, at the core o f the concept many meanings is the idea that peace can 
be achieved when military power is distributed so that no one state is strong enough to 
dominate others. If one state or group of states gains sufficient power to threaten 
others, compelling incentives exist for those threatened to disregard their superficial 
differences and unite in a defensive alliance. The accumulation of power from such a
43 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 
1962), pp. 13-22.
44 Bull, An Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics, p. 102-112.
43 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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coalition would, according to this conception, deter the potential aggressor from 
pursuing expansionism. Hence, from the laissez-faire competition of predatory and 
defensive rivals would emerge an equilibrium, a balance of contending parties, that 
would maintain the status quo.
In other words, according to the balance of power theory, a state’s behaviour is 
determined primarily by its external situation, especially the number of states in the 
international system and their relative power, rather than by its internal characteristics. 
The basic assumption of this approach is that states rationally form alliances to protect 
themselves against powerful, threatening adversaries. By combining their capabilities, 
alliance members are better able to deter aggression and avoid war. Should the 
common threat diminish or disappear, the alliance formed to address it is unlikely to 
endure for long.
In theory, states are rational and self-centred. In order to maintain their security, 
fluid and rapidly shifting alliances are needed. States also recognise that alliance 
competition will not automatically achieve equilibrium and that a balance will develop 
only if they practice certain behaviours. One requirement is that a great power not 
immediately threatened by the rise of another power or coalition will perform the role 
of “the balancer” by offsetting the new challenger’s power. Great Britain used to play 
this role in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when it gave its support to one or 
another coalition to ensure that none of them achieved preponderance. In addition, a 
successful operation of the balance of power system, according to Morton A. Kaplan 
and Hedley Bull, assumes that the conditions for its successful operation are as follows: 
(1) a certain number of independent states to make alliance formation and dissolution 47
47 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories o f  
International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 
pp. 30-35.
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possible; (2) relative equality in states’ capabilities; (3) a common political culture in 
which the rules of the system are recognised and respected; (4) a limited geographic 
area;48 and (5) the absence of international or supranational institutions capable of 
interfering with states’ alignments and realignments.
If the assumptions of the balance of power theory indicated above are correct, it is 
not surprising that the theorists see balance of power behaviour as a central conception 
of national interest and alliance policy. It is not only inevitable but is an essential 
stabilising factor in a society of sovereign states. It is less surprising, therefore, that the 
balance of power theorists regards the end of bipolarity as a return to an environment 
where conflict is always possible, and the components of power are always present. 
Without the “tight bipolarity” of the Cold War, realists expect that states will return to a 
general struggle for power as they pursue national interests.49 Under such conditions, 
the balance of power would still work in spite of a world-wide disarmament due to the 
collapse of bipolarity, because states will continue to relate to each other not through 
the current basis of military capability but in terms of mobilisation potential.
Yet such assumptions risk invoking a view of history that is deeply at odds with the 
historical narrative preferred by many political realists. For their challengers, the 
character of this endurance and continuity, which is also a form of change through time, 
remains highly debatable. The most visible controversies that have arisen in this 
context relate to writings expressing such a realist position which are taken to task for
48 Morton A. Kaplan suggests that a stable balance of power system needs at least five 
great powers or blocs of states; Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, 
Ch. 2; Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics, pp. 106-117.
49 In Mearsheiiner's “Back to lite Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold W»r,” pp. 
5-56.
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being unable to account for, or even to describe, the most important change in 
international relations: the shift from the medieval to the modem international system.50
In his article The Balance o f  Power Revisited, Inis L. Claude stresses that if the 
balance of power scheme is not designed for the prevention of world war, then it aims 
too low; and if it can not maintain general peace, then the quest for a better system is 
absolutely necessary. So he has justified his argument by questioning the view that a 
system for the management of international relations that failed to prevent a general 
war happening between 1914-1918 deserves high marks as a guardian of stability or 
order.51 Similarly, Robert Cox has drawn on a variety of historicist writers to insist that 
the study of international relations itself, including the forms taken by realist theories in 
different eras, be analysed more critically in relation to the historical context in which it 
arose.52 At a more general level, Christopher Layne summarises how realists neglect 
the dynamics of change as follows:
If history is just one damn thing after another, then for realists international 
politics is the same damn thing over and over again: war, great power security 
and economic competitions, the rise and fall of great powers, and the 
formation and dissolution of alliances. International political behaviour is 
characterised by continuity, regularity, and repetition because states are 
constrained by the international system’s “unchanging (and probably 
unchangeable) structure.”53
In light of the previous criticism of realists’ historical fallacy, it is noteworthy that the 
pattern of recurrent general war ended when the nuclear era began, after World War II.
50 See Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward A 
Neorealist Synthesis,” pp. 261-285.
51 Inis L. Claude, Jr., “The Balance of Power Revisited,” Review o f  International 
Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January 1989), pp. 77-85.
52 Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory,” Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981), pp. 126- 
155.
53 Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth o f the Democratic Peace,” International 
Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 10-11.
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John Lewis Gaddis points out that the “long peace” after the second World War 
resulted from the “balance of terror.” Alliance formation and the balance of power 
system could not have caused this long peace, because the rigid alliance blocs during 
the Cold War precluded the rapid realignments necessary for the equilibrium that the 
balance o f power theory envisions.54 It is thus the destructiveness of sophisticated 
weapons, not the scheme of the balance of power, that kept the peace.
Equally questionable is the balance of power assumption that the relative strength of 
states determines whether peace will result. If, as indicated earlier, nuclear technology 
has made the balance of power and coalitions obsolete, then the notions of inferiority 
and superiority no longer have the same clear political implications that they once had. 
Apart from this, the balance of power theory challenges the notion that the pursuit of 
peace between states through arms races or alliances is essentially the only obligation 
of the decision-makers, and that such international regimes as may exist are in any case 
best serviced as by-products of the pursuit of power. In fact, as some analysts contend, 
decision-makers may fail to understand the adversary’s dilemmas and problems, and 
ignore the possibility that their own actions helped to trigger the crisis. They may all 
make an error, “cognitive bias that inclines people to see the actions of others as 
expressions of basic predispositions while they see essentially the same actions on their 
own part as responses to situational pressures.”55 In these circumstances, 
miscalculation and misperception of the adversary’s resolve could occur all too easily. 
These analysts have identified psychological problems and bias that could come to the
54 John Lewis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International 
System,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142.
55 See, for examples, Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an 
Anarchic World,” International Organisation, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp.299- 
324; Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” Ibid, pp. 357-378. See also R. N. Lebow, 
Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca; NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1987).
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fore in the stress of crises, with potentially disastrous results. International regimes are, 
therefore, said to be useful prescriptions for solving these problems.56 All this suggests 
that the existence of international regimes is non-interventionist in the sense that states 
are sovereign and self-interested, but they nevertheless intervene effectively in the 
relationship between the international system and independent states.
To conclude, the aggregation of power by states to balance power as a way to 
preserve peace has proved not to be a universal law and has had a rather chequered 
history. The realists’ challengers have suggested that the prospects for peace in the 
modem international system depend on other factors.
1. 4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
Every theoretical perspective works with an exemplary problem which is assumed to be 
the most important kind of issue in the international system and which can be analysed 
using the appropriate theoretical tools. The exemplary problem for contemporary 
liberal analysts is that of the incentives and opportunities for co-operation. Co­
operation theory, one of three major theoretical approaches of liberalism to 
international political economy (1PE), is based upon analytic techniques, especially 
Game Theory and rational choice, that have exploded in the discipline of economics 
over the last decade. Although co-operation theory has been applied generally to issues 
related to trade, finance, the environment and economic sanctions, it is also crucial in 
the security domain, because security interdependence, as one observer remarks, is high 
only among such countries, and dynamic density is an important incentive for co­
56 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” pp. 357-365.
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operation.57 For example, Charles Lipson tries to relate differences in military and 
economic issues to differences in states’ discount factors and hence to the likelihood of 
international co-operation in military and economic affairs.58 In this respect, Robert 
Jervis explicitly emphasises the necessity of exploring the conditions which enable 
states to maximise their relative, instead of absolute, gains in security affairs.59 
However, questions may asked: what exactly is cooperation and when does it occur?
Co-operation, as Robert Keohane has noted, “is elusive enough, and its sources are 
sufficiently multifaceted and intertwined, that it constitutes a difficult subject to study. 
It is particularly hard, perhaps impossible, to investigate with scientific rigor. No 
sensible person would choose it as a topic . . . that its puzzle could readily be solved.” 60 
However, he argues, co-operation is naturally designed to cope with actual or potential 
conflict. Without conflict, co-operation would be meaningless. In his view, co­
operation is goal-directed behaviour. The goal of co-operation may be facilitated in a 
given issue area, through the resolution of a substantive problem, or through the power 
and influence of the collective in its interaction with other states and organisations, all 
with the ultimate purpose of enhancing the national well-being of participating states. 
Thus, co-operation needs the actions not only of independent states but also 
organisations. So Keohane expects that co-operation will occur hen actors adjust 
their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of
57 Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist 
Synthesis,” pp. 261-285.
58 Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” in 
David A. Baldwin ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, pp. 
60-81.
59 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics, Vol. 40, 
No. 1 (April 1988), pp. 324-329.
60 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, p. 10.
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policy co-ordination.”61 In other words, co-operation entails policy adjustment among 
actors so that eventually all will be better off than they would be if they acted 
independently.
Helen Milner holds the same view as Keohane when she states that o-operation 
has proved to be as elusive to realise as to analyse.”62 But she stresses that there are 
two important elements of the conception of co-operation. One is that the policies 
taken by each government are regarded by others as facilitating the realisation of their 
own objectives; the other provides the participants with gains or rewards. Accordingly, 
co-operation can be achieved in three ways. First, it may occur spontaneously without 
any agreement if the metaphor of Prisoners’ Dilemma works. Second, it can be 
negotiated by bargaining, which means that actors may co-ordinate with each other 
through negotiation. Third, co-operation can be achieved by imposition, which implies 
that actors may be forced to change their policies if the stronger intends to acquire 
mutual gains by adjusting its policy.6’
Many scholars have also noted that international relations is not a zero-sum game, 
and co-operation is, in many respects, the other side of the coin of conflict. In Game 
Theory, the Prisoner Dilemma game proposes rules of behaviour in such a situation 
and finds that the rule of Tit-for-Tat appears to perform better on average than other 
proposed rules. The Tit-for-Tat rule is one in which the players each follow the 
strategy used by the other player on the previous round o f play of the game; this tends 
to lead to the mutually preferable outcome, making both players better off as each plays 
the co-operation strategy. To some, the game, despite its difficulties, remains a
61 Ibid., p. 51.
62 Helen Milner, International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and 
Weaknesses,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992), p. 466.
6’ Ibid., p. 468-470; Sec also Oran R. Young, Internationa! Cooperation (Ithaca. NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 87-96.
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valuable strategy for reciprocity and co-operative agreements. The development of 
strategic rationality provides actors with better outcomes, and it is consistent with 
prospects of states’ strategic pursuit of self-interest.64 Obviously, states need not 
always be motivated by a desire to avoid conflict, but in some situations the calculation 
of being better off as a result of co-operation may be sufficient.
In brief, several advantages can be attributed to Game Theory in explaining 
international relations. First, it focuses on how states behave rather than on how they 
should behave. Second, it shows that the best outcome can elude the best individual 
choices. Third, it provides a better way of thinking about crisis behaviour. Fourth, 
Game Theory has stimulated in the area of the evolution of co-operation. Fifth, states 
are not only units and they are not monoliths. Finally, Game Theory is particularly 
suitable for an analysis of deterrence.65 Indeed, Game Theory is currently one of the 
major theoretical approaches for developing theories of states’ behaviours in the 
international system, and its advantages have been accepted as the basis of a model to 
deal with mixtures between conflict and co-operation.
Despite its successful achievements, there are some critics who challenge the utility 
of this approach in international relations. Some analysts argue that Game Theory 
reflects only computer simulation, not the real world. States will only follow the 
strategies that depend on their propensity to take risks, and it is still highly questionable 
whether all decision-makers are truly rational, since much evidence suggests the
64 For a discussion o f Game Theory and Prisoners’ Dilemma, see Duncan Snidal, “The 
Game Theory of International Politics,” in Kenneth A. Oye’s Cooperation under 
Anarchy, pp. 25-57; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f  Cooperation (New York: Basic 
Book, 1984), pp. 175-178; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving 
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” pp. 226-254; Steven Brams, 
Superpower Games: Applying, Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven :Yale 
University Press, 1985), p. xi; and Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” 
pp. 324-329.
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contrary view. More importantly, Game Theorists have not addressed the question 
“about how actors think or about how the logic of their situation makes them behave.”65 6 
Joanne Gowa has argued that Axelrod’s analysis of the possibility of co-operation is 
based on a definition of egoism in which actors care for nothing but their own gains. In 
some cases, a state may “seek to maximise a utility function that depends both on 
increases in its own payoffs and on increases in the difference between its payoffs and 
those of another state.”67 In a self-help system, Waltz believes, states worry that the 
division of possible gains arising from co-operation may benefit others more than 
themselves so that “even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not 
elicit their co-operation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased 
capabilities.”68
Joseph M. Grieco has made the same criticism of liberal assumptions about states’ 
utility functions. He contends that liberals have been preoccupied with actual or 
potential absolute gains from international co-operation and have underestimated the 
importance of relative gains. Two major structural factors thus prevent states from co­
operation with the others. The first constraint on co-operation in mixed interests with 
international situations is the potential for cheating. The second obstacle arises because 
the benefits o f co-operation are rarely symmetrical. Under these conditions, states 
would rather forgo the benefits of co-operation rather than see a competitor improve its 
relative capabilities. Further, an increasingly powerful partner today may possibly
65 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 135-137.
66 Ibid., p. 138-41.
67 Joanne Gowa, “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images,” International Organisation, 
Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 167-186.
68 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 105.
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become a formidable adversary in the future.69 Apparently, Grieco is concerned with 
both absolute and relative gains, but he gives priority to the latter.
Another useful contribution to the debate surrounding relative and absolute gains is 
Robert Powell’s explanation. He maintains that the debate between neorealism and 
neoliberalism concentrates narrowly on relative versus absolute gains, an issue which is 
less important than the structural conditions facing actors. Furthermore the debate has 
generally mistaken effects for causes and has contributed little to the analysis of co­
operation. In the context of anarchy, the major concern for states in cooperating with 
each other is the cost of using military capabilities in the international system. If states 
fear that the advantaged partner could use the additional capabilities produced by the 
gap in gains to be a greater military threat, then relative gains predominate and co­
operation is unlikely. Nevertheless, when using military force is costly, then relative 
gains may not be exploited and co-operation will be achieved.70 Powell’s assumptions, 
presumably, are on the basis of anarchy, which is a constant phenomenon in the 
international system and is accepted by most analysts. Ironically, it is anarchy, 
according to Milner’s observation, that has misled some analysts in explaining and 
understanding international relations. In fact, she concludes that these assumptions 
depend on some domestic and some international factors, and that “anarchy does not 
determine whether relative or absolute gains dominate the motivations of states.71
69 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., Controversies in 
International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 151-168.
70 Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” 
David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism : The Contemporary Debate, pp. 
209-230.
71 Milner, “International Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses, p. 
496.
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Puzzling over these arguments, the perception that the efforts in explaining and 
theorising international co-operation seems far discussed, whether motivated by rational 
choice considerations or the need to adapt to increasing international interdependence. 
One thing is certain: the term “international co-operation” is widely applied by 
international relations theorists, and is not fundamentally at odds with the self-help 
system and anarchic structure—at least not by the intention of their champion, even 
though some of the cumulative effects may be system transforming.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, it is fair to say that to provide an accurately comparative overview of 
international relations theory only by introducing some diverse perspectives is 
definitely insufficient, and it is also impossible to examine every controversy in detail 
within the present limited space. However, as indicated earlier, an adequate theoretical 
understanding of international relations can not be reached by any one school alone. It 
can only be achieved by all schools taken together and thus by an analysis of the 
debates they jointly provoke. Even realism, despite its continuing importance, is only 
one voice among several in the approach to international relations. It should be 
understood in relation to other important voices which together make up contemporary 
international theory.
It is as a result of these major differences that any theory used to explain and describe 
states’ behaviour in the international system, both constant and changing, needs to be 
tested in the real world. Accordingly, it would be premature to judge which school is 
superior. That is to say, no single piece of research can provide sufficient evidence for
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accepting or rejecting any theory or part of a theory that pertains to phenomena beyond 
those included in the study. And the only fact is that evidence shows.
From this perspective, realism has helped us understand, first, how political theory is 
derived from political practice and historical experiences that are rooted in human 
nature, which is deemed to be sinful and wicked. Second, the lack of hierarchy in 
authority at the systemic level creates rules that confine the choices available to states. 
States must therefore bargain with each other to defend and achieve their own 
objectives and purposes. Third, states have to live with their security dilemmas, 
implying that measures taken by one state in pursuit of its own security interests often 
decrease the security of others. This is a dilemma which leads to competition for more 
power in a vicious circle. Fourth, the balance of power is a perennial element of all 
pluralistic societies, and realism’s emphasis on the balance of power helps to explain 
why some states are more successful in achieving their goals than are others.
Indeed, realism has been by far the most popular theoretical perspective for 
explaining international affairs. However, there has been mounting “evidence” to 
suggest that the realist paradigm does not properly either describe or explain the 
world.72 Contemporary dissatisfaction with realism is reflected in the current wave of 
theoretical analysis that reveals realism’s failure to provide an adequate understanding 
of the dynamics of peace and war, which are at the heart of international relations 
theory. Accordingly, three major weaknesses can be singled out.
First, a theory of international relations needs to fulfill four basic tasks. It should 
describe, explain, predict and prescribe. In this respect, the realist paradigm seems to 
be too static in predicting the future of international relations because of the constraints 
of “structural continuity” and “timeless present”. If this is true, then there is no reason
39
to assume that behaviour in the future international system is bound to be the same as it 
was in the past.
Second, realism fails to account meaningfully for the new issues and cleavages on 
the global agenda. For example, realist theories are focused exclusively on the political 
and military dimensions of security, although some realists, such as Barry Buzan and 
Robert Gilpin, have stressed the importance of economics in world affairs; but they 
argue that there is no logic of economic and political change powerful enough to 
transform the basic condition and consequences of anarchy. Theories have now been 
re-examined and are seen as no longer adequate, and it is generally believed that the 
economic and ecological dimensions of security should be included, for excessive 
preoccupation with the military dimension might eventually undermine a state’s overall 
security posture.
Third, states are important and rational unified actors in international politics, but 
they are not necessarily the only actors which dictate the behaviours of international 
relations. Some other actors, such as political parties, ethnic groups, transnational 
corporations, and international regimes, play equally important roles in world politics. 
Moreover, these actors are all rational and calculating but they pursue different goals, 
and different actors have different power capabilities in different areas. Some actors 
can influence outcomes in some arenas but not others.
Strictly speaking, no particular finding from realism’s challengers will suffice to 
“falsify” the whole of theory. The major limitations of realism indicated above do not 
suggest that traditional approaches to international relations must be abandoned. 
Instead, the traditional concepts help us understand some important realities that could 72
72 See Charles W. Keglcy and Eugene R. Wittkopf. eds.. The Global Agerda (New 
York:Mcgraw-Hill, 3rd ed., 1992), pp. 1-10.
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be too pessimistic to some. In this sense, more efforts, both in academic fields and in 
policy-making, are required to lead the world into a better future.
For this reason, this chapter has traced the main issues in the controversies between 
realism and its challengers in international relations as a discipline, and has thereby set 
an agenda for the rest of the thesis. In the following chapters we demonstrate several 
examples of the development of international co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region in 
general, ASEAN-Taiwan in specific, by arguing that co-operation meets both individual 
as well as regional objectives. Moreover, there has been a tendency to judge the Asia- 
Pacific and ASEAN by different criteria which were applied with the advent of a 
number of critical regional problems which arose from the middle of 1997.
v
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CHAPTER 2
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IN TRANSITION
Drawing on its theories outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter begins by 
arguing that the forces that shape international co-operation are among the most 
important in international politics. In particular, the chapter suggests that many 
debates over the continuity and change in the Asia-Pacific region are based primarily 
on conflicting beliefs about the incentives of international co-operation.
For almost half a century the security structure of the Asia-Pacific region was 
dominated by the Cold War system and bipolarity. With the collapse of the Soviet 
empire and a possible withdrawal o f US military presence in the region, it now 
appears that the two opposing alliance structures have ceased to be the vehicles for 
both military confrontations and ideological struggles. In his article “Ripe for the 
Rivalry”, Friedberg maintains that bipolarity has not given way to unipolarity nor to 
simple multipolarity, but to “a set of regional subsystems in which clusters of 
contiguous states interact mainly with one another.”1
Therefore, the first section of this chapter presents a framework based on history 
and geography to understand how the Asia-Pacific region, it will be argued, has been 
transformed. Recent developments in the Asia-Pacific region appear to have created 
an especially acute challenge to both realism and its challengers in a way that this 
region presents deviations from the global pattern.
The second section considers the co-operative efforts in the region. Generally, 
most models outlined in the preceding section have been borrowed from European
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and Western experience, which is based on a process of regional integration and a 
process of state formation and the legitimisation of state structures. But what is true 
of Europe may not necessarily be true of other parts of the world, particularly in the 
Asia-Pacific region, thus the final section anticipates future developments and 
limitations in the Asia-Pacific region.
2. 1 AN OVERVIEW: THE BACKGROUND
2.1.1 DEFINING AN ASIA-PACIFIC” REGION
There is a paradox concerning the place of the Asia-Pacific region in academic 
thinking. Historically, most Asian people realise that Asia-Pacific is nothing but a 
geographical expression and that continent and ocean abound in diversities. The 
geographical concept perimeter refers generally to two subregional parts, Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia, including Japan, North and South Korea, Mainland China 
(People’s Republic of China, PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC), Indochina and 
members of ASEAN. From the viewpoint of political economy, the definition of the 
Asia-Pacific region is a matter of considerable controversy. For some, it refers to 
current members of the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation) grouping. The 
World Bank (1995) defines “East Asia and the Pacific” to mean a list which entails a 
total of 34 “low”, “middle” and “high” income economies. The Asian Development 
Bank (1994) emphasises a subset of developing economies in the region, including 
South Asia. Some geopoliticians argue that this region should be divided into four 
gcopolitically distinct subregions—Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia
1 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3
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and Oceania— because of their distinctive political, economic, social and cultural 
characteristics.2 Chandra Muzaffar even argues that Asia-Pacific is a concept not a 
reality and “as a concept, Asia-Pacific’ makes little sense.”3 Unlike East Asia or 
South Asia or Southeast Asia, it has no shared history or common cultural traits. 
Asia-Pacific is not even an accepted geographical entity.”4 Indeed, the competing 
definitions o f what constitutes “the Asia-Pacific region” are often inclusive or 
exclusive exercises in the politics of representation. The precise definition tends to 
change according to the issue area in question and is perhaps most useful in self- 
determined by the participants in regional organisations.
A region, according to Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, has three 
dimensions: a distinct geographic area with common historical experience; internal 
cultural, political and/or economic linkages; and organisations to regulate interactions 
and/or manage common affairs.5 If their definition is accurate, then the Asia-Pacific 
region has yet to become a true region, for the emergence of the Asia-Pacific as a 
region in international politics is a modem phenomenon, and it might best be 
considered as a region that is still in the process of evolution and whose identity has 
yet to be clearly defined. In fact, “Asia-Pacific” is not a natural region but a product 
of several developments associated with the modernisation and globalisation of 
political, economic and social life that has involved the spread of statehood 
throughout the world. Accordingly, for the purpose o f analysis in this thesis, the
(Winter 1993/94), p. 5.
2 For further discussion of how the Asia-Pacific region may be defined, see James C. 
Hsiung ed., Asia Pacific in the New World Politics (Boulder & London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 213-216.
3 Chandra Muzaffar, “APEC serves interests of US more than others,” New Straits 
Times, 29 July 1993, p. 13.
4 Ibid.
5 Richard Stubbs and Geofrrey Underhill, The Political Economy o f  the Changing 
Global Order (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart), pp. 331 -2.
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Asia-Pacific region is seen to encompass both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia in 
general. But, in a broader sense, the states that are currently members of APEC are 
also included in association with the security and economic movements of the region.6
2. 1. 2 THE COLD WAR SYSTEM
The decisive effect after World War II was to destroy the multipolar balance of power 
which in varying forms had characterised the international system since the 
seventeenth century. The end of the Second World War found the old pillars of the 
pre-war system of states incapable of sustaining that structure, and in its place grew a 
new bipolar structure founded on the predominance of the United States and the 
Soviet Union. It is widely believed that the collapse of the Great Power coalition after 
World War II helped modem realism to become established as the dominant approach 
to the theory and practice of international relations.
The extension of the Cold War to the Asia-Pacific region was, as in the case of 
Europe, a consequence of the shift in the international system caused by the Second 
World War. More precisely, it was the creation of the PRC (People’s Republic of 
China) in 1949 and the Korean War, begun in 1950, that effectively integrated the 
Asia-Pacific into the Cold War system that had first emerged in Europe. However, 
the indigenous Asia-Pacific states, seen in the Western mind for centuries as the 
“Orient”, were less amenable to the methods used to make sense of the situation in 
Europe. The lines between hostile and friendly territory were scarcely as clear as in 
Europe both in the geographical and political sense, and the lines of conflict within
6 Current members of APEC are: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China (PRC), Hong 
Kong, Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore. Indonesia, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Australia, Chile, Mexico, Canada and the United States.
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the Asia-Pacific region were as varied in their nature as were the states themselves. 
Both superpowers in any case experienced difficulty in applying policies devised for 
Europe to situations in this region. The geopolitics of European conflict allowed for a 
concentration of interests; but the diversified geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific states 
produced a multiple sphere of interests and posed the problem for both superpowers 
of achieving co-ordination amongst their allies.
Indeed, the difference in the Asia-Pacific in the post-war period lay not only in the 
sheer number of new and would-be new states but in the nature of their historical ties 
with the Great Powers and in the nature of the international situation in which they 
sought to achieve independence. Colonial dependence had created little scope for 
indigenous political activity, however successfully cultural institutions and values had 
survived the onslaught of the West. This ensured that decolonisation would involve 
nation-building from the ground up, implying a necessary concentration on internal 
consolidation at a time when international economic and political forces were exerting 
powerful external pressures on new states. It was a potent mixture of power. In 
Lucian W. Pye’s view, the political culture and progress of modernisation in Asian 
societies, unlike the situation in the West, where power has taken as a given, is 
generally seen as being one of building up sufficient power to put programmes into 
effect.7 In other words, the perceptions about danger in the West came from 
authority, while in Asian societies dangers were perceived to arise from a lack of 
power to justify the authority. In these circumstances, internal political conflict 
frequently turned regional states into arenas for superpower rivalry, not least because 
many of the revolutionary activities adopted communism, or versions of it, as their 
guiding philosophy. Probably, the most difficult problem faced by regional states was
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that of establishing the necessary political stability on which to build economic 
growth.
Unlike in the North Atlantic, in the Asia-Pacific region and more generally in what 
came to be known as the Third World, conflict was not entirely contained within the 
framework of the Cold War, despite the ambitions of the superpowers. In many 
instances the “enemy” was not one or another of the superpowers but the Cold War 
system itself. Basically, no region-wide anti-communist alliance was established, and 
the actual balance of power in the Asia-Pacific between the United States and the 
Soviet Union was more uneven than in Europe. Perhaps one of the most influential 
roles in which the operation of bipolarity was distinctive in the Asia-Pacific during 
this period centred on Communist China, founded in 1949. As a relatively 
independent strategic actor that had proved its entitlement to great power status in the 
Korean War, the PRC shifted from being a close ally of the Soviet Union in the early 
1950s to become its most implacable adversary by the end of the 1960s. Moreover, 
the PRC’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in the early 1960s made the international 
environment much more complicated. The structure of the international system 
during this period has often been depicted as a strategic triangle.8
At the global level, in order to preserve its independent diplomatic stance, the PRC 
demonstrated its flexibility by opening to the United States as the Sino-Soviet split 
was clearly evident. Later, it shifted to a more independent position as the Soviet
7 Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f  Authority 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 31-33.
8 For a discussion of the concept of a power triangle, see Lawrence Freedman, “The 
Triangle in Western Europe”, Gerald Segal, ed., The China Factor: Peking and the 
Superpowers (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 105-25; Lowell Dittmer, “The 
Strategic Triangle: a Critical Review”, Ilpyomg Kim, ed.. The Strategic Triangle: 
China, the United States and the Soviet Union (New York: Paragon House, 1987); 
Robert Legvold, “Sino-Soviet Relations: The American Factor”, Robert Ross, ed..
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threat declined. Strictly speaking, the essentials of the Cold War system between the 
two superpowers and the centrality of the strategic balance between these two blocs 
remained in place. The PRC did not carry the same strategic weight as the two 
superpowers in global configurations of power, but it became more openly recognised 
as the most complicating factor, and its influence was more evident in the conduct of 
the US-Soviet balance of power.
At the regional level, if the US and the Soviet Union could be described as global 
powers with a regional interest in the Asia-Pacific, then the PRC might be regarded as 
a regional power of global significance. Although the PRC did not enjoy the same 
economic or military predominance as China had done in the past, so that it could not 
establish its position as a paramount power in the Asia-Pacific region, its historical 
legacy made it extraordinarily sensitive to regional affairs.9 The PRC’s active 
participation in two major regional wars, the Korean War in 1950 and the Vietnam 
War in 1965, had led it to become a formidable adversary of the US and its allies. At 
the same time, the PRC had also demonstrated its potential and was regarded by 
Americans and regional states as playing a constructive role in both counter­
weighting Soviet expansion and resolving several important issues in the region, such 
as the problems of Cambodia and the Korean peninsula.
Apart from the power competition indicated above, another major development of 
the region in 1950s was its transformation from being only an object of geopolitical 
interest to the superpowers to one in which its constituent members as independent 
states sought to articulate an independent approach to international politics in the
China, The United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the 
Cold War (New York & London: M. E. Sharp, 1993), pp. 60-80.
9 Steven Levine, “China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power,” Harry Harding, ed., 
China Foreign Policy in the 1980s (New Haven: Tale University Press, 1984), pp.
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guise of what was later called non-alignment, beginning with the conference held in 
Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. This helped to identify it as a new dimension in 
international politics and contributed to developing the agenda that emphasised anti­
colonialism and the need for economic development. Another example, the one 
relatively successful regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967, was, as its title implied, restricted to 
Southeast Asia and was designed in practice to enhance the effective independence of 
its members. Such developments, according to Robert Legvold and Lawrence 
Freedman, initiated a transition from the tight bipolar system through a loose bipolar 
system to a multipolar set of structural arrangements.10 However, this was not able to 
change the basic framework of power competition between the two superpowers in 
the global arena; nor could it resolve differences of interests and competing security 
concerns of the Asia-Pacific states.
Needless to say, in sum, the international system during this period, from a realist 
point of view, remained unchanged and was still anarchical. Paul Kennedy proceeds 
from a conceptualisation in which the main world structures are determined by the 
formal loci of authority in the international hierarchy, so he concludes and predicts 
that the “broad trends of the past five centuries are likely to continue.”" 
Nevertheless, the context of the international system during the Cold War era, 
whether it was dominated for a time by Great Powers or only by two, did not take the 
same forms in the Asia-Pacific region as in Europe or elsewhere. Without the Korean 
War, as Robert Jervis puts it, the world probably would not have developed in the
105-108. See also Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan, eds.. The Chinese View o f the 
World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p. xxix.
10 Legvold, “Sino-Soviet Relations: The American Factor”, pp. 60-75; Freedman,
“The Triangle in Western Europe”, pp. 105-120.
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way it did.12 The same can be said about the significance of the Vietnam War for the 
Asia-Pacific region. These two major wars and developments within the regional 
states made the Asia-Pacific a region of global significance.
2. I. 3 THE END OF BIPOLARITY: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?
During the Cold War, efforts to challenge the dominance of realism were relentlessly 
thwarted by the continued rivalry between two superpowers, for the connection 
between theory and events was undeniable. It now appears that the dominant 
theories, based on the necessity of Great Power rivalry and the prominence of military 
power, are now in question. The central issue facing scholars and analysts is whether 
the entire international system discredits the realist approach because of the collapse 
of the bipolar system. More importantly, will the current global changes manifest 
themselves in the Asia-Pacific region? And is there anything about Asia-Pacific 
development that deserves to be noted from a theoretic perspective?
Kenneth Waltz responds to his critics, who mainly focused on questioning 
realism’s failure to explain and predict the end of the Cold War, by maintaining that 
“ a theory may help us to understand and explain phenomena and events yet not be a 
useful instrument for prediction.”11 He defines theory as a picture in which reality is 
reflected, and a theory’s capability of explaining is more important than its ability to 
predict. Some neo-realists, Joseph Grieco for example, argue that international
" Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 439-40.
12 Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal o f 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 563-592.
13 Kenneth N. Waltz,” Reflection on Theory of International Politics: A Response to 
My Critics,” Robert O. Keohane, ed.. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York:
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relations theories are capable only of predicting patterns of behaviour; they help one 
to understand how a given system works; they are not useful merely because they help 
one to predict the trend of events. In fact, the main analytical perspectives on 
international relations, neo-realism and liberalism, share with all their critics their 
inability to foreshadow, let alone foresee, this momentous global change. The end of 
the Cold War, according to the traditional version o f power transition theories, is 
marked by the problem of hegemonic decline and its consequences. Thus, the end of 
bipolarity is simply the result of the rise and decline of states’ relative power 
conditioned by the nature of the overall distribution o f capabilities. “The prospect of 
major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically now that the Cold 
War is receding into history,” as one realist concludes.14 Apparently, if realist 
forecasts are correct, the patterns of power competition will be repeated again and 
again. The unavoidably conflictual nature of politics in an anarchical international 
system is obviously the legacy of Cold War experience and historical realities. 
However, many criticisms of realism based on the post-Cold War transformation of 
international politics argue that the evaluation of theory should look to future patterns 
rather than past events.15 More significantly, the lesson of the sudden end of the Cold 
War suggests that power rivalries need not necessarily end in armed conflict as they 
did in World War I and World War II.
Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 335; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-16.
14 John J. Mearsheimer, “Europe after the Superpowers: Why We Will Soon Miss the 
Cold War,” Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., The Global Agenda, 
3rd ed. (New York: Mcgraw-HiU, 1992), pp. 158-159. See also Waltz’s “The 
Emerging Structure o f International Politics,” pp. 42-48.
15 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of 
Realism,” International Organisation, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 251-252.
See also Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Embarrassment o f Changes: Neo-Realism as the 
Science of Realpolitik Without Politic- ” Review o f International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 
1 (January 1993), pp. 63-80.
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In the case of the Asia-Pacific region, the period of the end of bipolarity, when the 
“new world order” becomes world-wide aspiration, has not provided real peace for 
regional states. There is no doubt that the collapse of the Soviet Union has made the 
United States the only superpower in the world arena, but this does not mean that the 
US is either able or willing to exercise sole hegemony in the sense of being able to lay 
down the law to the rest of the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Having 
noticed the change of world politics today, Henry A. Kissinger declares that the world 
no longer has two superpowers, but at least six major powers (the US, the PRC, 
Russia, Japan, UK, France, etc) The United States is militarily the strongest, but the 
circumstances in which its military power is relevant are diminishing.16
For one thing, Asian stability during the past several decades has benefited from the 
American military presence. In response to domestic demands and the end of 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States is reducing its military forces, 
which have long been regarded as the main buttress to regional stability. This new 
strategic environment is seen as uncertain since it is suspected that the US may not 
have sufficient domestic support in the long term to sustain the level of forces 
deployed in the region necessary to serve the objective of upholding stability. To 
make matters worse, as some analysts maintain, the perception of a perception of 
possible “power vacuum” caused by US withdrawal might encourage more turbulence 
and unilateral bids for power accumulation.17 Tensions between the two Koreas and 
between the PRC and Taiwan remain high. North Korea’s aspiration to acquire 
nuclear weapons and territorial disputes over the South China Sea have also signified 
potential dangers within the region. The break-up o f the bipolar system has
16 Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 17-28
17 Denny Roy. “Assessing the Asia-Pacific ‘Power Vacuum’,” Survival, Vol. 37, No.
3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 43-49.
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compelled regional states to deal with problems that have deep roots of their own, and 
which direct them toward engaging in behaviour apt to lead to spiralling conflicts, 
such as arms races, crises and even wars.18 On the other hand, the dynamics of their 
highly expanding economic growth, coupled with an easy access to military 
technology after the bankruptcy of the Soviet empire, have provided them a better 
chance to purchase more sophisticated weapons. Ironically, instead of establishing a 
structure of arms control or a collective security, the United States has fuelled arms 
competition by becoming one of the major arms suppliers in the region.
Accordingly, the region, to some pessimists, is in danger of heading “back to the 
future”, because states in the region are responding to the uncertainty about their 
future threats by an arms build-up. This might suggest a self-stimulating military 
rivalry between states, in which their efforts to defend themselves militarily cause 
them to enhance the threats they pose to each other. In other words, the realists can 
justify their arguments by pointing out that in an anarchic order, security can only be 
achieved through self-help, but self-help (or armaments and national defence) 
increases the insecurity of all thereby incurring the risk of a security dilemma. 
Viewed in this way, the recent development of the Asia-Pacific region may confirm 
the realist wisdom of a “timeless present” and the view that the collapse of the bipolar 
system has not given way to a better world in the region.
Given these recent incidents, optimists wonder whether this is necessarily to be the 
case, and some may argue in terms of changes that manifest global effects on the
18 For a further discussion of the arms race in the Asia-Pacific region see Desmond 
Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 78-112; Barry Buzan and 
Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 
1994), pp. 3-21; Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third 
World. I9S4-I99I (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of
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Asia-Pacific region. One of the major structural changes is the rise of mulitilateralism 
at the global level, which is sometimes taken as an essential characteristic of the new 
world trend, and there is speculation as to whether this is to be repeated in the Asia- 
Pacific region. However, it is highly contentious whether multilateralism is more 
stable than a bipolar system, and no historical survey had been done on the question. 
Specifically, the rise of the norm of multilateral consultations in the Asia-Pacific 
region reinforces an acquired collective identity. Even Waltz acknowledges that his 
theory fails to account for the changes of world politics and that a multipolar system 
seems more stable than the bipolar one.19
From the economic perspective, rapid economic growth for the Asia-Pacific states 
and the relative decline of American hegemony have changed the basic structure of 
the distribution of power. The rise of Japanese economic power, of NIEs (the newly 
industrialised economies: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), and 
then of ASEAN states and the PRC has proved to be successful. As a result of the 
rising importance of economic security in the new era, the US has converted its 
economy from a Cold War orientation to a post-Cold War strategy. Japan has thus 
replaced the Soviet Union as the major challenge to American worldwide interests.20 
For its policy toward Asia-Pacific region, despite its initial hesitation, the US finally 
attempted to provide leadership in the region as a whole by convening a summit for 
the annual meeting of the APEC forum in 1993 with a view to transforming it into a
Congress, July 20, 1992), pp. 60-72.; Gerald Segal, “Managing New Arms Races in 
the Asia/Pacific,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 1992), p. 82
19 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” pp. 42-43.
20 Samuel P. Huntington, “America’s Changing Strategic Interests,” Survival, Vol. 33, 
No. 1 (January/ February, 1991), pp. 3-17.
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more formal free trade area. This may be seen by some as an American grandiose 
scheme, using APEC as a vehicle for creating a “new Pacific Community.”21
In security matters, in response to an uncertain strategic future, a comparatively 
new mode of multilateral arrangements has emerged in Asia-Pacific international 
relations. The formation of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993, which is 
designed to promote a multilateral security dialogue in Asia-Pacific region, may be 
considered an historic event in the sense that for the first time all Asia-Pacific states 
began to officially discuss political and security co-operation issues. Furthermore, it 
is also believed that the establishment of a security framework in the region, although 
it is essentially consultative in character, could be seen as the first step to promote 
regional stability. More importantly, the ARF is seen as a significant success for 
incorporating the PRC within multilateral approaches in the hope that it will become a 
good neighbour in the region as it inevitably grows in power. A detailed discussion of 
ARF is preserved in chapter four.
There is no doubt that the end o f bipolarity and the decline of American hegemony 
have provided better chances and new reasons for constructing multilateral regimes in 
the Asia-Pacific region.22 Interestingly, according to the theory of hegemonic 
stability, the loss of US hegemony would equally reduce the ability of regional states 
to co-operate with others. But this may not necessarily be the case in the Asia- 
Pacific, for the changing perceptions of the benefits of co-operation have encouraged 
regional states to change their behaviours, which has in turn made international co­
operation in the region possible. Besides, in the case of Asia-Pacific, there exists
21 Ngai-Ling Sum, “The NICs and Competing Strategies of East Asian Regionalism,” 
Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, eds., Regionalism & World Order (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1996), 221-222; Michael Leifer, Dictionary o f the Modern Politics 
o f  South-East Asia (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), p.52.
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what can be termed as economic interdependence leading toward common prosperity 
and stability. In other words, collective action can sometimes substitute for 
hegemonic leadership. Compared to Europe, the process of Asian multilateralism was 
late in getting started and it remains limited in its scope, but this does not mean that 
the situation is decidedly short of hope.
Another notable by-product of regional economic growth is the development of 
democracy, for example in South Korea and Taiwan. It is argued that economic 
growth provides the basis for a natural evolution of democracy, and further prosperity 
is made possible by regional peace. Some scholars maintain that democracy is 
incubated by wealth; more importantly, démocratisation makes international conflicts 
less likely because democracies almost never fight each other. Moreover, empirical 
support for the pacifying impact of constitutional democracy, as Bruce Russe» 
suggests, is firmer than the assumption that economic interdependence breeds peace.21 
Indeed, the popular sentiment in the democracies in recent years has tended to oppose 
military involvement, although the Desert Storm (the war with Iraq) shows that the 
electorate can be brought around to support military activities by skilful political 
leadership. 23
22 Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganisation of the Pacific 
Political Economy,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 1993), pp. 501-525.
23 For more discussions on democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, “The Fact of 
Democratic Peace,” Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, 
eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (London: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 58-81; Zeev 
Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,
1946-1986,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993); 
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Démocratisation and the Danger of War,” 
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; John M. Owen, 
“How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 
(Fall 1994), pp. 87-125; Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive 
War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), 
pp. 235-269; Francis Fukuyama, The End o f History and the Last Man (London: 
Fenguin Books, 1992), p. 262; Luyne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic 
Peace,” pp. 5-49.
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Insofar as the number of democracies in the Asia-Pacific region is likely to 
increase in the coming decade, especially among the NIEs and ASEAN states, it 
remains to be seen whether democracies are indeed more peaceful in their 
relationships one with another. Furthermore, while communism may have been 
dismantled in the region, this by no means implies that the successors to communist 
regimes must be democratic. Apparently, the significance of rapid modernising Asia- 
Pacific states presents an anticipating evolution of democracy, which might be 
regarded by many regional states as a challenge to existing authoritarian systems. For 
them, démocratisation not only brings domestic turmoil but also undermines 
economic growth in the long run. Resistance to démocratisation, therefore, has 
become a common feature of many regional states, and is justified in the name of 
economic development and social and political order.
However, the flow of historic trends is hard to avoid, as Francis Fuguyama 
declares. In contrast to the theory of historical continuity, he regards this 
fundamental change in human history as a “large process” and concludes “that we 
may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular 
period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of 
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government.”24 In the Asia-Pacific region, the 
political and social consequences of recent economic crisis have not yet overcome, 
but anti-Western sentiments are being expressed. It is too early to make a judgement 
on its long-term implications, but it is also hazardous to dismiss it as a short-term, 
solely economic problem.
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2. 2 THE EVOLVING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION
2. 2. 1 INCREASING ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
Interdependence, generally, refers to a condition where the actions of individual 
members of a social system impact on the welfare of other members of the system. 
That is to say, those who are interdependent are affected by, and react in a sensitive 
manner to, each other's behaviour; the higher the level of interdependence, the more 
pronounced these impacts and reactions will be.24 5 Interdependence, as Stuart Harries 
puts it, is “usually, but not always, a characteristic of a high degree of economic co­
operation or integration.’’26 K.. J. Holsti has pointed out that interdependence has a 
key feature in the contemporary international system, the namely rapidly increasing 
interconnectedness between states, which has occurred as the result of the “dramatic 
growth of means of transportation, communication and exchange of goods, money, 
and ideas.”27 Therefore, complex interdependence is said to have the characteristics 
of multiple issues, multiple channels of contact among societies, and inefficacy of 
military force for most policy objectives.28 This does not mean that military force has 
become obsolete. It certainly continues to play a central role when states are in
24 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 
1989), pp. 3-4.
25 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, pp. 8- 
11; See also Oran R. Young, “Interdependencies in World Politics,” International 
Journal, Vol. 24 (Autumn 1989), pp. 726-50.
26 Stuart Harris, “Economic Co-operation and Institution Building in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,” Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill, eds.. Pacific 
Economic Relations in the 1990s: Co-operation or Conflict? (Sydney: Allen &
Unwin, 1993), p. 274.
27 K. J. Holsti, Change in the International System: Essays on the Theory and Practice 
o f International Relations (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), p. 53.
18 Kcohanc and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, pp. 
24-27.
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conflict with others, but it would be inappropriate in resolving disagreements on 
economic issues. Moreover, the link between international trade and the frequency of 
war, according to Edward Mansfield’s observation, has found an inverse relationship: 
the higher the level of commerce, the lower the incidence of war, and vice versa.29 In 
this respect, interdependence makes states avoid war in order to maximise their gains
In the Asia-Pacific region, for many years, the pace of economic growth was very 
slow compared with other regions of the world. Some fundamental problems arose 
for the regional states in forming better economic structures. First, the initial stage of 
nation-building, as indicated earlier, focused more on dealing with politics than on 
economics, and the eclipse of colonial authority left nothing but devastation. Second, 
during the early Cold War period, most states were embroiled in the confrontation of 
ideological differences inspired by the two superpowers. Third, the region largely 
involved developing states whose economic structures and trade patterns were similar, 
which meant that the situation was more often competitive than complementary. The 
only exception was probably ASEAN, but its contribution seemed primarily political 
rather than economic.
However, by the 1980s, despite political constraints and unsettled debates over 
some issues (territorial disputes and ideological conflict for instances) the 
undercurrents for economic development in the region were gaining strength, (see 
Table 1 & 2) An inflow of large-scale foreign direct investment (FD1) possibly 
played an important role in helping the regional states to escape from the negative 
effects of economic cycles and to upgrade their industrial capacity. From 1980 to 
1992, the total exports from regional states (including Japan, NIEs, ASEAN-4 and the
29 Edward Mansfield, Power Trade, and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), ch. 4.
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PRC) increased from 14.4 per cent to 24 per cent of total world trade.30 Intra-regional 
trade among these states has also increased much faster than the overall export growth 
since the mid-1980s. All these trades have made regional states much more 
interdependent than ever before. In a recent study, the World Bank has emphasised 
that most of the so-called “miracle economies” of the world are concentrated in this 
region.31
In fact, the Asia-Pacific states are at different stages of economic development and 
have different sociopolitical structures. Japan, the indisputable leader despite its 
cautiousness, has already become the major supplier of capital and advanced 
technology in the region through direct foreign investment in Northeast and Southeast 
Asia. Its presence is enormous and influential, and its economic impact on regional 
states is either already or potentially unparalleled in scope and intensity. Nonetheless, 
a number of Japanese commentators have argued that Japan has neither the strength 
nor the wish to become the dominant power, because the US-Japan economic 
relationship is important not only for bilateral relations but also for growth and 
economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. In order not to precipitate 
itself into trade confrontation with the US, Japan’s leadership seems technical and 
sector-specific rather than broadly political, and it is mainly a leadership from 
behind.32
30 Iyanatul Islam and Anis Chowdhury, Asia-Pacific Economies: A Survey (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 11.
31 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 1-8.
32 Alan Rix, “Japan and the Region: Leading from Behind,” Higgott, Leaver, and 
Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? 
pp. 62-82; See also K. E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: 
Explaining the Reactive State.” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 1988), pp. 
517-41.
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The NIEs (Newly Industrial Economies: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Korea) are generally considered to be at the next stage of transformation, which refers 
to the transformation from a labour-intensive economy to one with relatively more 
technology-intensive and intellectual-intensive industries. These countries have 
successfully shifted their status from capital recipients to major foreign investors in 
the region since the mid-1980s. The increases in labour costs in NIEs, as their 
economies moved up the higher technology ladder, have created chances for the less 
developed ASEAN-4 and the PRC to follow. For NIEs, the ASEAN-4 and the PRC 
are relatively abundant in natural resources and low-cost labour supply, and have thus 
become their first choice for the relocation of production. As a result of their 
economic achievements, NIEs has been dubbed the “East Asian Miracle” economies. 
Meanwhile, the ASEAN-4 and the PRC are also at a stage of transformation. They 
are joining the trend toward market-guided and export-oriented economic 
development with their traditional labour-intensive products, and are achieving 
impressive results. The growth rates of most economies remain high. Commercial 
relations within the region are increasingly rapidly.
The phenomenal growth in intraregional trade and investment flows reflects a 
vertical division of labour in the region. These developments have both facilitated 
structural transformation and further enhanced economic integration within the Asia- 
Pacific region. Some observers, therefore, consider this impressive performance as 
proof of the advantage of “Flying-Geese Formation,” which indicates a spreading “V” 
shape of economic development. Japan, obviously, plays the leading position, then 
the NIEs, and then the Southeast Asia and the PRC. It is argued that the “geese” 
behind Japan will leam from the progress of those up ahead, move into positions, and 
eventually close the technological gap. If development is to continue, every player
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can supposedly improve its position in following the Japanese pattern.51 As a result, 
interdependence based on investment and reciprocity will precipitate the path of 
regional integration. But there are doubts about this scenario.
In contrast to such a simple interpretation of the economic model of the Asia- 
Pacific region, some analysts, Pekka Korhonen and Mitchell Bernard for instances, 
argue against the model of “flying Geese Formation” as analogous to the regional 
economy. Many emphasise that the pattern is nothing but a temporary phenomenon 
or a frame of reference, for these “geese” are not of the same size or breed, nor are 
they flying at the same speed.53 4 A broader concern with anticipating hostilities about 
international economic relations involves a re-evaluation of what may constitute a 
regional bulwark. As the global-oriented and market-guided economies, these 
“geese” would not accept the short-term and limited intraregional trade benefit at the 
price of long-term economic development. After all, the Asia-Pacific economies, 
perhaps more than those in other regions, have based their rapid growth on their 
global marketing approach. Moreover, the United States, as the largest market for 
regional products, tends to perceive such an economic pattern more as a threat than as 
an opportunity or as an engine for American economic prosperity, which has been 
viewed as the first priority in the post-Cold War period.55 All these factors have
53 For a more detailed discussion of the “Flying Geese Model,” see Pekka Korhonen, 
“The Theory of the Flying Geese Pattern of Development and its Interpretation,” 
Journal o f Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1994, pp. 93-108; Mitchell Bernard and 
John Ravenhill, “Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalism, Hierarchy 
and the Industrialisation of East Asia,” World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995), 
pp. 179-209; Alvin Y. So and Stephen W. K. Chiu, East Asia: And the World 
Economy (London: SAGA Publication, 1995), pp. 267-272; Duk-Choong Kim, “Open 
Regionalism in the Pacific : A World of Trading Blocs,” United States Economic 
Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, 1992, pp. 79-83;
54 Glenn Hook, “Japan and the Construction of Asia-Pacific,” Gamble and Payne, 
eds.. Regionalism & World Order, pp. 182-3 and 225-31.
35 “Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community,” US Department o f State 
Dispatch: Asia and the Pacific, Vol. 4, No. 29, July 1993, pp. 509-12.
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shown that any strategy for building up regional economic barriers might sometimes 
do more harm than good to regional economies.
In this regard, the mutual interdependence that comes from the increasing 
internationalisation of the global and regional economies may be seen as a means by 
which security can be enhanced. For the Asia-Pacific region, the rapid economic 
growth based on international markets is also seen as increasing strategic dependence. 
However, the growing interdependence in the region could present a double-edged 
sword in the sense that gains could be either reinforced by closer economic co­
operation or reduced by increasing the vulnerability of the trading state to pressures 
from other states in economic terms.36 Insecurity due to such vulnerability may not 
easily be resolved. For example, bilateral trade friction has become a constant feature 
between the US-Japan economic relations. To some extent this is both natural and 
unavoidable, given the interdependence of the two economies, and there seems no 
single formula for success in trade negotiations between them.
Another example is the PRC. The West, the US in particular, has from time to time 
considered economic sanctions against PRC’s infringement of human rights, but this 
has proved to have no effect because the PRC has not yet completely given up its self- 
sufficiency policy, which it developed to avoid being vulnerable to just such outside 
pressure on the one hand. At the same time, active efforts to keep the PRC poor 
would be counter-productive by exacerbating antagonism. Furthermore, using 
economic weapons against another state, whether by imposing embargoes or targeting 
particular industries could also incur dangers to oneself. In such circumstances, no
36 Vulnerability, according to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “can be defined 
as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies 
have been altered...  Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness 
of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time. ”
63
Western country would want to be supportive of America in any economic conflict 
with the PRC which it considered to be the result of misguided United States policy. 
Therefore, the peaceful evolution associated with economic development and 
increasing interdependence is regarded as the most favourable option toward the PRC 
by both the Asia-Pacific states and the West.
It seems that there is always going to be a problem of the distribution of power in 
the international system. But interdependence may have a mitigating effect on the 
abuse of power by major actors, because unilateral policies in the contemporary 
world, even for powerful states, are no longer as useful as they might have been. In 
theory, economic interdependence can foster interests in co-operation and provide 
particularly useful ways to promote common welfare as well as reduce the chance of 
conflict escalation.37 In practice, high economic growth and the great increase in 
mutual interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region, as Stuart Harris observes, has 
indeed changed the basic structure of the security system and reduced potential 
conflict in the region, although the full implications have yet to unfold. But Harris 
maintains that all these facts suggest qualified optimism.38 In the long run, as long as 
economic co-operation within the region still advances, a sense of community or 
positive feeling shall develop among people of the different states.
2. 2. 2 INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THE REGION
See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, p.
13.
37 Louis Kriesberg, “Regional Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era: Causes, Dynamics, 
and Modes of Resolution,” Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., World 
Security: Challenges for a New Century (New York: ST. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 
155-173.
38 Stuart Harris, “The Economic Aspects of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region,” 
Desmond Ball, ed., The Transformation o f Security in the Asia/Pacific Region 
(London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 47-48.
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To some analysts, institution-building is a prerequisite for international co-operation, 
which provides an important mechanism for reducing uncertainty and fears of perfidy, 
and one by which states may jointly gain and thus mitigate, if not eliminate, the 
harshest features of international relations emphasised by some pessimists. The 
cumulative effects of states actions can have profound consequences for the 
international system. Thus, although states continue to be important international 
actors, they possess a declining ability to control their own destinies. More 
importantly, “institutions”, in Robert W. Cox’s view, “provide ways of dealing with 
conflicts so as to minimise the use of force.”’9 Hence, he stresses that institutions are 
designed to deter any hegemonic strategy so that the diverse interests of the weak may 
not be neglected. Keohane regards institutions-building as a project worth preserving 
for world politics, despite the fact that it is always a frustrating and difficult business, 
for the existence of institutions may provide governments with a better impetus to 
achieve common ends. But, at the same time, he warns that “institution-building may 
be more difficult where security issues are concerned, but is equally essential if co­
operation is to be achieved.”39 40
If, as some suspect, the transformation of world politics will be primarily concerned 
with issues of economic opportunity and security, institutions that focus on 
international co-operation will also rise in salience. Undoubtedly interest in 
institution-building in the Asia-Pacific region has surged since the end of the Cold 
War. But the pressure for enhancing regional co-operation has its own logic. Its 
central feature is the general pervasiveness of uncertainty, which is endemic to the
39 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory," Kcchane, cd., Neorcalism and it* Critics, p. 219.
40 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 243-47.
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international system and an inevitable product of sovereignty as the defining 
characteristic of nation states. This uncertainty is greatly exacerbated in this region, 
not just because of the collapse of bipolarity and its consequences but also because of 
the rapidity of change and increasing complexity of security matters. There is no 
doubt that a widespread apprehension throughout the region has arisen from the 
growing concerns about seemingly formation of regional economic “fortresses” in 
Europe and North America. At the same time, the increasing capabilities of some 
major regional powers (Japan and the PRC) may become another source of instability 
in the region. All these are important motivations to many involved in the co­
operation processes. In other words, economic and political factors are undoubtedly 
playing larger roles in both shaping the structure of the emerging economic and 
security frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region and determing important aspects of 
regional co-operative efforts with regard to security matters.
Unlike the situation in Europe, there are no effective institutional arrangements that 
could facilitate collective consideration by the states of the Asia-Pacific of security 
problems, such as the territorial disputes between Japan and Russia and conflict 
between Asian States and the PRC. APEC and ARF, therefore, have been regarded 
by many as initial steps for promoting further co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region 
and have become venues for discussing major regional issues. Although these 
regional institutions are essentially consultative, they have brought regional states into 
more regular contact at multilateral gatherings in which a wide range of economic and 
security matters are dealt with in such a manner as to familiarise different 
bureaucracies with the concerns of the region as a whole. In this sense, they are seen
66
by many as useful mechanisms for regional stability and conflict avoidance and 
management.41
In fact, on the economic front, networks of academic economists and policy 
advisers have been important in the regular Pacific Trade and Development 
(PAFTAD) meetings since 1960s. Business co-operation groups at the regional level, 
such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the Pacific Economic Co­
operation Council (PECC), an informal group consisting of representatives of 
government, business and academia from fourteen Asia-Pacific states, have 
contributed to greater understanding among regional states and helped to expand 
information flows, thus providing a way for regional governments to be involved 
indirectly while avoiding a formal commitment to an economic co-operation process. 
As Stuart Harris observes:
Continued development of co-operation at the broad regional level will 
involve coalition-building, either to defend the region interests, including 
its interest in maintaining the multilateral trading system, and reducing the 
discriminatory targeting of the region by the United States and EC, or to 
press a regional view and increase the region’s influence in multilateral 
forums. It will involve in due course growing policy co-operation and 
implicit, if not explicit, forms of microeconomic policy co-ordination.42
The Asia-Pacific Economic co-operation forum (APEC), established in 1989 
primarily as the result of an Australian initiative, has been seen as a direct 
governmental region-wide links. It was initially a meeting at ministerial level
41 Paul M. Evans, “The Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation in the 
Asia/Pacific Region,” Desmond Ball, ed„ The Transformation o f Security in the 
Asia/Pacific Region, pp. 201-216. See also Desmond Ball, “A New Era in 
Confidence Building: The Second-Track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region,” Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 25, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 157-76.
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intended to deal with economic issues. As its significance grew, it was quickly 
upgraded to an unofficial summit in 1993. Surprisingly, the first official summit, 
hosted by Indonesia in November 1994, gathered to discuss not only economic but 
also political and security issues. During the meeting, it was agreed that industrialised 
economies would achieve the goal of free and open trade and investment no later than 
2010 and developing economies no later than 2020. APEC, has thus not only served 
as an economic organisation for regional states but has also become the primary 
intergovernmental institution in the region. Indeed, acceptance of such direct 
governmental links arose from an enhanced appreciation of the needs and potential 
gains from co-operation. Further, APEC also provides opportunities for developing 
better personal relations between leaders, which in the Asian context is a necessary 
basis, although it is still not sufficient, for developing a sense of community.
As APEC has been upgraded to its current status, setting up a permanent secretariat 
office in Singapore to operate the routine functions of co-ordinating economic and 
commercial policies among member states, it has become the legitimate institutional 
framework in the region, on which more effective in the promotion of regional co­
operation will be carried out. At the same time, APEC has promoted a wide range of 
positive developments such as free trade, investment, competition policies, education, 
transportation, communications, and disaster aid management. Attempts by APEC to 
engage in constructive confidence-building is an important exercise in learning and 
support for the institutionalisation of co-operation. It is in this regard that APEC can 
be termed an “epistemic-like community.”41 42
42 Stuart Harris, “Economic Co-operation and Institution Building in the Asia-Pacific 
Region,” in Higgott, Leaver, and Ravenhill, eds.. Pacific Economic Relations in the 
1990s: Co-operation or Conflict?, p. 287.
” The term “episleinic communities”, according to Peter M. Haa', refers to “a 
network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular
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In the security realm, as indicated earlier, the end of the Cold War and the collapse 
of bipolarity has changed the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific in a way that it is 
marked by uncertainty and complexity. During the Cold War period, no multilateral 
security institutions were established for the Asia-Pacific that were comparable to 
such organisations as the CSCE (Conference on Secuiity and Co-operation in Europe) 
or collective defence arrangements like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). 
Nevertheless, there did exist certain forms of security co-operation within the region, 
although they were primarily inspired by external powers. For example, SEATO (the 
South-East Asia Treaty Organisation), established in 1955, was the institutional 
expression of collective defence, but it never fulfilled its military role, even during the 
Vietnam War. ASPAC (the Asia Pacific Council), established in 1966, was an 
attempt to develop a grouping of anti-communist states in the region, but it too failed 
to develop widespread support. Another notable example was ASA (the Association 
of Southeast Asia). Unlike SEATO and ASPAC, ASA was purely regional, but it had 
little success because of its political similarity to SEATO. These developments 
highlighted the difficulties of congruence between ideological and strategic affinities. 
Interestingly, the bilateral alliances manipulated by the United States survived. 
Perhaps the major achievement of this type of security co-operation to American 
partners (Korea, Taiwan and ASEAN) in the region was their remarkable economic 
growth.44 Not surprisingly, this bilateral framework on security co-operation is still 
seen by many as a major stabiliser in the region nowadays. Hence, the basic structure
domain or issue-area.” See Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities 
and International Policy Co-ordination,” Inlernalional Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 1 
(Winter 1992), pp. 1-35; and Richard Higgott, “Competing Theoretical Approaches to 
International Co-operation: Implications for the Asia-Pacific,” Higgott, Leaver, and 
Ravenhill, eds.. Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Co-operation or Conflict? 
pp. 290-311.
44 Yahuda, The International Politics o f  the Asia-Pacific 1945-1995, pp. 10-13.
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of regional security, as well as providing domestic market for its partners, was 
designed by the United States through the exercise of hegemonic power, and the 
bilateral alliances were merely a reflection of American strategy that was driven by 
the global struggle with the Soviet Union in the Cold War era.
From the historical perspective of international politics, security co-operation in the 
Asia-Pacific is apparently harder to achieve than economic co-operation. There were 
no regionwide political institutions that linked together the various parts of the region, 
for they might directly impinge on the key issue of sovereignty. It is surprised, as 
some analysts have argued, that the Asia-Pacific region is virtually no effective 
multilateralism to conduct regional relations, and “the leap from economic 
multilateralism to multilateral security planning is not yet in sight.”45 Nevertheless, 
there can be no doubt that the Asia-Pacific region has been moving toward security 
multilateralism since the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1993, 
despite the fact that most of its members have accepted that it is an embryonic, rather 
than a fully-fledged, security organisation, and there is little likelihood at this stage 
that ARF has sufficient institutional strength to mitigate any substantial tensions 
between regional states. In this respect, the ARF is considered to represent a crucial 
step in setting up the first multilateral meeting to discuss security issues in the Asia- 
Pacific region.
Another major thrust for regional security co-operation was the creation of CSCAP 
(Council for Security Co-operation in Asia Pacific) in June 1993.46 Basically, this 
represents a non-governmental effort to promote multilateral security co-operation,
45 Quoted in Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the 
United States after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 
1993/94), p. 72; Buzan and Segal, “Rethinking East Asia Security,” pp. 15-18.
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and its initiative is commonly described as “second track diplomacy”, complementing 
the official ARF process.46 7 Moreover, its purpose in creating a more structural 
regional process that is open to all states and territories in the region has been 
regarded as an important element for confidence and security building measures 
(CSBMs) and might be seen to have a useful role in promoting regional transparency.
In sum, if recent trends of institution-building in the Asia-Pacific region suggest 
that the future development and habits of co-operation can be learned from the past, 
then the maxim that "-the lessons of history are seldom clear and often deceptive”48 
may not be true. This is not to overstate the speed or breadth of this process, but to 
point to its significance over time. Institution-building certainly requires a heightened 
learning function in international relations if the pursuit of national interests is not to 
mitigate co-operative behaviour. Evidences cited above show that there has been 
positive progresses in international co-operation within the region. More importantly, 
the habits of co-operation are now beginning to be clearly perceived in the region. 
Any such organisation, as Miles Kahler observes, “is an insurance: its initial 
premiums should be kept low because the risks and the eventual pay-off are highly 
uncertain. The task at hand is to sell the insurance to governments that remain 
sceptical.”49 Obviously, all such processes will ultimately need the decision-making
46 Its current members include: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United 
States.
47 Paul M. Evans, “Building Security: The Council for Security Co-operation in Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP)”, Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1994, pp. 125-40. See also in Ball’s 
“A New Era in Confidence Building: The Second-Track Process in the Asia/Pacific 
Region,” pp. 157-76.
48 Buzan and Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” p. 4.
49 Miles Kahler, “Institution-building in the Pacific,” Andrew Mack and John 
Ravenhill, eds„ Pacific Co-operation: Building Economic end Security Regimes in 
the Asia-Pacific Region (Sydney: Allen & Unwin), pp. 38-39.
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abilities of political elites, and any problem-solving approaches proposed by either 
academics or politicians need to be carefully scrutinised.
2. 3 MAJOR CONSTRAINTS ON REGIONAL CO-OPERATION
2.3.1 COMPETING LEADERSHIP
Viewed from the perspective of the traditional balance o f power, the situation in the 
Asia-Pacific has now ended with increasing multipolarity, which indicates that the 
states in the region now have a broader range of potential alliance options. Viewed 
from the perspective of political economy, the era of American hegemony is also past 
since the cost that the US bore during the Cold War for ideological and foreign policy 
reasons now seems unbearable to most Americans. This signals that the US might 
change its behaviour and recalculate its long-term interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The formation of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), an 
emergence of a new subregion in the Americas after June 1990, could be viewed as a 
clear reflection of the transformation of American strategy in the post Cold War era.
Logically, as the only and by far most powerful member of the international 
community, the United States has the least to lose from a defection away from 
multilateralism, while the weakest states have the most to lose. Flowever, as argued by 
Richard Higgott, “uncertainty about the behaviour of major actors is more damaging 
to the confidence and strength of a regime than recidivist behaviour by smaller 
players.”50 The United States has a consistent trade deficit with most states in the
50 Richard Higgott, “APEC—A Sceptical View,” Mack and Ravenhill, eds.. Pacific 
Co-operation. Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, p 
80.
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region. If the US were to turn in a more protectionist direction, then the regional 
states might form their own protective cordon, for the relations among regional states 
more closely resemble a situation of complex interdependence. Under such 
circumstances, the cost for all would be high. Hence, it appears that a joint gain could 
be achieved for the US and its Asian trading partners through multilateral institutions. 
It is, furthermore, generally accepted that multilateral arrangements more often than 
not are underpinned by the understandings of Great powers.
Paradoxically, the preference for bilateral ties, and a state-centred power-based 
approach rather than a rules-based system for both political and economic issues, as 
well as an overemphasis Western values and culture for the United States in the Asia- 
Pacific region has the potential for creating frictions with regional states. The key 
bilateral relationships, involving the US, Japan and the PRC, are all complex 
arrangements of competition and co-operation. One of the most notable rifts between 
the US and regional states is centred on the definition of the region. “Asia-Pacific” 
and “East Asia” are the cores around which attempts are now being made by regional 
states to reconstruct regional identities.
APEC, expressive of market-led understanding of the identity of the region, is seen 
as a political goal to include a broadly defined Asia-Pacific region. The initial 
American response to APEC, as indicated in the previous section, was “wait and see.” 
For Americans, this new institution in the Asia-Pacific region was regarded as 
uncertain and suspect, and no visible interests immediately served the objective of 
upholding stability. Indeed, much of the motivation for APEC arose because it was 
seen as, on the one hand alternative to a dominant American leadership role and, on 
the other hand a forum to reduce US-Japan trade conflict. To a certain degree, the US 
role seamed to promote APEC as an arena for trade liberalisation and open
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regionalism rather than a vehicle for multilateral consultations. In addition, an open 
APEC would reduce the risk of NAFTA exclusivism.51
It was not until 1993 that the US showed real interest in the APEC forum, although 
the announced priority of the Clinton administration still focused on bilateral issues 
and regional concerns in the Americas. The character of APEC changed as a result of 
an initiative by the US government at the Seattle summit in 1993 to hold a meeting of 
APEC’s political leaders for creating a so-called “New Pacific Community.”52 
Getting involved with APEC, in a sense, represents a new US strategy for projecting 
itself into the “Asia-Pacific.” To some extent, it serves primarily as a tool for prising 
open fast-growing Asian markets and for pressing Europe into further trade 
concessions. In this respect, an APEC-based free and open trade project that the 
Clinton administration officially endorses and actively defines as an opportunity for 
trade liberalisation is conceptualised by some analysts as “open regionalism.”53
In response to the formation of APEC, the establishment of an EAEG (East Asian 
Economic Group, later caucus in place of group, EAEC), which grouped together 
ASEAN and Northeast Asian states, including Japan and the PRC, but excluded the 
US and other western states, was publicly proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mahathir in 1990 in the name of “look East.” While the declared aim is 
to promote economic co-operation and the liberalisation of trade in East Asia, the real 
intention seems to be independence within the APEC framework. The proposal 
maintains that EAEC is not a “subordinate organisation of APEC, and has no
51 Robert A. Scalapino, “The US Commitment to Asia,” Desmond Ball, ed„ The 
Transformation o f Security in the Asia/Paciftc Region, p. 74.
52 Washington Post, July 8, 1993.
53 P. Drysdale and R. Gamau, “The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of 
Economic Integration”, C. F. Bergsten and M. Noland, eds.. Pacific Dynamism and 
the International Economic System (Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1993), pp. 183-224.
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obligation to report on agenda items.”54 Clearly, attempts by Mahathir not to have the 
US dominate economic policy in the region and to engage in confrontation with 
APEC have great potential to be divisive in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the fact 
that the concept of such a grouping has received a lukewarm response from regional 
states due to America’s strong objection, this proposal has some attractions for a 
number of regional governments, especially for ASEAN states.
Basically, the EAEC proposal was in many ways a logical response to events. 
First, it was a response to challenges coming from the trend of global regionalism. 
Since the major interest of the US is in developing the NAFTA trade bloc, Mahathir 
has justified his proposal in terms of East Asia establishing its own bloc without the 
US and Western states. As Malaysia Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, put it, “the 
East Asian Group should be able to sit with North America or Europe on an equal 
footing. This would not be possible if we relied on APEC because the US and 
Canada also belong to the North America free trade area.”55 Moreover, a suspicion 
that APEC may become a vehicle for advancing American trade policy also deters 
regional states from further co-operation.
Second, from the perspective of economic structure, the EAEC members share a 
common network-based type of economy. This type of economic structure differs 
from Western firm based economy. According to Linda Low’s analysis, the network- 
based economy operates essentially through “market forces” on the basis of a 
relocation of production networks which forms a web of production, sourcing and
54 Asahi Shimhun, 30 August 1994.
55 Quoted in David Camroux, Looking East and Defining Inwards: Malaysia as a Self 
Conscious Middle Power During the Mahathir Era, 1981-93 (Brisbane: Griffith 
University, Centre for the Study of Australian Asian Relations, 1993), pp. 33-4. See 
also Bernard K.. Gordon, "Southeast Asia After the Cold War,” Ilsiung, ed., Asia 
Pacific in the New World Politics, pp. 149-52.
75
distribution. Members of this network become closely integrated with each other. In 
Low’s view, the trend is likely to accelerate.56
Third, the suspicions which many regional states, especially the ASEAN states, 
inherited from the colonial period and the Cold War legacy have left them with highly 
sensitive attitude to their sovereignty. This common political perception and shared 
value might be diluted by the growing legitimacy of APEC. Hence, most ASEAN 
states disagree with any possibility of APEC impinging on their sovereignty, just as 
EU in relation to its member states.57 More importantly, the threat of APEC 
augmentation could be a replication of power politics that reduces the importance of 
the smaller members, which means that preserving a distinct voice is difficult, and 
less powerful ASEAN states may be ruled out from any core circle. Under these 
circumstances, their interests would be better served if Japan and the US 
counterbalance each other, and the EAEC makes much more sense than does a wider 
APEC. As Mahathir has noted, his group of countries seems to have something in 
common both with regard to attitudes towards economic development and also 
culturally.”58
Fourth, Japan, as the only industrially developed state in the proposal, is at the core 
of competitive projects to reshape relations around the regional identities of “East 
Asia” and “Asia-Pacific.” In Mahathir’s view, Japan has a definite role to act as the 
“voice of Asia” both in an economic and a political sense. This “voice of Asia” 
would obviously be a different voice to APEC. Indeed, Japan has been at pains to 
form an Asian order that accepts it as a power without military force. For example,
56 Linda Low, “The East Asian Economic Grouping”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 
4, 1991, pp. 375-82.
57 Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 December, 1993, p. 12.
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Japan has replaced the US as a principal market for Asian manufacturing products and 
has become by far the largest investor in its East Asian neighbours. Without doubt, 
Japan has become a key economy in both Southeast and in East Asia. Its political- 
security role is also growing.59 Mahathir’s proposal, therefore, is echoed by those in 
Japan who call for a “return to Asia.” There are even reports that the EAEG idea did 
not originally come from the Malaysian Prime Minister but was initially from Japan, 
probably a response to the US NAFTA initiative.60 From the start the Japanese 
government has been two-faced on the matter, neither expressing support for 
Mahathir’s proposal nor open opposition. The policies of trying to placate Asians and 
at the same time please the US has put the Japanese government in a quandary. 
Perhaps, Japan needs to remain ambivalent about EAEC because of its sensitivity to 
an East Asian regional identity.
However, the implications of the initial Japanese response to the EAEC proposal, to 
many Americans, could be tantamount to a new Japanese domination in Asia. In 
other words, this situation presented a serious challenge to US interests in the region. 
Concealed underneath the more melodramatic trade friction across the Pacific was the 
genuine concern in the nation that Japan was fast turning Asia into a collective 
economic superpower, somewhat like the abortive Great East Asian Co-prosperity 
Sphere, from which American and other Western states would be shut out. In order to 
press the Japanese government to identify with Asia-Pacific rather than East Asia, the
51 Quoted in Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs, “Competing Conceptions of 
Economic Regionalism: APEC Versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific”, Review o f 
International Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer 1995), p. 525.
59 Ibid., pp. 527-528.
60 Bernard K. Gordon, “Japan: Searching Once Again,” Hsiung, ed., Asia Pacific in 
the New World Politics, pp. 65-68. See also Chalmers Johnson, “History Restarted: 
Japanese-American Relations at the End of the Century,” in Higgott, Leaver, and 
Kavenhill, eds.. Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Co-operation or Conflict? 
pp. 54-56.
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Clinton government has been acting to prevent the creation of a common East Asian 
identity incompatible with US interests. Certainly, the American opposition was 
crucial in shaping Japanese attitudes, despite significant unofficial Japanese sympathy 
and support for the idea, and thereafter the Japanese government grew more negative, 
refusing even to discuss the topic when Mahathir visited Tokyo in December 1991. 
Other members of EAEC, which are primarily export-oriented economies and heavily 
dependent on the large American markets, are clearly vulnerable to US pressure. 
Thus, they have been wary of the EAEC and would rather have Japan as a link to the 
US than as a champion of Asian interests in competition with the US.
To be explicit on the competition between these two organisations, it is clear that 
APEC has succeeded and EAEC has become a subgroup within APEC. But it is not 
simply a contest to see which of two competing economic organisations is the winner. 
It is important to note that economic co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region needs to 
take the political, historical and cultural dimensions of economic organisation into 
consideration.61 In some respects, the emergence of EAEC may embody a response to 
a perception of undue Western pressure and perhaps a reassertion of Asian values. 
More precisely, the fact that Mahathir expressed such concerns in public revealed the 
degree to which the cohesive bonds of the Cold War coalition had weakened, 
lowering the costs of squabbling for small states.
Obviously, there is no quantitative methodology that can predict precisely what 
long-term future economic co-operation will be for a region as complex as the Asia- 
Pacific. It would also be misleading to try to make a single forecast. However, it is 
useful to try to identify what clusters of issues are likely to develop and how the
61 lliggott and Stubbs, •‘Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC 
Versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific”, p. 531.
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present choice for the Asia-Pacific states, including East Asian states and North 
America, may affect future alternatives, although the potential for a split still exists.
2. 3. 2 UNCERTAIN TRANSFORMATION
A consequence of the end of the Cold War, as indicated earlier, is the decline of 
states’ concerns for military security in favour of economic security. This is not to 
suggest that military security can be totally replaced by economic security. In fact, as 
Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal argue, economic interdependence in itself is 
insufficient to eliminate the chance of military conflict. Without a regular basis to 
enable states to communicate, the Asia-Pacific region faces a perilous and uncertain 
future.62 In this sense, it is true that during a period of transition, when former allies 
may turn out to be potential adversaries as, for example (in trade matters), and former 
neutrals may turn out to be real or potential allies, states have to rely on their own 
means to protect their interests in the face of uncertainty. According to the realist 
assumption, when the pace of global and regional change is somewhat bewildering 
and the lines between allies and adversaries are blurring, the military security of a 
state always becomes the first priority. The end of the Cold War may have removed 
the threat of a large-scale global conflict, but the possibilities of small-scale regional 
conflicts still abound in the region. Conflicts that are most difficult to resolve, as one 
scholar observes, involve “long-held suspicions with their historic roots, as well as 
religious and ethnic differences.”61
62 Buzan and Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” pp. 3-7.
61 Bernard K. Gordon, “The Asian-Pacific Kim”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Fall 
1991), p. 154.
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In the Asia-Pacific region, a conviction that economic growth, development, 
internal unity and regional stability are inextricably linked has led in their case to the 
articulation of a variety of multidimensional security policies which include, but do 
not privilege, national defence. The possible presumption that economic development 
is as important to the survival of a state as national security means that the level of 
military spending is heavily dependent on the state of government finances. 
Uncertainty about the implications of the end of the Cold War for regional security is 
one of the major factors contributing to that perception. Moreover, the threat of an 
increase in Japanese and PRC influences in the region, meaning a relative decline in 
US influence, will be even more acute. Taken together, these factors suggest a 
remarkable degree of political fragmentation and hostility as the defining feature of 
the region’s international relations. And those who used to look to the US to hold a 
stable balance of power in the region have to worry about its effectiveness when faced 
with a relative decline of American power and a fast changing security outlook for the 
region. Under these circumstances, the prospects for international co-operation in the 
region seem rather pessimistic.
In the past two decades, Asian stability, according to Donald S. Zagoria, has been 
based on five pillars: a network of bilateral security co-operation between the US and 
its allies, the US-Japan alliance, the increasing trend of regional integration, 
increasing modernisation and reform within Asian communist states, and the 
impressive economic performance of the region. Furthermore, Zagoria has 
categorised five potential threats to regional stability in the future. They are: 
unpredictable North Korea, unresolved territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands, 
domestic instability in the PRC and Vietnam, the gradual erosion of US-Japan
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relations, and the increasing withdrawal of American forces.64 Zagoria concludes that 
the US will be concerned less with the old task of containing the former Soviet Union 
and more with bargaining the relations among a number of possible regional powers. 
This is akin to Great Britain’s role in nineteenth century Europe. Muthiah Alagappa 
makes a parallel statement in reviewing the new strategic environment in the Asia- 
Pacific region. Emphasising the benefits of maintaining regional stability by 
introducing external powers such as the US, he then terms this a “balance of 
presence.”65
The basic premise of the balance of power, as noted in chapter one, is the concept 
that peace will result when power is distributed so that no one state has sufficient 
power to overwhelm the others. According to this theory, war is prevented when 
there exists rough parity in the capabilities of the major states. Conversely, war tends 
to break out when a state has a substantial capability edge over its adversaries. 
Hegemonic stability, therefore, is said to be able to provide public good, especially for 
small states. However, this theory’s expectations were not fully supported by 
empirical evidence during the Cold War era, when such hegemony actually led to 
more, not less, armed conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.
Since the end of the Cold War there has been much talk about the need to maintain 
a balance of power in the region, but rhetoric obscures an interpretation of the concept 
that is quite different to that understood in the old multipolar Europe. The end of 
bipolarity actually provides a broad option for regional states to feel free to align 
themselves with any regional powers, even with external powers. Ironically, most of
64 Donald S. Zagoria, “The Changing US Role in Asian Security in the 1990s,”
Sheldon W. Simon, ed.. East Asia Security in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: M.
E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 45-58.
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the regional states, ASEAN states in particular, are strongly opposed to balancing 
themselves against the larger regional powers, considering this to be antagonistic and 
counter-productive, and preferring external powers to maintain the balance of power 
while themselves pursuing a policy of dialogue and engagement.65 6 For example, in 
1996 ASEAN brought India into the regional framework to counterbalance the PRC.
Indeed, most regional elites currently have an interest in pursuing a long peace for 
the region, but they prefer an approach to dispute settlement that contrasts markedly 
with the legal agreements, formality, and public disputation that have come to 
characterise international relations in Western states. It is possible that such a 
preference may have implications for the development of regional security regimes, 
offering the example of a less structured approach to multilateral security. This may 
also imply the institutionalisation of co-operative activity in the Asia-Pacific region in 
a distinctly Asian way. In other words, a general sense of co-operation in the Western 
world may have a different interpretation in the Asia-Pacific states. In K. J. Holsti’s 
view, “Western predilections for creating organisations and formal structures, 
deciding modalities and delineating responsibilities are disdained. The Asian way 
stresses patience, informality, consensus and evolution.”67 In this respect, it implies 
that maintaining regional stability may not be achieved in the form of a legal decision. 
Negotiation and compromise are more likely than binding formal agreements to yield 
an outcome acceptable to both parties.
65 Muthiah Alagappa, “Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast 
Asia: Going Beyond Zopfan,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12, No. 4 (March 
1991), p. 280.
66 Ibid. See also Paul Dibb, Towards A New Balance o f Power in Asia (London: IISS, 
Adelphi Paper 295, 1995), pp. 39-43; Desmond Ball, “Strategic Culture in the Asia- 
Pacific Region,” Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 44-74.
67 K. J Holsti, “International Theory and War in Third World,” Brian L. Job, ed., The 
Insecurity Dilemma: National Security o f Third World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1992), p. 18.
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Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has found that the Asia-Pacific region is in a state of flux, or 
perhaps it is better to describe it as being in a process o f transition from the bipolar 
era to a future that has yet to take shape. In a sense, realists may be correct because 
there is plenty of evidence available to point to the enduring presence of insecurity in 
the Asia-Pacific international system, ranging from the threat of political instability, 
and territorial disputes to the existence of local wars. States, therefore, in an 
unorganised realm have to put themselves in a position to be able to take care of 
themselves since no one else can be counted on to do so. However, in relative terms, 
realists may lack precision because there are grounds for optimism that some 
improvements will carry positive effects, such as economic integration, institution­
building, and benign international environments. The ASEAN states, without doubt, 
are at the forefront of such activity and play a very important role in maintaining 
regional stability. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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Table 1.1 Share of Asia-Pacific economies in world trade, 1980-1992 
(Exports % o f world share)
Region 1980 1985 1989 1992
Asian NIEs 4.0 6.3 8. 5 9.4
ASEAN-4 2.5 2. 5 2. 6 3. 1
China (PRC) 1.0 1. 5 1. 8 2.2
Japan 6.9 9. 8 9. 4 9.3
(USA) (11.6) (11.8) (12. 5) (12. 3)
Total 14.4 20. 1 22. 3 24
(Total) (26) (31.9) (34. 8) (36. 3)
Table 1. 2 Share of Asia-Pacific economies in world trade, 1989-1992 
(Imports % of world share)
Region 1980 1985 1989 1992
Asian NIEs 4. 5 5.7 7. 9 9. 3
ASEAN-4 2.0 2.0 2. 5 3.3
China (PRC) 1.0 2. 2 1.9 2.0
Japan 7.3 6.9 6. 9 6.2
(USA) (13.2) (19. 1) (15. 1) (14. 7)
Total 14. 8 16. 8 19.2 20. 8
(Total) (28) (35. 9) (34. 3) (35. 5)
Sources: Islam and Chowdhury, Asia-Pacific Economies: A Survey, p. 11; The 
World Development Report 1991.
84
CHAPTER 3
ASEAN: A UNIQUE MODE OF CO-OPERATION?
Following the argument highlighted in the previous chapter, this chapter continues the 
historical account by describing the mode of co-operation that has evolved in the 
Southeast Asian region from the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. The purpose is to 
provide a historical analysis by identifying the most important causes for the co­
operation among ASEAN members. More importantly, my analysis also supports the 
argument that a non-Westem style co-operative institution can operate effectively in 
international co-operation, albeit in its own unique way.
The first section of this chapter begins with a brief discussion of ASEAN evolution 
and its key characteristics and also argue that the uncertainties of the strategic 
environment of the Cold War era have not led to a situation of falling dominoes in 
Southeast Asian states, as had been feared. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, 
instead of degenerating into economic and political chaos, instability and obscurity, 
the regional states have entered into a period of transformation and relative peace and 
stability, despite all of the limitations and constraints mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Rather, as some believe, we may point to at least five positive developments 
in the first part of 1990s: such as the termination of the danger of global conventional 
or nuclear war involving the superpowers, high-speed economic growth, the peaceful 
settlement in Cambodia, the integration of Indo-Chinese states into ASEAN, and the 
cessation of communist insurgencies in the region.1 A closer examination of these 1
1 Trevor Findlay, “South-East Asia and the New Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue,” 
SIPRI, Yearbook, 1994, pp. 125-129. See also Zagoria, “The Changing US Role in 
Asian Security in the 1990s,” pp. 45-58.
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developments reveals that the ASEAN organisation has long been playing a crucial 
role in promoting regional stability. As Haas has pointed out “ international relations 
in Asia today, to a large extent, consist of a set of mirrors reflecting the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations . . .  the result is the ‘ASEANization’ of Asian regional co­
operation.”2
It is in this regard that the second section of this chapter presents an analysis of 
ASEAN’s main achievements and contributions to the region. ASEAN has frequently 
been cited as a successful example of Third World co-operation, and there is no reason 
to deny its contribution to regional stability. Its experiences suggest that the 
commitment of the member states has been sustained by the benefits and advantages 
that ASEAN provides beyond the announced objective of economic co-operation.
However, some, Michael Leifer and Paul Dib for example, are more dubious about 
ASEAN’s capability as a guide to the present or the future in the region. Harder test 
may be applied in a rapidly changing regional environments which included the 
evolution of new power structures, a region-wide arms build-up, renewed territorial 
disputes, and a possible defection of some member states. These developments mark 
a period of dramatic and profound change in the context of new security concerns. 
What is less clear is whether these changes can be peacefully and effectively managed 
by ASEAN. Furthermore, in such times, will those beneficial factors still prove 
adequate for the continued relevance and hence, maintenance, of ASEAN? If so, what 
are the implications? Or is there any new pattern applicable to ASEAN? The final 
section of this chapter considers some of the challenges from a theoretical perspective.
3. 1 CHARACTERISTICS
3 Michael Haas, The Asian Way o f Peace: A Story o f Regional Co-operation (New
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3.1.1 ADAPTABILITY
Adaptation, according to Charles E. Ziegler’s definition, means to make a suitable 
change for a purpose or adjust to new conditions within existing structures. It does not 
“challenge the dominant motivating ideology, basic system values, decision-making 
structures, or central goals of an organisation,” and an “adaptive behaviour seeks to 
preserve the existing order.”3 Adaptability, therefore, is said to be capable of 
maintaining the status quo. Logically, the above definition is similar to the core 
assumption of many meanings in balance of power theory, in which there is relatively 
widespread satisfaction with the distribution of power. More precisely, adaptability 
refers to a fluid situation where all essential actors preserve their identity, integrity and 
independence through the balancing process, which is related to the maintenance of 
the system and status quo.
ASEAN came into being in 1967 mainly as a result of the desire of its five original 
members (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines; Brunei 
joined the organisation in 1984) to create a mechanism which could contribute to 
peace and stability in intra-regional relations. The initial purpose, a proposal for 
alleviating the tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia, was not to form a military 
alliance but to act as an instrument for the prevention and resolution of disputes 
among its members. In this respect, ASEAN’s formation seemed certainly 
inapplicable to the balance of power theory, for it did not encourage military 
alignments, nor was it an organisation designed to deter potential aggressors. In fact. *1
York: Praeger. 1989), p. 282.
1 Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and adaptation in the 
Gorbachev Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 12-14.
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there was no common threat perceived by its member states, and its precise interests 
and future role were uncertain. As Rajaratnam, the former Foreign Minister of 
Singapore, recalled, This was “because at that time, we ourselves having launched 
ASEAN, were not quite sure where it was going or whether it was going anywhere at 
all.”4 Nevertheless, in terms of ideals, it was established as an organisation for the 
purpose of terminating confrontation within member states, confining itself to a 
generalised appeal to “good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful co­
operation.”5 More importantly, a consensus made by ASEAN member states from the 
outset emphasised the inviolability of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes.
Interestingly, although ASEAN’s creation was based on the belief that a united 
front against external challenges would strengthen the capability of each state to 
ensure its own integrity, and that foreign bases were temporary expedients, most of 
ASEAN member states, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, accepted 
that reliance upon friendly outside powers for security guarantees was necessary. For 
example, the ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) proposal, initiated by 
the Malaysian government and signed in 1971 by all member states of ASEAN in the 
hope that Southeast Asian states might be freed from all forms of interference by 
external powers, had proved impractical. The major problem in implementation was 
the absence of a consensus, and most of the ASEAN members had serious reservations
4 Quoted in Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN States and the Progress of Regional Co­
operation in Southeast Asia,” in B. Dahm and W. Draguhn, eds.. Politics, Society and 
Economy in the ASEAN States (Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz, 1975), p. 4.
5 Frank Frost, “Introduction: ASEAN since 1967—Origins, Evolution and Recent 
Development,” Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into the 1990s (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1990), pp. 4-5.
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about the proposal.6 Obviously, at the inception of ASEAN, the member states did not 
articulate an operational doctrine of regional security to which they were all 
committed, and the organisation was marked by strong divergences of view and 
interests which highlighted their different security perspectives which reflected on 
their alliance with external powers. In Sheldon W. Simon view, this structural 
incapacity to protect its own member states from the interference of external powers in 
local conflicts, caused most ASEAN states to become entangled in power competition 
with outside powers for years.7
It came as little surprise that during the early years of its formation, ASEAN’s 
progress was limited. This was partly because of the different priorities of the 
member states in nation-building and the problem of reaching consensus, especially 
under the conditions that most member governments had no experience of co­
operating with each others. In fact, none of the member states in the early years of 
ASEAN’s establishment was free from internal turmoils, for example racial, ethnic 
and communist-backed insurgencies. Moreover, the fear of legacy of colonial rule 
that left them highly suspicious about others intentions had never diminished. There 
was, as a result, little scope for the development of co-operation. The situation of 
these states, as one scholar puts it, “encompassed a wider task than the enormous 
problems of seeking to establish good governance.”8 Indeed, for members of ASEAN, 
security could not be acquired through mere diplomatic solidarity provided by the 
organisation in the face of a climate of instability. The major task for these states was 
how to survive. A good example of this view comes from Hans H. Indorf:
‘ Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security ofSouth-East Asia (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 55.
1 Sheldon W. Simon, “ASEAN Security in the 1990s,” Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into 
the 1990s, pp. 113-114.
* Yahuda, The International Politics o f  the Asia-Pacific 1945-1995, p. 38.
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For small states at the circumference of superpower activity, the 
philosophical foundations for security must be viewed in a total context. The 
ultimate criterion for policy is survival, not victory . . .  If the survival of the 
small states is at stake, there is need for considering new approaches to old 
practices.9
Similarly, reviewing ASEAN’s concrete achievements in its early years, as Michael 
Leifer argues, “the association had achieved no more than a modest performance as a 
basis for continued existence” and “ASEAN has a viable, if less than remarkable 
future.”10 “The most noticeable achievement of ASEAN to date is its survival for 
almost nine years,”" stated by Indorf in 1975. For ASEAN itself, the main problem of 
its initial stage lay not in how to operate efficiently but how to survive properly. And 
the habit of co-operation actually took time to cultivate. In this regard, the above 
assessments were no doubt reasonable at the time.
Despite the evident gap between declaratory intent and operational reality as well as 
its limited formal co-operative projects, ASEAN was seen by its member states as an 
important venue for consultation which had enabled a pattern of regular contacts to 
reduce potential conflict and provided a basis for further co-operation. One of the 
most noticeable changes in ASEAN’s attitude came after the end of Vietnam War. In 
response to a sudden change in the regional security environment of ASEAN, the Bali 
summit was held in 1976 and reached two major agreements: the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. 
The following six norms taken from the document at that summit were especially
• Hans H. Indorf, Strategies for Small-State Survival (Singapore: National University 
of Singapore, 1985), pp. 1-2.
10 Quoted in Frost, “Introduction: ASEAN since 1967—Origins, Evolution and Recent 
Development,” Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into the 1990s, p. 7.
" Hans H. Indorf, ASEAN: Problems and Prospects, Occasional Paper No. 38 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ISEAS, 1975), p. 54.
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relevant to the performance of ASEAN adaptability in regional conflict resolution: 1) 
Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of all nations; 2) 
The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion and coercion; 3) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 4) 
Settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means; 5) Renunciation of the 
threat of use of force; and 6) Effective co-operation among themselves.12
The need for such a declaration was part of the threat of regional instability 
commonly perceived by ASEAN states, especially the challenge posed by the 
communist victories in Indochina and the threat of Vietnamese expansionism. It was 
also aimed at strengthening unity and co-operation among ASEAN member states and 
building a bridge for Indochina.13 The most significant features of the Bali summit 
were that ASEAN became more cohesive by assuming a defined political role, and it 
held out the prospects of the Indochinese states becoming associated with ASEAN 
through a Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. Without doubt, this represented a highly 
flexible response by ASEAN members to the change of external situation. In the case 
of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, ASEAN’s unanimous support for Thailand 
proved exemplary. More importantly, an effective collective role at the United 
Nations against Vietnam’s invasion raised world-wide esteem for ASEAN. 
Admittedly, such a mechanism, providing a framework within which members could 
discuss their common concerns and differences in a “neutral atmosphere”, served as a 
useful purpose for building confidence and trust, and in this regard the so-called 
“ASEAN spirit” gradually formed. For some observers, ASEAN’s performance has
12 ASEAN Documents: Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, Article 2, 
ASEAN Secretariat Jakarta, June 1978.
11 Leifer, Dictionary o f the Modern Politics o f South-East Asia, p. 256.
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been characterised as “ a loose framework which can accommodate changes” 14 and in 
which its members perceive any drastic change of government within any one of the 
members as the greatest threat to the survival of all. Indeed, the reaction of ASEAN 
states to an uncertain Indochina indicated a common strategic concern for possible 
regional instability in the future. And the existence of different emphases did not 
undermine the efforts of co-operation among member states.
In general, what has emerged from the discussion above is a picture of ASEAN 
development since its inception in 1967. Interestingly, in contemplating the records 
and prospects of ASEAN, little progress was made in the early years, but its 
subsequent efforts to promote regional co-operation were encouraging. Its 
adaptability under different strategic situations and flexibility in various period 
deserves to be noticed. Hence five major factors can be singled out as dynamics of 
ASEAN’s adaptability.
First, ASEAN’s roots were purely regional, and it was not considered to be an 
implantation from foreign models. Before ASEAN was established, the record of 
regional co-operation had been chequered, as in the development of SEATO (the 
South-East Asia Treaty Organisation 1955-1977) and ASA (the Association of South- 
East Asia 1961-1967). The combination of the colonial experience of all ASEAN 
states, as their shared cultural legacy, reflect on the concept of “ASEAN identity,” 
implying the exclusion of any external interferences after their independence.1' 
Obviously, the “like-minded” consensus on regional issues is one of essential elements
14 Khong Kim Hoong and Abdul Razak Abdullah, “Security Co-operation in ASEAN,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 9, No. 2, (1987, pp. 137-138. See also Amfinn 
Jorgensen-Dahl, “The Significance of ASEAN,” World Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 
(August 1980), pp. 55-59; M. Pathmanathan, The Pacific Settlement o f  Disputes in 
Regional Organisation: A Comparative Perspective o f  the OAS, OAU and ASEAN 
(Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, Facultv of Economics and Administration, 
1978), p. 20.
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if ASEAN is to play a key role not only in pushing Southeast Asia in the direction of 
regional integration but also in encouraging Asia-Pacific-wide co-operation.
Second, ASEAN’s declaratory intent was economic rather than political. From the 
outset, the member states of ASEAN did not articulate any political purpose, which 
tended to make co-operation more difficult, although its operational reality was to 
form an embryonic security community.16 The advantages of pushing economic co­
operation in the frontline indicated that ASEAN’s appearance seemed more amiable to 
both its members and outsiders. At the same time, a shared conviction that the way to 
deter the appeals of communism in the region was through economic development and 
growing material prosperity enhanced their willingness to co-operate with each 
other.17 On the one hand, the ASEAN economy-oriented strategy proved to be 
effective in dealing with external powers on matters of regional affairs during the Cold 
War era. On the other hand, this soft weapon (some may term it a non-aggressive 
policy) also paved the way for Indochinese states—Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and 
Cambodia—to be integrated into the ASEAN sphere.
Third, ASEAN’s collectivity served as a source of learning. The most fundamental 
challenge confronting ASEAN was how to define an acceptable balance between its 
members’ national and regional security priorities. For instance, one impressive co­
operative effort made by ASEAN was its uncompromising role toward Vietnam in 
spite of different security concerns among its members. Another example was 
provided when ASEAN heads of government headed for the Manila summit in 
December 1987, despite the high risk of domestic turmoil in the Philippines at that *1
11 Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f  Authority, p. 90-132 
'* Michael Leifer, ASEAN's Search for Regional Order (Singapore: National 
University of Singapore, 1987), pp. 1-6.
11 Gordon, "Southeast Asia /-viler the Cold War”, Ilsiung, ed., Asia Pacific in the New 
World Politics, p. 138.
time. All these had created an image that ASEAN should be treated as a coherent 
entity. At the same time, the sense of collectivity was also able to strengthen 
ASEAN’s resilience to external pressures. Perhaps ASEAN’s most remarkable asset, 
as Russell H. Field puts it, lies in its spirit of learning to co-operate.18 Therefore, 
ASEAN as a group is undoubtedly more influential than any individual state.
Fourth, ASEAN’s flexibility served as a source of its survival. The ASEAN 
organisational structure is complex, and its decentralised style reflects a perceived 
need for decisions on key issues to be taken by national representatives at high level 
through extensive consultation. In this regard, it has provided member states with a 
policy for pursuing intra-mural accommodation rather than “competitive 
interference.”19 Problems are solved through co-ordination and not through sub- and 
super-ordination; interventionism of any kind is rejected. ASEAN’s flexibility was 
shown through the accommodation of Brunei, which was included in ASEAN as soon 
as it became fully independent in 1984, and Vietnam, which was granted in 1995.
Finally, ASEAN’s continuing existence has proved its adaptability. Thirty years is 
a sufficient span of time to permit judgement to be passed on the record of any 
organisation. The capability of sustaining an institutional existence over three decades 
constitutes a test. Indeed, ASEAN has now moved from “adolescence into 
adulthood,”20 as former Malaysian Foreign Minister remarked. In this regard, it has 
generally acknowledged as a successful regional organisation, especially in the Third 
World.
" Russell H. Fifield, “ASEAN: Image and Reality,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXI, No. 12 
(December 1979), p. 1207.
” Bilson Kurus, “Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison d’Etre,” Asian Survey, 
Vol. XXXIII, No. 8 (August 1993), p. 825
"Zakaria Haji Ahmad, “ASEAN in the 1990s,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 9, 
No. 3 (September 1987), p. 85.
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After thirty years of operation, it is quite clear that none of the ASEAN members 
has showed signs of wanting to abandon the association, while a number of states have 
even expressed interest in a closer relationship. Undoubtedly, ASEAN’s continued 
existence has become a major factor for regional stability. However, as ASEAN 
advances into the next generation, it faces a series of significant economic, political 
and strategic challenges which will test its adaptability and sense of momentum. It is 
likely that ASEAN will have to contend with an environment in which there is a more 
fluid pattern of multi-polar competition for economic and political influence in the 
region. This would certainly pose serious challenges for ASEAN’s capacity for 
cohesion, particularly the commitment made by ASEAN in Bangkok in December 
1995 to bring all ten Southeast Asian states into the organisation by 2000.
3. 1.2 UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY
As demonstrated in the previous section, there are difficulties in changing the nature 
of the relationship among ASEAN member governments because of the lack of a 
shared strategic perception. Admittedly, ASEAN was created between adversaries of 
different kinds in an attempt to promote a structure of reconciliation. Hence, the basic 
problem arises as to which is the best way of sustaining a structure of reconciled 
relationships as a basis for regional stability, if only on some limited issues. In other 
words, ASEAN’s common strategy, despite their major concerns about internal 
economic and political problems and without compromising the sovereignty of each 
member state, has been dependent on the role of external powers. Throughout its 
history ASEAN has experienced external alliance arrangements. Thailand, Malaysia,
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Singapore, the Philippines, and most recently Indonesia have all had security ties with 
the US, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the PRC.
Different security concerns within ASEAN members derive from their different 
strategic locations. Taking the example of Thailand, the country has been heavily 
involved in much of the region’s recent experience, particularly because it is situated 
at the centre of the mainland of Southeast Asia and because it is the only regional state 
which was never colonised. Its geographic location and historical experience have 
moulded the longest and clearest policy tradition. During the colonial intervention in 
Southeast Asia, Thailand was sandwiched between Anglo-French imperial 
competition and served as a buffer zone. Fearing a resurgence of communist Vietnam 
with dominion over Cambodia and Laos (these countries declared their independence 
in 1953 and 1954 respectively), and in compliance with US-inspired containment 
policy, Thailand signed the Manila Pact, Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, by 
providing itself as the headquarters of SEATO. From then until the expiration of 
SEATO in 1977, it maintained, a strong anti-Communist policy and a close 
relationship with the US and its allies.
Although Thailand had consistently been an aligned state seeking protection against 
Vietnamese expansionism in Indochina and had experienced great international 
manoeuvrability in its anti-Communist policy, it sought to transform itself after the 
fall of Indochina in 1975. Thailand’s reaction to this event seemed precarious, for it 
was suffering local communist insurgency at the same time. In response to the new 
strategic situation, Thailand immediately established formal diplomatic relations with 
communist China following the disengagement of US military forces in Indochina, 
which implied the replacement of the US by the PRC as a new security partner. In the 
meantime, in order to deter Vietnam’s expansion from Cambodia, which was invaded
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in 1978, Thailand increased its emphasis on regional co-operation by drawing on the 
support of its ASEAN partners to mobilise international opinion in its strategic 
interest. In addition, Thailand provided its territory as a base for PRCs supplies to 
pass through so that military resistance groups could engage in insurgency in 
Cambodia. Thai’s policies, as a result, led to an end of external support for 
communist insurgencies in Thailand. In these respects, Thailand has become the 
region’s principal example of conflict between, on the one hand, the desire to promote 
strong regional associations and, on the other hand, the need for security relations with 
external powers.
This paradox, from a traditional geostrategic point of view, originated from 
Thailand’s sensitive position on the mainland of Southeast Asia and its most passive 
strategic position, which gave it no choice but to take advantage of the growing 
antagonism between mainland China and Vietnam. Indeed, faced with a succession of 
crises, the strategic context in which Thailand was forced to operate changed radically 
with the accentuation of conflicts among Asian communist states. All this suggests 
that Thailand had developed substantial foreign policy flexibility and that it would not 
merely accommodate itself to the PRC’s strategic power. Thailand’s policy of 
introducing external powers, therefore became ASEAN’s policy, and “the political 
fortunes of ASEAN were made hostage to solidarity with Thailand.”21
The impact of the Thailand-PRC alliance on other members of ASEAN was to 
precipitate their emergence as a more cohesive diplomatic community after 
highlighting some o f their different strategic perspectives. The critical point of 
division between Thailand and its ASEAN partners centred on Indonesia. Indonesia’s 
government publicly expressed resentment and frustration at Thailand’s policy, for it
21 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f  South-East Asia, p. 97.
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encouraged the involvement of the PRC as well as the Soviet Union in the political 
fortunes of Southeast Asian states. In theory, introducing the PRC into regional 
conflict was considered by Indonesia as a contradiction to the Zone of Peace proposal. 
In practice, Indonesia was more sympathetic to Vietnam than other ASEAN members 
for several reasons. First, Indonesia saw an anti-colonial war waged by the 
Vietnamese against the French as a strong parallel between its experience with the 
Dutch. Second, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, in Indonesia’s view, reflected a 
prolonged war against the domination of external powers. Third, and most 
importantly, Indonesia has always been suspicious of the PRC’s regional ambitions. 
That fear is common to some Southeast Asian states. Vietnam, therefore, might 
become an ideal buffer against the spread of PRC influence. Accordingly, as 
Indonesia’s army chief of staff remarked, “Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia 
should forge closer ties to face the potential threat from a strong China.”22 Similarly, 
Indonesia’s sympathetic role to Vietnam was reflected in ASEAN’s 1992 decision to 
accept Vietnam and Laos as full members. More interestingly, the security agreement 
between Indonesia and Australia concluded in 1995 may be considered as a sign of the 
most contradictory behaviour of Indonesian foreign policy in its persistent support for 
the non-aligned movement.
Indonesia, obviously, experienced frustration in relation to its central role in 
ASEAN, for its regional policy was not shared by the other ASEAN members. 
Malaysia and Philippines, for example, were the ASEAN states which recognised the 
PRC prior to Thailand. Given that the Malaysian government claimed to fear the 
longer term threat of the PRC and saw Vietnam as a counterweight to Chinese power, 
it had long been suffering from communist-inspired guerrilla war aimed at
Lev, Suryadinalu, “Indoncsia-Victnam Relations I Jnder Soeharto,” Contemporary
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overthrowing the existing authority. Accommodation with the PRC was thus regarded 
by the Malaysian government as expedient in the hope that this would help to 
"demonstrate to the country’s resident Chinese community and to its insurgent 
communist party that its legitimacy was recognised and endorsed by its counterpart in 
Beijing.”23 Nevertheless, the Philippines, involve later in territorial disputes with the 
PRC, tended to see Beijing as less threatening and expressed little concern over the 
PRC’s involvement in regional affairs.
In contrast to the other members of ASEAN, Singapore had a geostrategic interest 
in encouraging rather than discouraging the presence of external powers in the region 
and favoured a policy of attrition. Since formally separated from Malaysia to become 
an independent republic in 1965, Singapore has confronted tense relationships with its 
close neighbours, i.e. Indonesia and Malaysia. Singapore’s traditional vulnerability 
and strategic consideration, therefore, made it seek to encourage the PRC’s regional 
presence as a counterweight to Indonesia and Malaysia, though the relationships have 
been improved through co-operation within ASEAN. Singapore also sought to 
maintain good relations with its neighbours by deliberately emphasising that it would 
not recognise the PRC before Indonesia. Still, Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of 
Singapore, visited Beijing in 1976.24
Despite the inward show of independence on different security perceptions, 
ASEAN displayed its solidarity in response to the challenge imposed by Vietnam to 
Thailand’s territorial integrity. Vietnam was condemned for its violation and 
indifference to ASEAN peace proposals. More importantly, as a resort of other 
members’ concerns that an insecure Thailand would draw closer to communist China,
Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 331-346.
" Leifer, ASEAN and the Security o f South-East Asia, p. 55.
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the best way to reduce the PRC’s influence in the region was through the firmness of 
ASEAN support for Thailand’s intransigent stand on Vietnam. In other words, 
ASEAN’s position on the Cambodian issue continued to be a product of constant 
consultations and compromises to accommodate Thailand and Indonesia in 
particular.2 *5 A central characteristics of ASEAN, typically in this event, was the 
demonstration of its ability to continue co-operating despite member states’ different 
perceptions of their security interests. Moreover, ASEAN’s experience at the United 
Nations has shown that its collective bargaining power with outsiders is much stronger 
than the power of individual states.
From a realist point of view, it appears that anarchy still prevails in the ASEAN 
region, for all ASEAN members, indeed, persistently maintain their separate national 
security policies. Besides, as the preceding section demonstrates, their border disputes 
have remained unsolved. All these factors have driven member to upgrade their 
military forces and to introduce external powers to balance outside threats. Under 
such circumstances, anarchy is seen as the framework for solutions to the problem of 
insecurity, because anarchy can be synonymous with international politics without 
violence. The ASEAN case, in this respect, can be seen as a “mature anarchy”, to use 
Buzan’s term, for it demonstrates that wars are no longer a desirable way to settle 
differences.26 However, the idea of common security that is designed to solve the 
problem incurred by the security dilemma has not been option for the ASEAN.
2i For details see Southeast Asia Year Books (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1976).
25 Danny Unger, “From Domino to Dominant:Thailand’s Security Policies in the
Twenty-First Century,” Robert S. Ross, ed., East Asia in Transition: Toward a New
Regional Order (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 241-243
26 Barry Buzan, “Is International Security Possible?” Ken Booth, ed., New Thinking 
About Strategy and International Security, pp. 31-53. See also Barry Buzan, “The 
Southeast Asian Security Complc" ” Contemporary Southeast Asia. Vo! 10. No. 1, 
1988, pp. 12-13.
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Interestingly, being aware of their strategic differences and possible enmity with 
each other, the ASEAN members have reiterated four self-inhibiting principles as the 
habit for a “code of conduct”: non-interference in domestic affairs, the non-use of 
force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and regional solutions for regional 
problems. Thus, “ASEAN”, as one scholar states, “has become an anarchy of friends 
rather than an anarchy of enemies.”27 In this respect, although ASEAN has not 
become a regime within which specific principles and procedures are required of 
members to resolve their conflicts, it has created habits of co-operation and deference 
to members whose interests may be most seriously affected in a given area.
3. 2 ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
3. 2. 1 THE ASEAN WAY
The two concepts of legitimacy and institutionalisation, so central to theorising 
about political development in Western societies, refer to precisely the illusion about 
the source of power. Legitimacy, a regime's procedures for making and enforcing 
laws that are acceptable to its subjects, is achieved when those are channels for the 
upward flow of power bow to the presumption of the higher-ups that it is their wishes 
which determine the course of action. The terms for the acceptance of the illusion 
differ, in a sense, from culture to culture. Institutionalisation is described as a means 
to stabilise and perpetuate a particular order. It occurs when power relationships have 
become so regularised as to transform these dynamic processes into structures which 1
11 Quoted in Sheldon W. Simon’s “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative 
Efforts and the ASEAN Regional Forum,” paper presented to the Conference on the 
30 years of ASEAN in Mainz, July, 1997, p. 5.
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are, in fact, the routinized interactions of designated superiors and assigned 
subordinates whose relationships have fallen into the grooves of habit. Processes 
become structures when habit constricts the random outcomes of power relationships 
within predictable moulds. Expectations about how others will behave have become so 
standardised that they create the myth of “offices” and “posts” as being no more than 
depersonalised forms of power. Thus, institutions, as Robert W. Cox describes, “are 
particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn influence the 
development of ideas and material capabilities.”28 With institutionalisation, states 
have come to accept structures, which are really no more than patterns of behaviour, 
as historically given realities, and as part of their natural social and political 
environment.
These general observations are basic for an understanding of the formation of 
Western societies. But what is true for Western societies may not necessarily be true 
for Asian societies. Since most of Asian states have accepted institutions modelled in 
varying degrees upon Western forms, the process of the actual operation of state 
power depends upon the character of the power relationships that relate to the 
structures of government. To uncover the actual flow of the Asian way, or more 
precisely the “ASEAN way”, it is necessary to look beyond the formal arrangements 
of authority to the dynamics of the informal relationships which generate the 
substance of power that is ultimately decisive in determining political developments in 
the region.
r Cox, “Social Forces, States and World,” Kcohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, 
pp. 217-225.
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“Western thinkers are having considerable difficulty finding the right paradigm to 
describe a world where non-western powers are emerging,”29 suggests Kishore 
Mahbubani. He also points out that the inability of traditional Western analysts to 
understand Asian development is based on three mistakes. The first one is the 
separation of internal societies from outside world, whereas, by contrast, it is the 
momentum of Asian states to integrate societies into regional dynamism. Second, an 
assumption that Asian states may follow European model, becoming liberal, 
democratic, and capitalist, in Mahbubani’s view, fails to appreciate other cultures and 
social forms that create their own models. Third, the European states are so obsessed 
with their high living standard that they fail to realise their long-term problem. 
Establishing an economic bulwark by raising barriers to free trade and sustaining high 
subsidies in Europe will potentially develop geopolitical fault lines.10 Mohammed 
Ayoob offers a similar critique about the fallacy of Western analysts in examining the 
Third World through concepts that are defined by their own images. This is not to 
suggest that all theories originated from the West are inapplicable to situations in the 
Third world. However, the fact is that their explanation only partially reflects the 
reality of the non-Westem world, because
the historical experience in the Third World—  both under colonial rule and 
after political decolonization— has been very different. In fact, it is the 
differences in the two historical experiences where are related not merely to 
the process of regional integration but, more importantly, to the process of 
state formation, that make the substantive problems underlying the issue of 
regional security in the Third World so different from the European model 
from which the term has been borrowed.11
” Kishore Mahbubani, “The Pacific Way,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1 (January 
/February 1995), p. 101.
,0 Ibid., pp. 104-106.
31 Mohammed Ayoob “Regional Security and the Third World,” in Mohammed
Ayoob, cd.. Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia 
and the Middle East (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 3-21.
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The ASEAN way, characterised by the habits of constant consultation and 
accommodation in the hope that a sense of community could be formed, stresses 
informality, process and consensus.” The benefits of informality over formal 
procedures have been regarded by political elites in ASEAN as an important feature of 
intra-regional relations. They are aware that negotiation and compromise are more 
likely to produce an outcome acceptable to both parties than are binding legal 
structures, especially under the condition that there is no immediate solution necessary 
to meet the strategic requirement. Some long-term frictions between member 
governments, such as the Malaysia-the Philippines, Malaysia-Thailand disputes over 
borders, and issues concerning overlapping EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones), have 
been a source of conflict. But these do not endanger good bilateral ties, as member 
states constantly insist, though no final decisions have been made.
In this respect, from the basic theoretical point o f view, especially from both a 
realist and a liberal institutionalist conceptual viewpoint, the forms of framework in 
the ASEAN region are less elegant, precise or articulated than those in Western 
societies, because ASEAN is not a formal alliance, nor is it engaged in a formal 
security institution. ASEAN’s behaviours, nevertheless, are not lacking in 
philosophical or conceptual substance. As a forefront organisation in the Asia-Pacific 
region, ASEAN’s performance in social learning and identity building deserves 
special notice here. The preference for informality, non-binding, non-legalistic and 
non-institutional approaches involves lengthy consultations amongst diplomats,
52 Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements Through Political 
Co-operation,” Paper presented to the Conference on 30 Years of ASEAN, in Mainz, 
July, 1997, pp. 1-6. Amitav Acharya, “Multilateralism: From “ASEAN Way” to 
“Asia Pacific Way?” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1997. Ball, “Strategic 
Culture in the Asia/Pacific Region,”, pp. 44-74
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bureaucrats and academics from member states. The constant negotiations could take 
the form of formal or informal personal contacts for the purpose of achieving 
understanding and consensus. Sometimes, private talks may be more important than 
formal meetings, for they provide non-hostile and “comfort level” situations for 
members to achieve consensus. Moreover, it was clear at the outset that ASEAN 
members would avoid conflict by sweeping contentious issues “under the carpet” 
when acceptable outcomes were considered unlikely by member states. Such 
processes, Amitav Acharya suggests, could also create goodwill among the 
participants and encourage their constraint on political and military behaviour.”
The evolving role of ASEAN since its inception has been dependent on policy co­
ordination, which implies a consistency of information and expectations. A growing 
adherence to common goal would thus emerge. Such intensive consultative processes, 
in other words, entail the exchange of information, the creation of transparency, 
burden- sharing and shared principles of problem-solving that need to be enshrined in 
a more specific context. ASEAN, without doubt, exhibits such characteristics. It is 
this type of informal approach that leaves scope for research and administrative input 
from its members, while at the same time providing a framework within which 
members may feel that they are in a better position to deal with others.
More importantly, the habits of co-operation among ASEAN members are an 
essential step toward the process of institutionalisation. An annual meeting of foreign 
ministers, a formal summit of members leaders every two years, numerous informal 
ASEAN-related meetings, and a permanent secretariat have provided ASEAN with 
appropriate institutional structures. The “core requirements” of institutions, better 
regional information and greater general understanding through the achievement of
” Acharya, Ibid p 47. See al«o Noordin Sopiee. “ASEAN and Regional Security,”
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transparency, involve a lot of energy, including intellectual capital, initiative, informal 
diplomacy, and considerable time. These features are characteristics of the ASEAN 
way.34
Yet, while ASEAN does not lack regularised contacts at bureaucratic and 
ministerial levels, its decision-making is characterised by the practice of consensus 
rather than by permanent bureaucracy. This suggests that in the different ASEAN 
cultures, the flexible framework of co-ordination and co-operation is considered to be 
an important common feature among political elites without sacrificing their 
sovereignty to regional authority. Another important feature shared by all members 
about decision-making is the dynamics of personalised relationships, which generate 
the substance of power that determines political development in the region. In other 
words, formal structures are given vitality largely through informal relationships 
which are usually highly personalised and make up the substance of real power in 
society. Mahathir’s EAEC proposal, Suharto’s security agreement with Australia, and 
Lee Kuan Yew’s personal visit to Beijing when most ASEAN states except for 
Thailand preferred an anti-Communist policy, are indicative of the personal-based 
decision making that prevails in this organisation.
In sum, the Asian way arose because it was gradually realised that many so-called 
principles of international relations observed in Western political experience could not 
be applied satisfactorily in an Asian context. The “ASEAN way” has created its own 
unique picture that cannot be sufficiently explained by either realist or liberal 
institutionalist tools. Rather, it is a combination of both approaches. In this regard, it 
is not surprising that sceptical views conveyed by scholars on the prospects of
Ayoob, ed., Regional Security in the Third World, p. 228.
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ASEAN’s success in the future purely from theoretic concepts are much too 
subjective. The major principles of the ASEAN way, can thus be identified as 
follows: 1) non-confrontation; 2) non-interference; 3) decision-making by consensus; 
4) concentration on process and identity-building; 5) co-operative efforts; 6) mutual 
respect, and; 7) flexible accommodation of opposites.35 The development of ASEAN, 
to be more precise, has been the fruit of the political and cultural fusion of East and 
West, and the long-term direction has been set. But, it is also conceivable that the full 
institutionalisation of ASEAN may occur in the future.
3 .2 .2  AN ASEAN COMMUNITY
It is generally believed that security co-operation is harder than economic co­
operation. The principle reason, from a realist point of view, is that the former 
directly impinges on the key issue of sovereignty. A security community is said to be 
a common responsibility which depends on a mutual recognition of the need for 
peaceful relations, self-restraint and amelioration of the arms competition. According 
to Karl Deutsch’s definition, a security community means a group of states which 
agree to solve their common problems by “dependable expectations of peaceful 
change.”36 Basically, it is based on the idea that increases in one’s own security will 
not be attained by provoking insecurity in others. The principles of a security
M F. KratochwiI and J. Ruggie, “International Organisation: A State of the Art on an 
Art of the State,” International Organisation, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 753- 
776.
35 “Foreword”, Hadi Soesastro, ed„ ASEAN in A Changed Regional and International 
Political Economy (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), pp. 
iii-iv. See also Hussin Mutalib, “At Thirty, ASEAN Looks to Challenges in the New 
Millennium,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1 (June 1997), p. 79.
" Karl DeuLch ct. a!., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5-6.
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community identified by some scholars are that all states have a legitimate right to 
security, but security can not be obtained through military superiority, and that 
military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between states. 
Such a community, obviously, needs a high degree of political and economic 
integration as a necessary element of peaceful relationships.37 Under this 
circumstance, co-operation will replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of 
interests.
As far as ASEAN is concerned, if the organisation is judged simply in terms of its 
achievements as an economic grouping, as its declared purpose is seen as the 
acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the 
region, it might be viewed as unimpressive. If, however, its success is judged in terms 
of political, security and diplomatic influence, it has performed particularly well. In 
an interpretation of ASEAN security achievements in the region, Alagappa has 
identified four basic merits of ASEAN security co-operation:
1. the prevention of intervention by members in each other’s internal affairs;
2. the creation of regulatory mechanisms to facilitate the solution and adjustment of 
intraregional problems through peaceful means;
3. success in espousing and giving reality to a conception of regional order; and
4. the enhancement of the stability and solidarity of the region, and thus a minimising
” Amitav Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security 
Community’ or ‘Defence Community’”? Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Summer 
1991), pp. 159-177. See also in Acharya, “A Regional Security Community in 
Southeast Asia?” Ball, ed., The Transformation o f Security in the Asia/Pacific Region, 
pp. 175-192.; Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a classical Approach,” 
World Politics, Vol. XVIII, No. 31 (April 1966), p. 373; James E. Dougherty and 
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories o f International Re! itions: A 
Comparative Survey (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), pp. 435-437.
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of interference and intervention by extraregional powers.18
In Alagappa’s view, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia (the three core states of 
ASEAN with similar security doctrines; Thailand, Brunei, and the Philippines have 
not articulated their formal security doctrines), can be grouped within a system of 
“comprehensive security”,39 which is based on the assumption that national resilience 
resides not only in the absence of external military threat but also in the presence of 
socio-economic development within national boundaries. Regional resilience refers to 
a common security concerns among ASEAN states and points to the process of 
institution-building and regional identity as a way to enhance the prospect of regional 
security free from external interference.
Indeed, various motivations exist for regional security co-operation. These could 
range from common interest in peaceful modes of state behaviour to a specific interest 
in maintaining a US security presence in the region. Despite geographic and historical 
diversity, ASEAN leaders share a common culture in regard to international relations. 
The destiny of ASEAN states has come to depend more and more upon efforts to 
forge a common identity and a compatible operational code in foreign policy. Some 
of the important accords adopted by ASEAN, such as ZOPFAN in 1971, the Treaty of 
Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976, and ASEAN Concord,
" Indonesia’s security doctrine is based on the concept of “national resilience”, 
Singapore emphasises a “total defence” security doctrine; and Malaysia focuses its 
security doctrine on comprehensive approach. For more details see Muthiah 
Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security: Interpretation in ASEAN Countries,” Robert A. 
Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sung-Joo Han eds., Asian Security 
Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), p. 57. 
See also in General Soedibyo, “Changing Superpower Policies: Questions for the 
ASEAN-An Indonesian Perspective,” IISS, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1992, pp. 3-5.
” Ibid., p. 13. See also in Richard Stubbs, “Subregional Security Co-operation in 
ASEAN,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 5 (May 1992), pp. 397-410; David Dewitt, 
“Concept of Security for the Asia-Pacific Region in the post-Cold War Era: Common 
Sc.urity, Co operative Security and Comprehensive Security,” Paper presented at the 
Seventh Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 6-9 June, 1993.
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were to serve this purpose.40 Moreover, the bilateral basis of security co-operations 
within the framework of ASEAN, (for example, agreement between Singapore and 
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, Thailand and Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Indonesia, and Malaysia and Indonesia) has developed into an overlapping and 
interlocking network. In addition, a series of joint trilateral military exercises among 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia has been characterised by some as a “defence co­
operation committee”, an “ASEAN defence spider web”, or a “web of interlocking 
bilateral relationships.”41 In addition, the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), 
which ties Malaysia, Singapore and the non-regional countries of Britain, Australia, 
and New Zealand, has also provided a framework for security co-operation. Some 
member states of ASEAN have even suggested creating an “ASEAN’s defence 
community”. One of Singapore’s top military officer, Winston Choo, openly stated 
that “firm and strong bilateral ties will provide the foundation for multilateral co­
operation.”42 Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Abu Hassan Omar, made a similar 
statement by proposing “an ASEAN Defence Community” which would “make the 
ASEAN states to new heights of political and military co-operation.”43 The 
Philippines former Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos also stressed that “defence co­
operation is a must in ASEAN.”44
Although the trends pushing regional states toward greater security co-operation are 
relatively powerful, ASEAN is by no means a military alliance, nor is it a defence 
community. This because some major constraints have surfaced. First, there is no
40 “Political and Security Co-operation”, ASEAN: An Overview, Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat, 1995, pp. 8-10.
41 Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, “Some Thoughts on ASEAN Security Co-operation: An 
Indonesian Perspective,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12 (December 1990), p. 
171.
42 Strait Times, 23 March 1989.
41 Strait Times, 5 May 19P9. Also in The Sunday Times (Singapore), 14 May 1989.
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shared perception of external threat and political motivation by members of the 
community, which is an essential condition for shaping an alliance or a defence 
community. Secondly, it is still doubtful whether ASEAN, even it could foster a 
common defence arrangement, could deter any potential aggressor. More seriously, a 
defence community could be counterproductive, as Fidel Ramos argued, for it would 
“encourage the big powers to initiate preemptive counteraction and prevent ASEAN 
from pursuing with undiluted vigour and freedom of action its vision of full regional 
stability and economic self-sufficiency.”45 Thirdly, the threat perceptions of ASEAN 
member states are basically inward-looking, and a military alliance is considered both 
irrelevant and ineffective against intrastate threats. In the meantime, an ASEAN 
military alliance could also indirectly retard the economic growth, which is seen by all 
members as a necessary element for domestic stability, and it might also encourage an 
arms race in the region as well.46 In this regard, despite a number of benefits provided 
by creating a military alliance. ASEAN leaders would evidently prefer more moderate 
measures to increase security co-operation among its members. The creation of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 has justified the fact that there is no need for 
ASEAN to build up a formal military organisation, but efforts to increase bilateral or 
trilateral military co-operations are still indispensable.
The above discussion shows that ASEAN is not a military organisation. But is 
ASEAN nevertheless a “security community”? Paradoxically, the answer could be 
both negative and positive. According to Acharya’s observation, ASEAN has not yet
44 The Sunday Times (Singapore), 26 November 1989.
45 Quoted in Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security 
Community’ or ‘Defence Community’”? op, cit., p. 169.
46 Jusuf Wanandi, “Security Issues in the ASEAN Region,” Karl D. Jackson and M. 
Hadi Sosastro, eds., ASEAN Security and Economic Development (Berkeley: Institute 
of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984), pp. 297-308. See also
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reached the stage of a “security community”, because it is not “based on a 
fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among the actors 
in the avoidance of war,”* 47 and a number of actual or potential conflicts still remain. 
For example, these are still unresolved territorial disputes between some ASEAN 
member states. For one thing, unlike Western defence planners, those of NATO in 
particular, who may engage their adversaries in frank debate about fundamental 
security concerns, in ASEAN this is almost impossible. Superficially, the bilateral 
relations between ASEAN members, especially those between Singapore and 
Malaysia as well as Malaysia and Thailand, remain relatively peaceful, and their 
defence planing and military structures are to some extent based on the need to deter 
each others.48 Based on the above analysis, Acharya insists that the development of 
ASEAN in regional security matters may best be described as a “security regime”, in 
which the interests of the member states are neither entirely compatible nor wholly 
competitive, rather than the term “security community”.49
However, it is argued that ASEAN has served as a stabiliser for its member states 
since its establishment. More importantly, the common commitments within ASEAN 
members from the outset have been: non-interference in the internal affairs of fellow 
member states, no force to be used in the settlement of disputes, and respect for each 
other’s sovereignty. The commitments have been viewed by many as a full implying
Sukhumhand Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Internal Dimension of Security 
in Southeast Asia,” Ayoob, ed., Regional Security in the Third World, pp. 57-91.
47 Acharya, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ‘Security Community’ or 
‘Defence Community’”? op, cit., p. 159-177; Acharya, “A Regional Security
Community in Southeast Asia?”, in Ball, ed., The Transformation of Security in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, pp. 175-192.
41 Tim Huxley, “The ASEAN States’ Defence Policies: Influences and Outcomes,” in 
Colin Mclnnes and Mark G. Rolls, eds., Post-Cold War Security Issues in the Asia- 
Pacific Region (Newbury Park: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 137-152. See also in Tim 
Huxley, “Malaysia and Singapore: A Precarious Balances?” The Pacific Review, Vol. 
4, No. 3, 1991, pp. 208-212.
“security community”. For example. Sheldon Simon argue that “ASEAN may be a 
security community in the sense that no member would consider the use of force 
against another to settle disputes.” 50 Barry Buzan contends that the existence of an 
ASEAN security community has not changed the fundamental anarchical character of 
the international system. But the norm has demonstrated what mature anarchy looks 
like.51 Michael Leifer stresses that SEAN was conceived by its founding members 
as an embryonic security community,”52 and the fact is that its operational reality 
differs from its announced purpose. Actually, ASEAN was bom out of conflict, but 
conflict became a source of its revival. Leifer has summarised ASEAN’s achievement 
in confronting the challenges of the regional political environment and in its effort to 
forge a credible regional co-operation by characterising ASEAN as a “diplomatic 
community.”53 Indeed, bilateral tensions between some ASEAN members have not 
impeded the development of such co-operation. The habits of co-operation, an 
important element in forming a community and one that takes time to cultivate, have 
been institutionalised between member states. For instance, ASEAN’s policies 
towards Indochinese states since the late 1970s have proved its effectiveness not only 
as an instrument for building up regional confidence in dealing with external relations 
but also as an important regional actor on a global scale.
Without doubt, there is always going to be the problem of the asymmetries of 
declaratory intent and operational reality in an international organisation. But an
Acharya, op. cit.
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Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1992, p.122.
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institutionalised dialogue and the habit of co-operation may have a mitigating effect 
on the abuse of bilateral tensions by major actors. This may be achieved through the 
calculation of constraints inherent in interdependence. The logic of security co­
operation in an era of interdependence is that the reassurance of those neighbours is 
central to states that stress a non-military means of achieving and maintaining their 
security. In that sense, even though there is no sufficient evidence of the existence of 
a ’’security community” in the ASEAN region, there would appear, however, to be a 
group of states conscious of a shared, consensual understanding of the need for 
security co-operation in the region.
In ASEAN, these commitments have contributed to the concept of regional 
resilience through national resilience. There is no doubt that ASEAN, since its 
inception, has evolved from its origins as an institution for political consultation 
towards regional reconciliation, and external bargaining. That is, ASEAN has 
prevented a feeling of isolation among its members that might encourage competition 
among external powers in the region. The bond of a common future destiny has 
helped ASEAN states to stand together. Through ASEAN, the Southeast Asia that has 
known wars in the past has become an area of peace and a community for regional 
states. In this respect, ASEAN’s existence represents a major contribution to regional 
stability.
3.3 SOME LIMITATIONS
3. 3. 1 SUSTAINING AN ASEAN IDENTITY
There always exists an assumption, as noted in the previous section, that the 
“ASEAN way” is a prototype of an ASEAN culture and is the configuration of all 
elements that have become interrelated in regional patterns of thinking, doing and 
valuing in ASEAN. One unique explanation that accounts for ASEAN’s 
achievements is the way in which members go about resolving their differences and 
disputes. It is also worth noting that ASEAN elites, both political and academic, 
repeatedly stress the differences between Western and their own approaches to 
regional co-operation. ASEAN can thus be seen as expressive of cultural components 
or principles which may summed up in the terms of musyawarah (consultation) and 
mufakat (consensus). In other words, the association rests on the search for common 
values in the ASEAN region as a whole rather than in the individual member states. 
The question might thus be asked: is it possible to speak of ASEAN-wide cultural 
principles when ASEAN is comprised of four major ethnic groups and more than five 
widely spoken languages? (Malay, Thai, Tagalog, Chinese and English) More 
importantly, no country or culture nowadays is an island. All ASEAN states are 
susceptible to external influences. In addition, the basic reason for ASEAN’s 
convergence is a common interest which originates from historical conditions. 
However, “common interest” seems to be a mask which hides actual problems and 
disagreements, since there is no system of open voting. We must then ask: how will 
new international circumstances affect the so-called SEAN identity” ?
The commitment of ASEAN in the Bangkok Declaration in 1995 to incorporate all 
ten Southeast Asian states into the association by the end of year 2000 was, in fact, 
based on a desire to realise the vision of all-inclusiveness set out in its founding
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declaration in 1967.54 Previously, opportunities to build united Southeast Asia had 
been constrained by the exigencies of the Cold War structure and regional conflicts. 
One o f ASEAN major responses to the end of the Cold War has been to expand its 
membership from six to ten. Since 1992, both Vietnam and Laos have acquired 
observer status at ASEAN’s Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), which is the highest 
decision-making body in the Association after the ASEAN summit. Vietnam was 
admitted to full membership in July 1995. The first Informal Summit in Jakarta in 
November 1996 reaffirmed that Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (the CLM countries) 
should be included simultaneously. The enlargement of ASEAN, as the Philippines 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Roberto Romulo, put it, “earns extending to a broader 
world the ASEAN spirit, the ASEAN style, the ASEAN approach and ASEAN’s 
methods and techniques—consultative, consensual, gradual, patient, non- 
contentious.”55 Almost all ASEAN leaders openly welcome the inclusion of all 
Indochinese states into ASEAN.56
The incorporation of Vietnam into ASEAN has been regarded by many as a 
significant development in the history o f modem Southeast Asia. Indeed, Vietnam’s 
membership in ASEAN has both security and economic implications. As the second 
largest state in size in Southeast Asia, after Indonesia, Vietnam has formidable 
military forces and plays a very crucial role in maintaining regional stability. From 
the perspective of the balance of power, the combination of ASEAN’s military 
capability with Vietnam’s armed forces is a sufficient counterweight to balance any 
potential external threat. It can contribute positively to “regional resilience”, or at
54 "Bangkok Summit Declaration of 1995,” Fifth ASEAN Summit (Jarkada: ASEAN 
Secretariat, 1996), pp. 65-66. See ASEAN Declaration of 1967, ASEAN Documents 
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”Straits Times, 23 July 1994.
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least can enhance ASEAN’s ability to fill the security vacuum in the region and 
maintain the status quo in the event of US disengagement. Vietnam’s entry, therefore, 
may be viewed as an extension of ASEAN security supervision to the ambit of 
northern power, despite the fact that the enlarged association does not have enough 
military strength to confront China, as one Vietnam strategist argues.”
Economically, the developmental experience of the ASEAN states can be helpful to 
Vietnam in carrying out its market-oriented economic reforms. As a result of its high 
economic performance in the past few years, Vietnam might easily become one of the 
economic “tigers” in the Asia-Pacific region. Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN will 
facilitate ASEAN’s economic growth, for the country’s large population can be 
provided by ASEAN states with appropriate labour-intensive investments.58 On the 
other hand, an integration of Indochinese economies into ASEAN will not only attract 
more foreign direct investment but also increase ASEAN’s weight and voice in global 
forums.
However, what is on the surface an inclusion of Indochinese states into the ASEAN 
region is more fundamentally a political and security consideration than an economic 
necessity. Furthermore, the negative effects of enlargement could be serious. 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra has argued that the process of expanding ASEAN 
membership was based not on “rational” assessments of difficulties but on “collective 
political will”: the only way in which most of the problems and issues of ASEAN’s 
arguments about an expanding membership from six to ten can be resolved. In his 
view, an optimistic expectation about the enlargement of ASEAN through collective
” Hoang Anh Tuan, “Vietnam’s Membership in ASEAN: Economic, Political and 
Security Implications,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 3 (December 
1994), pp. 259-272. See also J. N. Mak, “The ASEAN Naval build-up: Implications
for the Regional Order,” The Pacific Review. Vo1. 8. No. 2, 1995.
” Ibid., pp. 261-264.
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political invites scepticism. First, the expansion of ASEAN to accommodate Vietnam 
and CLM states (Cambodia, Laos and Myammar) would generate apprehension about 
the “dilution” of ASEAN’s style of diplomacy, that is based on consultation and 
consensus-building and has accounted for ASEAN’s identity and success.59 Whether 
this unique form of identity could be applicable to the new members is still in 
question.
Inviting new members to join ASEAN, in a sense, means including a larger and 
more diverse grouping into the organisation. ASEAN will thus inevitably face the risk 
of slowing down its decision-making process, which relies mainly on consensus. 
Moreover, the internal decision-making processes of new member states need more 
time to adjust. This is certainly true for a state like Vietnam, which is still ruled by 
communist political elites. The same problem arises in CLM states, where there are 
inadequate legal institutions and human resources to support the decision-making. 
More seriously, all these states lack experience in regional co-operation. Under such 
circumstances, the risk that the ASEAN way could be diluted by the primacy of 
individual self-interest and conflicting conceptions of identity should not be 
underestimated.
Second, any idea of using Vietnam as a counterweight to balance foreign powers 
might be counter-productive and could accentuate differences within ASEAN and 
complicate ASEAN’s relations with China. To make matters worse, it could incur 
power competition and cause regional instability. Despite the fact that both 
communist regimes, Vietnam and China, are determined to reconcile with each other, 
an underlying contention over maritime jurisdiction has remained; and Vietnam has 
had a strained relationship with China since the late 1970s. In some ways, this might
" Sukhumbhand Paribatra, “From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and Prospects,’
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be seen to represent a balance of power in Southeast Asia.60 As a matter of fact, the 
practice of a balance of power in Southeast Asia, as it was during the Cold War era, 
can not be realised today because the collapse of the Soviet Union indicates a 
termination of bipolar confrontation, which used to be the main buttress of an 
equilibrium in the region. Apart from this, the reality is that even the combined 
military forces of the ASEAN, as noted earlier, may not be sufficient to confront 
China. Besides, ASEAN states are not keen to align themselves against foreign 
powers in the region, China in particular. A more likely outcome is to find a style that 
may result in a less structured approach to multilateral security instead of seeking a 
balance of power by creating a military alliance.
Third, it is logical to predict that CLM prospective members will be incorporated in 
the regional organisation since they have historical experience in common with 
Vietnam and other ASEAN states and they are rapidly being enveloped by the same 
economic linkages. Yet an expansion of membership, especially an admission of 
Myanmar, could bring sharp Western criticism or even sanctions due to Myanmar’s 
poor human rights record. While there has been some disagreement within ASEAN 
on how to urge Myanmar to improve its human rights practice, the overall ASEAN 
policy has been one of the “constructive engagement”. It is believed that only through 
such a policy can Myanmar be led into a more normal socio-political system.61
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Nevertheless, international pressures have been increasing. The EU made a decision 
in late 1996 to remove Myanmar from the GSP (Generalised System Preferences) list. 
The US president, Bill Clinton, demanded the imposition of economic sanctions and 
tried to persuade other ASEAN members to deny Myanmar’s membership.“
ASEAN’s response to international pressures against Myanmar’s entry to the 
organisation has been negative. “We see the membership of Myanmar from various 
angles— strategic and growth of the region. It should be brought into the regional 
organisation,” argued Malaysia’s Dato Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. He believed that 
Myanmar’s participation “would bring changes to benefit its people.”63 Jusuf 
Wanandi put it more bluntly by stressing that “human rights are important for 
ASEAN, but we will do it the ASEAN way.”64 Similar sentiments were echoed by 
ASEAN political elites. And a final decision was made by the foreign ministers in 
Kuala Lumpur in May 1997. All three CLM states would be included simultaneously. 
Given the unanimous stand of ASEAN on the Myanmar issue, enlarging ASEAN to 
incorporate such a military junta has caused the Association severe political 
embarrassment. Nonetheless, the Indonesian government has taken to advising the 
Myanmar’s military junta on matters of political development in the hope that this 
would speed up its integration with ASEAN.
Given that the problems of incorporating the three CLM states may not reverse 
ASEAN’s decision, the principle of non-interference in a fellow member’s internal 
affairs is in questions. In Ranjit Gill’s view, none of the ASEAN members can live 
alone or in a vacuum, “oblivious of developments in a neighbouring country and
Weakening Consensus in the Asia-Pacific,” Strategic Survey (Oxford: I1SS 1996/97), 
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which could affect the entire organisation, in the event of a security threat.” He also 
pointed out some illusions of ASEAN by suggesting that “while new members will 
derive considerable benefits, and increased international respect by association, does it 
necessarily enhance ASEAN’s standing?”65 In short, the argument here, as Buzan and 
Segal have observed, is that states with low levels of domestic cohesion will become a 
source of instability with their spill-over effects on regional order, and “no state can 
rely on consistent patterns of attitude and alignment.”66
Fourth, it is generally recognised that ASEAN’s co-operation on the political front 
has been far better than in the economic realm. The level of intra-ASEAN economic 
co-operation has not proceeded as well as expected, and the major institutional thrust 
has centred on AFTA (the ASEAN Free Trade Area). The main concern is the 
participation of Vietnam and the CLM states, which are economically less developed 
than the present ASEAN member states and are undergoing major transitions in their 
socio-economic system, would slow down the progress of ASEAN’s economic co­
operation and even undermine AFTA by reducing the necessity for its very existence.
In sum, there is little doubt that ASEAN itself has to play a key role in defining an 
ASEAN identity. Its norms, rules, and principles that are enshrined in the Bangkok. 
Declaration of 1967 and Article 2 of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation 
provide the basis for regional stability. Assuming that ASEAN’s effectiveness as a 
regional group has been dependent very much on the internal stability of its member 
governments, the question is: how long and to what extent can ASEAN continue to 
maintain its identity in the face of integration with new members whose economic and 
political problems have just emerged?
M Asiaweek, Vol. 22, No. 30, July 26 1996.
“  Idid., p. 236.
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3. 3. 2 THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF ASEAN
Many commentators, Keohane, Nye and Ruggie for examples, portray 
institutionalisation as a means to stabilise and perpetuate a particular order. Institution 
building is said to be a way of reducing uncertainty and fears of perfidy. Thus, the 
cumulative effects of institutionalisation can have significant consequences for the 
international system. Undoubtedly, the aggregate effect of actions by institutionalised 
arrangements have potent effects that transcend political boundaries. However, as 
Keohane has argued, institutions should be seen as providing “peace through law”, 
and “institutions that facilitate co-operation do not mandate what governments must 
do; rather they help governments pursue their own interests through co-operation. . . 
Nor do institutions that promote co-operation need to be universal. . . that permits 
problems of collective action to be overcome.”67 Indeed, the significance of an 
institution is to provide an environment of stability and predictability. More 
significantly, this helps participants to achieve common interests.
The above discussion does not imply that ASEAN is an organisation without 
institutional forms. On the contrary, ASEAN is highly institutionalised and its 
institutionalisation is, in fact, in train. More than 400 annual ASEAN meetings 
indicate that a weakly institutionalised regional organisation is no longer possible.68 
However, it is true that ASEAN has consistently rejected Western style of co­
operation enacted through formal organisations, though it has not resisted all forms of 
institutionalisation. It is argued by Leifer that Western-style institutionalisation may
47 Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, p. 246.
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not be appropriate for a region that includes both industrialised country (Singapore for 
example), and developing countries (Vietnam and CLM). Furthermore, the ability to 
sustain the ASEAN community has been dependent on the internal stability and 
economic development of its member states, or, as Leifer has put it, ASEAN was the 
“institutional product of regional conflict r e s o l u t i o n . A  typical difference can be 
seen in ASEAN’s distinctive process of decision-making.
Traditional Western-style of decision-making is “the process of making a choice by 
numerical aggregation, involving voting majorities, rules of collective choice, and 
legislation.”70 One side wins and the other loses; the successful side wins by being 
more numerous than the other. In that sense, it could be seen as a process of zero-sum 
decision-making. Without any clear defined or formal decision-making structure and 
with no open voting since its inception, ASEAN appears to be “instituted with the 
minimal weight necessary for the anticipated functions.”71 Consensus, a principal tool 
used by ASEAN in decision-making, may thus cover genuine problems and 
disagreements that could in the long run hamper the progress of ASEAN 
institutionalisation. In the meantime, there seems to be no sufficient definition of 
what consensus is, and decision-making and negotiations “are carried out by specific 
committees and groups which adopt a more personalised rather than a bureaucratic 
approach— consensus model.”72 6
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Indeed, to compel ASEAN to face institutional emulation of the Western model 
makes no sense. First, learning is not equal to copying, but rather adapting. Secondly, 
from an historical point of view, it is still highly controversial whether bureaucratic 
approaches are valid for critics, because they are barely three or four decades old. 
Thirdly, there is no single recipe for effective bureaucratic organisation. As a 
consequence, the key emerging issue is whether or not a high-performing ASEAN 
culture can be maintained in combination with Western-style institution.
ASEAN’s institutional evolution is what Michael Hass has characterised as a 
“cultural theory of international co-operation.”73 That is, an approach to dispute 
settlement in ASEAN does not resort to European-style of legal agreements, which 
focus on the concept of transparency, a process resented by many ASEAN leaders. 
Rather, it sets aside difficulties for later resolution and prefers an approach of using 
weak organisational structures to achieve consensus. Functionally, this consensus­
seeking approach may avoid confronting the difficulties of institution-building that are 
involved in constructing a coherent set of general norms, principles and procedures 
out of separate identities. Therefore, the logical assumption is that the more 
successful ASEAN leaders are developing as a cultural basis of co-operation, the 
stronger their resistance to institutionalisation at the regional level. Furthermore, the 
changing global political economy, involving a new status and importance for Asian 
economies and societies, seems to demonstrate that the so-called a cultural perspective 
co-operation really works.74 Yet, as argued earlier, the striking cultural heterogeneity 
of the region has its own weakness and is even a barrier to institutionalisation.
77 Hass, The Asian Way to Peace, p. 21.
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All this suggests the existence of a major dilemma. The implication is that, far from 
discussing some imminent Western-style of institutionalisation, ASEAN leaders have 
turned to the institutionalisation of instrumentalist values in regional co-operation. 
This is partly because of the “inward-looking” policy adopted by all ASEAN states. 
That is to say, the national consensus of each ASEAN state has become the first stage 
before achieving regional consensus. In this respect, however, the risk ASEAN may 
face is that as such an approach proceeds the opportunity for the member states of 
ASEAN to move towards institutionalisation is sacrificed. In theory, although there is 
no denying the fact that institutions are complex entities, commonly encompassing a 
range of informal as well as formal elements, some deliberate efforts to modify or 
reform can produce disruptive effects which are consequences neither foreseen nor 
intended by those promoting specific changes, so that there is always some risk that 
ventures may do more harm than good. This is not to suggest that any efforts 
following these lines are doomed to failure. But naive hopes concerning to the 
efficacy of specific transformation in the realm of institutions constitute a common 
and serious failing among policy makers. As such, institutions, are intended to 
generate predictability and monitor deviations from the norm in state behaviour.”
In practice, it is also tempting to argue that even if the level of institutionalisation in 
the ASEAN region has not fully developed, there is no necessary correlation between 
the degree of institutionalisation and its importance, and there is no strong evidence to 
suggest that slow institutionalisation with informal and direct bargaining and 
consensus-seeking will produce worse outcomes than more conventional approaches. 
But this argument has some serious flaws. For it is typically products of political
” Oran R. Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and
Critical Variables,” in Rocenau and Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government 
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compromise rather than co-ordinated planning. Without a common and transparent 
policy, states can rarely be convinced to abide by an institutionalised consensus, and a 
weak institution often encourages states to seek solutions from the outside world. 
Under these circumstances, the result would be unending defections of participants 
from institution.
For ASEAN, deepening institutionalisation is inevitable because of the increasing 
demand for an earlier realisation of AFTA, which indicates that closer co-operation 
among member states is necessary, and a sea change in the wider regional 
environments also call for ASEAN to enhance co-operation between members. All 
such processes will ultimately need a greater transparency of the decision-making 
process. In short, the real problem for ASEAN in the face of its institutionalisation in 
the region stems, on the one hand, from the lack of confidence of states in the 
intentions of their fellow member states, and, on the one hand, from their own abilities 
to compete successfully in the absence of protectionist support mechanisms. In this 
respect, there is little doubt that ASEAN needs more political will and clout to achieve 
the necessary breakthrough.
3. 3. 3 ASEAN: A FORM OF REGIONALISM?
The most controversial proposal for a regional grouping, as noted and discussed in 
the previous chapter, has been Mahathir’s call for an EAEG, which was intended to be 
limited in terms of its goals and memberships. His main argument is that ASEAN 
would inevitably be weakened by a large numbered APEC.76 Despite a significant
For details see Hadi Soesaslro, "ASEAN and APEC: Do Concentric Circles Work ’ 
The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1995, pp. 475-93. Also in Higgott and Stubbs,
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setback for the EAEG proposal, the confrontation has clearly highlighted a growing 
dilemma for ASEAN. To a certain extent, Mahathir’s suggestion has reflected a 
potential concern of ASEAN states over the possibility of external interference in their 
internal affairs. In other words, the identity and autonomy o f ASEAN would probably 
be compromised in a Western-style forum with the emphasis on formal negotiation. 
In order not to lose its relevance in the face of new international environments, 
ASEAN has to consolidate its identity through closer co-operation within member 
states. The question arises, how does ASEAN promote regional co-operation without 
at the same time being regarded as a rigid regionalism?
As a concept, regionalism is exceedingly complex. Various points of views have 
produced diverse definitions and interpretations. From an historical point of view, 
Karl Deutsch believes that regionalism is a stage of development of political 
communities which shows an evolutionary trend towards the common goal of 
maximum human satisfaction. The slow process from Greek City-State to the 
emergence of a supranational community, as manifested by an aggrandisement of size 
and increase of functions, showed the different stages of the development of political 
community.”  From the geopolitical point of view, Norman J. Padelford bases his 
definition of regionalism on geographical boundaries. He stresses that “geographical 
limitation is necessary for regionalism”. Regionalism, therefore, is a concert of 
political interests which may bring together countries that are geographically apart.7* 
According to Joseph Nye’s definition, regionalism refers to “the formation of 
interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions. . . a limited number of
“Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC Versus EAEC in the Asia 
Pacific,” pp. 516-35.
” Karl Deutsch, Political Community At the International Level: Problems o f 
Definition and Measurement (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), pp. 3-4.
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states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual 
interdependence.”79 From Leifer’s perspective, regionalism means “a convergence of 
political interest. . . a common sense o f region represented in institutional form by 
sovereign states contiguous to one another is, above all, a political expression.”80 
Further, as Alagappa notes, the core meaning of regionalism is “sustained co­
operation, formal or informal, among governments, non-government organisations or 
the private sector in three or more contiguous countries for mutual gains.”81 Paul M. 
Evans defines regionalism as “a conscious awareness of shared commonalties and the 
will to create institutions and processes to act upon those commonalties.”82
Nevertheless, Andrew Murrell argues that traditional definitions have produced little 
result because “both ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ are ambiguous terms,” and without 
some geographical limits the term ‘regionalism’ becomes diffuse and unmanageable.” 
He then suggests that a new definition o f regionalism should include economic, social, 
political, cultural, or historic dimensions.81 It is his argument that the traditional 
understanding of the term “regionalism” is based on the model of the EU, but that this
71 Norman J. Padelford, “Regional Organisation and the United Nations”, International 
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is an inadequate and incomplete basis for explaining contemporary regionalism.84 In 
terms of a new regionalism, John Chipman has observed:
Regionalism, in general, is the tendency towards and preference for regional 
systems or methods. It seeks to defend a certain cultural disposition, and 
aims towards a degree of autonomy in the management of regional affairs. In 
the sphere of international security, regionalism is the attempt by a group of 
states to order their relations amongst each other in such a way as to advance 
commonly agreed aims, to avoid local conflict and to manage it, if it does 
break out, as much as possible, on a regional basis.85
Obviously, despite the competing definitions of regionalism, there is little doubt 
that regionalism is an existing fact which reflects, in a sense, the failure of the nation­
state as well as world organisation to meet the needs of all individuals. It is the nature 
of human beings that has served as an impetus to drive the nation-states to associate 
with each other and thereby form greater entities. It is also evident that the ultimate 
goal of the drive of human beings is world community. This does not mean, however, 
that regionalism runs parallel with globalism or subtracts from global unity. On the 
contrary, regionalism is seen as an intermediate unit and a dynamic resource in the 
transition from nation-state to world community. Based on this assumption, 
regionalism only aims at strengthening world community.
Thus, the virtues of regionalism are that it can help develop norms and rules which 
will cultivate habits of co-operation and deepen interdependence within regional 
states. On the one hand, this could mitigate the effects of regional diversity and 
reduce the risks of the resort to force as a method of settling disputes. On the other 
hand, regionalism might be seen as a shelter for states against domestic and external
“ Ibid., p. 71.
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pressures on governments as well as from outside competition. Under these 
circumstances, group identity could be formed and the danger emerging from the 
security dilemma could also be eliminated. More importantly, the negative effects 
incurred by anarchy can be obliterated. Viewed in this way, regionalism often appears 
to be a necessary strategy for assuring peace and stability within a certain region, not 
only because it creates an atmosphere of peaceful interaction and provides regional 
states with commitments for long-term prospects, but also because it indirectly 
promotes good relationships with other regions.
Yet, there are also a number of reasons to be pessimistic. First, an overemphasis on 
regionalism may create a recurrence of protectionism, which is contradictory to the 
concept of a world community, despite the fact that protectionism nowadays has 
declined internationally due to multilateralism. Second, regional institutions may lack 
the power to act effectively and independently in internal affairs without reliance upon 
external assistance. Thus, an effective regionalism may mean the willingness to 
consider the use of external assistance to solve internal problems.86 Third, regionalism 
may become an enlarged nationalism if it is misguided. Regionalism, by its very 
nature, reflects the phenomenon of the regional status quo, and its “inward-looking” 
policy is likely to favour existing power holders. Any external challenge to the region 
would be regarded as a challenge to the interests of incumbent powers.
If we examine the case of ASEAN by using the concepts noted above, we find that 
the ASEAN organisation is very helpful for regional states in settling conflicts, and 
indeed the ASEAN region has become a peaceful community. Further, ASEAN’s 
successful exertion of diplomatic pressure to stop conflict spilling over to its members 
from Vietnam and Cambodia has gained itself international recognition, although
*6 Ibid., p. 26. “Conclusion,” Fawcett and Hurrell, op., cit, p. 316.
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there is no coercive power to enforce any peacekeeping measures to contain 
expansionism. In this regard, ASEAN has been characterised as an “open self-reliant 
regionalism.”87 While ASEAN may bring benefits to those who are engaged in it, one 
should not expect that it is a panacea, it is only a useful means to lessen the chances of 
domination by greater forces because co-operation enhances the individual position of 
participants. Moreover, ASEAN can not be expected to be devoid of problems and 
difficulties. In fact, the latter are of many kinds and varieties.
For example, ASEAN’s obsession with the principle of “non-interference” with the 
internal affairs of its member states, especially relating to the issues of human rights 
and démocratisation that could spill over into neighbouring states, may drive ASEAN 
into regional isolationism. In addition, ASEAN’s aspiration for a realisation of AFTA 
in 2003 without a policy of being “iutward-looking” may only become a void 
framework that invites global resistance. More seriously, a regional organisation like 
ASEAN that excludes from its agenda discussion of real and potential security 
problems within its members, or is irresponsive in the face of a strong and aggressive 
China, could reduce its cohesiveness. Accordingly, a narrow- minded regionalism, 
would be fragile and even perilous.
Indeed, no region can immunise itself from either the influence of global trends or 
the effects of other regions’ unfriendly strife. Robert D. Hormats suggests that 
regionalism is a “metaphor for our time,”88 which implies that regionalism may work 
well, especially in reducing uncertainty inherent in anarchy and the security dilemma.
17 The idea of open self-reliance, according to Chong Li Choy, is normally related to 
the development of states with autarkic systems. The entire idea implies a strategy 
whether that states seek a fulfilment of self-reliance within the regional grouping. See 
Chong Li Choy, “Open Self-Reliant Regionalism: Power for ASEAN’s 
Development,” ISEAS Occasional Paper, 65, 1981, p. 41.
“ Robert D. Hormats, “Making Regionalism Safe,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No 3 
(March/April 1994), p. 100.
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Even so, regionalism will sometimes depend upon international support for its 
success. With regard to the domestic and extra-regional level, regionalism seems to 
be much less effective.
Conclusion
The findings of this chapter, when combined with the findings of the two preceding 
chapters, demonstrate that conflict-cooperation are the most frequently employed 
variable in research. And the findings presented in this chapter also demonstrate that 
traditional international relations inquiry had produced little knowledge about co­
operation between small states, particularly in the ASEAN region. The present 
analysis has served to raise as a serious concern: namely that there exists the 
possibility that the most fundamental assumptions of the field are inadequate.
The next chapter will try to evaluate the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum. It 
does so by taking a less synoptic view and a more in-depth approach. It will also 
provide additional evidence to examine the ARF phenomenon and see how it might be 
applicable to the wider regional security context in the Asia-Pacific.
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CHAPTER 4
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: A NEW ASPIRATION?
The synoptic analysis presented in chapter 3 is not intended to supplant traditional 
reviews and assessments of research but to supplement them by providing 
empirical evidence that will test the adequacy of theory and paradigms subject to 
the principle of falsifiability. This chapter continues to evaluate the propositions 
developed in the previous one and considers the tendency for regional states to 
prefer co-operation.
Therefore, the first section of this chapter begins by examining the present and 
future interests of the ARF. Why an ARF? and why now? In fact, the demand for 
more extensive co-operation in ASEAN derives in part from rapid changes in the 
international political system in the region. These include a shift in the distribution 
of power as well as changes in the pattern and intensity of political and economic 
interaction. All these continue signal the persistence of uncertainty and instability. 
From this perspective, the quest for Asia-Pacific regionwide co-operative 
institutions capable of governing complex relations, especially in relation to 
regional security, must focus on the progress made elsewhere in forming regional 
institutions. As a consequence, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created to 
discuss regional issues and held its inaugural working session in July 1994.
The second section is followed by an assessment of ARF’s applicability in a 
theoretical context. Clearly, it may be premature to evaluate the ARF at this early 
stage. However, questions may still be raised as to whether a further 
regionalisation of the so-called “ASEAN way” mechanism is applicable to a wider
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Asia-Pacific region, which is several times larger than ASEAN in geographic size 
and population and is far more diverse in ethnic, cultural, and religious terms and 
levels of economic development and types of political systems. Or, we may ask 
from a theoretical perspective, is the ARF, with a balance of power in mind, 
leading the region towards a more realist vision society or towards a more 
promising future as a highly institutionalised community? Is it perhaps even a 
completely new approach toward regional security?
The final section discusses future challenges and the prospects for the ARF from 
a wider regional perspective. Three main actors, the US, Japan and the PRC, will 
be discussed and see how they mutually interact.
4. 1 AN ASEAN-CENTRED MECHANISM
If the ASEAN-style preventive diplomacy is thought by its members to be an 
important ASEAN achievement for the Southeast Asian region and a model to the 
world, then the launching of the ARF should also be considered a significant effort 
made by ASEAN to develop a security framework in the Asia-Pacific region, 
despite its initial uncertainty. An extension o f ASEAN’s experience in co­
operative security to the Asia-Pacific region could facilitate the creation of a more 
secure and predictable strategic environment for the region. Ideally, the 
establishment of the ARF at a formal governmental level will bring together a 
number of Asian and Western powers to discuss mutual security concerns, and in 
the long run this may replace the traditional system of bilateral security ties in the
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region dominated by the US.1 However, a process modelled on the CSCE 
(Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) was actually rejected, 
because it suggests a form of collective security or collective defence 
arrangements.2
In fact, behind its creation there were different opinions as to whether ASEAN 
should seize the initiative in creating a new multilateral security architecture in the 
face of the dramatic change of the international environment after the end of the 
Cold War. At the fourth summit of ASEAN in 1992, Singaporean Prime Minister, 
Goh Chok Tong, signalled his desire to extend security co-operation with a wider 
group of regional states through external dialogue by suggesting that “ASEAN 
should intensify its external dialogue in political and security matters by using the 
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences.”3 At the same time, Indonesian Foreign 
Minister, Ali Alatas, expressed his hesitation even on the eve of announcing the 
ARF in July 1993 by insisting that “the situation in East Asia and the Pacific at this 
moment would not warrant an immediate multilateral institutional thing.”4
Nevertheless, ASEAN leaders agreed to launch a three-stage process, namely: 1) 
the promotion of confidence-building measures; 2) the development of preventive 
diplomacy; and 3) the elaboration of approaches to conflicts.5 This so-called ARF 
Concept Paper is based on the principles of full and equal participation and the
' Crone, “New Political Roles for ASEAN,” in Wurfel and Burton, eds., Southeast 
Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy o f a Dynamic Region, p. 45- 
46. Also in Brian Bridges, “Western Europe and Southeast Asia,” Wurfel and 
Burton, op, cit., p. 216; Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 August 1993, p. 11.
! Far Eastern Economic Review, February 6, 1992, pp. 10-11.
'ASEAN: An Overview, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1995, p. 68.
4 Quoted in Michael Antolik, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of 
Constructive Engagement,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 2 
(September 1994), p. 120.
’ “C hairman’s Statement of the Second Meeting of the ARF,” Bandar Seri 
Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 1995, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1945.
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consensus of all participants. To facilitate these principles, a regular exchange of 
views on measures to enhance an enduring peace, stability and prosperity would 
move along two tracks. Track one will be carried out by ARF governments. 
Track two will be carried out by non-governmental strategic institutes to which all 
ARF members are eligible. In this regard, the ARF is seen a long-term process for 
CBMs on security issues. The fundamental question, however, is whether the ARF 
can develop the capacity to go beyond confidence-building towards preventive 
diplomacy.
Apparently, it was the ASEAN belief that an ASEAN-style ARF could be 
applied in a wider Asia-Pacific region. Three significant approaches can thus be 
derived from the ASEAN model. First, there will be no hegemony of any major 
power participating in the ARF, and no single country has the right to impose its 
views on others. Against a larger backdrop of the evolving relations employed in 
the region, in which only a power makes the rule, the announced goal of the ARF is 
a collective effort to develop an environment of peace, prosperity and stability in 
the Asia-Pacific.6 According to Jusuf Wanandi, the ARF is to fulfil ASEAN ideas, 
including ZOPFAN, TAC and SEANWFZ (Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons- 
Free Zone). Acceptance of these ideas implies that the ARF can not only reduce 
tensions and confrontations in the region but also provide assurance that the vital 
interests of each member will be considered in the process of decision-making, and 
any decision shall be based on careful and extensive consultations among all 
members.7 In this way, members of the ARF would not resort to force in resolving 
conflicts among themselves. Some existing problems that have not been solved
6 Ibid.
7 Jusuf Wanandi, “The ARF: Objective Processes and Programmes,” paper 
presented at the Ninth Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, June 1995.
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would be swept under the carpet, and consensus on common interests will be fully 
intact. In some cases, many problems can still be solved by strengthening bilateral 
relations.
Second, a non-governmental support structure, the Council for Security Co­
operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), was established in 1993 as a “second- 
track” approach to complementing the official ARF process. It should be noted 
that the initiative, to some analysts, Paul Evan and Desmond Ball for example, 
represents a significant achievement of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The CSCAP is an academic-driven seminar and conference. It has played a similar 
role as ASEAN-ISIS (Institute for Strategic and International Studies), which 
pushes ASEAN in the direction of a more formal process of security dialogue.8 
More specifically, CSCAP has four important projects, comprehensive security, 
maritime co-operation, enhancement of security co-operation in the North Pacific, 
and confidence- and security-building measures.9 Thus, the main idea of CSCAP 
is to create a more structured process in the hope that the so-called “second track” 
approaches could compensate for some sensitivities obstructing the ideas and 
options generated in the formal governmental process. In this way, CSCAP can 
indeed be very crucial because understanding, communication, and confidence will
* “Track two” refers to the blended meetings of academics, journalists, officials, 
etc. These have become an Asia-Pacific speciality. See Desmond Ball, “CSCAP: 
Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture,” paper presented to the 
Eighth Asia Pacific Roundtable, ASEAN ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, 6-8 June 1994.
Paul M. Evans, “Building Security: The Council for Security Co-operation in Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP)”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1994, pp. 125-140; also 
Evans “The Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia/Pacific Region: Context 
and Prospects,” paper presented to the conference on 'Economic and Security Co­
operation in the Asia Pacific: Agenda for the 1990s,’ Canberra, 28-30 July 1993.
’ the Security o f the Asia Pacific Region, CSCAP Memorandum No. 1 (April 
1994).
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take time to foster. Moreover, security co-operation in this region is an entirely 
new test.
Third, to encourage all ARF participants to enhance their consultations on 
security co-operation, including exchanges on security perceptions on a bilateral, 
sub-regional and regional basis, the concrete proposals for co-operation should first 
be raised and accepted by ASEAN itself. In other words, ASEAN has sat in a 
driver’s seat and become the major driving force to sustain dialogue, facilitate 
understanding and enhance the confidence of ARF members in the process. 
Ideally, following such ASEAN-centred characteristics, regardless of possible 
responses from others, a genuine willingness to see the view and position of others 
in ARF may gradually take shape. Viewed in this way, any method of exercising 
influence and superiority by one member over the others will be rejected. The 
dialogue is thus conducted in a flexible way between friends rather than opponents.
Quite clearly, ASEAN is attempting to play an active, leading role in the 
regional network by creating opportunities to enter into dialogue with adversaries 
through the ARF. The ARF is thus the result of the vision and foresight of the 
ASEAN heads of governments, who agreed that ASEAN could use established fora 
to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region as well as intra- 
ASEAN dialogues on regional security. ASEAN could intensify its external 
dialogues on political and security issues by using the ASEAN-Post Ministerial 
Conference (PMC). Potential disputes could thereby lessened, and confidence 
would develop and grow. This could eventually lead to peace, security and 
prosperity for all in the region.
While most observers were not in disagreement about the novelty of the ARF as 
an ASEAN proposal, they were in unison about the problems confronting its
138
implementation and realisation. In this respect, one can argue that ASEAN is 
seeking to serve as a regional balancer or mediator. Two reasons, according to 
Leifer, explain ASEAN’s success in playing a central role in promoting a regional 
security dialogue. First, ASEAN can be an acceptable interlocutor, or an honest 
broker, among major powers (the US, Japan and China) because of their suspicions 
of each others’ intentions. Second, the ASEAN model can provide a better 
momentum applicable to a wider Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era 
because there is no imminent common threat of creating a counter military 
alliance.10 However, Leifer has questioned the validity of the ARF by arguing that 
“to interpret its role in terms of a new paradigm in international relations would be 
the height of intellectual naivety.” And such a multilateral undertaking, in Leifer’s 
view, would be tantamount to “making bricks without straw.” But in the absence 
of any alternative arrangements in the region, “bricks made without straw are better 
than no bricks at all.”"
Critics argue that an ASEAN-centred ARF has remained merely a theoretical 
possibility and unrealisable in the real world, for it is largely an utopian construct. 
So far, ASEAN members have yet to develop adequate capabilities to solve their 
own internal problems, let alone problems from a wider and more complicated 
Pacific region. The question “why the ARF and why now?’ subsumes some 
assumptions. One assumption is that creating a multilateral mechanism might be 
expressive of ASEAN’s intention to preempt its influence over East Asia. Sheldon 
W. Simon has pointed out that unless ASEAN “seized the initiative on security 
multilateralism, an Asia-Pacific organisation would be created and then dominated
10 Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's model o f  
regional security, Adelphi Paper. 302 (London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 
1996), p. 26.
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by outsiders.”* 12 Indeed, only by doing so can ASEAN be relevant to the wider 
security questions in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with regard to the South 
China Sea. The ARF, under such circumstances, could be an instrument employed 
by ASEAN to protect its own interests or as the glue to reinforce its political 
cohesion.13 Given that the ARF shares the ASEAN-style advantages, the fact that 
ASEAN has consistently downplayed the security aspects of its own in the past 
makes this departure particularly significant. Furthermore, the creation of the 
ARF, to a large extent, means bringing together a number of Asian and Western 
powers to discuss mutual security concerns. This seems to be at odds with 
ASEAN’s long persistent identity in fending off external influences.
Indeed, the future path of the ARF is not yet clear. Its efficacy will be severely 
tested by trying to deal with regional as well as external powers. But ASEAN has 
put its faith and reputation in consultation as the first line of defence, a faith 
embodied in the ARF, to which the Great Powers in the Asia-pacific region are 
invited to. Dialogue, leading towards confidence-building, is the best way towards 
a genuinely peaceful community. In this sense, the formation of the ARF, at least, 
is modestly promising. After all, extending an ASEAN-centred confidence­
building dialogue in an uncertain strategic environment is better than nothing. 
ASEAN’s role, therefore, as Paul Evans observes, “has moved from the periphery
" Ibid, p. 59.
12 Sheldon W. Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative Efforts 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum,” A paper presented for the University of Mainz 
Conference on the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN, July 10-12 1997, Mainz, 
Germany.
” Julius Caesar Parrenas, “The Future of ASEAN,” Chan Heng Chec, ed., The New 
Asia-Pacific Order (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997), pp. 205-207.
140
to centre stage.”14 In that context, the following section will examine the ARF 
from a theoretical perspective.
4. 2 ARF IN THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT
4. 2. 1 THE HEGEMONIC STABILITY THESIS?
Traditional concepts of international order, as noted in chapter one, are constructed 
around the mutual recognition of sovereignty and aim at the creation of certain 
minimalist rules and institutions designed to limit the inevitable conflict that is to 
be expected within a pluralist and fragmented international system. Such views 
have been challenged by the idea that international order involves more extensive 
schemes of regional co-operation to safeguard peace and security, to promote 
economic development, to solve common problems, and to sustain common values. 
More importantly, international order implies an effort of states to because 
involved in the creation of norms and rules that deeply affect the domestic 
structures and organisation of states.
Yet this may not necessarily be the case for some. From a neo-realist point of 
view, although the end of the Cold War has changed the context of international 
environment, the idea of using an international regime like the ARF as a means of 
or constraining the potentially disruptive effects of unequal power distribution still 
remains highly suspicious. In addition, the idea that using relatively high levels of 
institutionalisation could eventually restrict the vulnerability of certain states,
14 Paul M. Evans, “Emerging Order in Asia Pacific,” Wurfel and Burton, eds.,
Southeast Asia in the New World Order The Political Economy o f a Dynamic 
Region, p. 14.
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ASEAN in particular, to the unilateral exercise of regional or external powers 
would also be naive. Neo-realists argue that from the perspective of hegemonic 
stability, the establishment of institutionalised co-operation depends heavily upon 
an unequal power distribution and the existence of hegemony. If the hegemon is in 
an extremely dominant position, the very extent of that power may make 
institutions unnecessary or at best marginal. They also argue that international 
regimes grow and flourish under the benevolent auspices of a single hegemon, 
because a hegemon has the resources to entice or coerce other states into 
participating in an international regime, and to provide the system with collective 
goods, especially by acting as a leader of last resort in the financial sector.15 In 
other words, the dominant power favours such a regime for it increases economic 
well-being and provides it with more political leverage. In this respect, the concept 
that international co-operation owes most to the presence of a hegemonic power 
capable of imposing its preferred pattern of relations among other countries 
became central to the contemporary realist paradigm, and the US-led grouping- of 
advanced industrial countries and the Soviet-led socialist bloc in the Cold War era 
is the favourite model of hegemonic stability.
The world, as Keohane argues, might have been dominated decades and 
centuries ago by hegemons which set the rules whereby global resources and 
statuses were allocated, but today’s bifurcated structure is simply too decentralised
15 Charles p. Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International 
Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies 
Quarterly, Voi. 25, 1981, pp. 242-254. See also Andrew Wyatt-Walter, The 
United States and Western Europe: the Theory of Hegemonic Stability,” in Ngaire 
Woods, ed., Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 126-149; Martin Hollis and Steven Smith, Explaining 
and Understanding International Relations, pp. 36-38; Rosenau and Durfee, 
Thinking Theory Thoroughly, pp. 23-27; Gilpin, War and Change in World 
Politics, pp. 34-36.
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to be ruled by a single hegemon. Without a certain degree of co-operation from 
other states, even a hegemon cannot guarantee either stability or effective 
leadership.16 Critics also challenge some versions of hegemonic stability theory by 
arguing that no single hegemon has the absolute power to lay down the law for 
institutions. Laying down the law is a collective endeavour with mixed results. 
The fundamental purpose of international institutions is to prevent the rise of a 
hegemon. For example, Robert Gilpin believes that smaller states have changed 
their co-operative arrangements, thus contributing to relative hegemonic decline; 
and he sees this change in world history as an unending cycle: “the conclusion of 
one hegemon war is the beginning of another cycle of growth, expansion, and 
eventual decline.”17 Robert Jervis shares a similar view by explaining the 
transformation of international order by means of historical long-cycle theory 
which asserts that the costs of maintaining economic and political order and 
preserving an empire eventually weaken the hegemon. As the weight of global 
responsibilities take their toll, new rivals ascend to challenge the increasingly 
vulnerable world hegemon. This diffusion of power sets the stage for another 
global war.18
However, the long-cycle theory is not without its critics. In particular, the 
question has been raised: Must the implied world leader, specifically the United 
States, rise and fall as if to conform to the law of entrenched cycle? The
16 Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy, pp. 31 -46; see also Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p.44- 
45.
11 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 210
" For a discussion of long-cycle theory see Robert Jervis, “The Future of World 
Politics: Will it resemble the past?” International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter 
1991-1992), pp. 39-73. See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory Raymond, A
Multipolar Peace? Great l ’owei Politics in the Twenty-first Century (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 72-88.
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implication of this thinking has yet to fully materialised so far. Some argue that the 
US still plays a leading role in terms of global political and economic agendas, 
even after the end of the Cold War. Others contend that the US indeed has been 
declining.15 *9 More significantly, we must ask: does history repeat itself exactly? In 
other words, must there necessary be the demise of one hegemon and the rise of 
another through a major war?
Whatever one’s position in the debate over whether the US has declined as the 
state-centric world’s hegemonic leader, it is apparent that the emergence of a 
multilateral world has sharply reduced the possibility that any single hegemon can 
dominate global politics. Nowadays, hegemons have found it increasingly difficult 
to exercise economic as well as political domination, even within their own spheres 
of influence. The rise of the multi-centric world has challenged a state-centric 
assumption that brought major changes to the state-centric world. Although some 
analysts, such as Richard Ned Lebow, may argue that the fragmentation of 
international politics derives from the declining ability o f the hegemons to maintain 
control over the course of events,20 it appears more accurate to see hegemonic 
decline as a consequence rather than as a cause, of the decentralising tendencies. It 
is the global trend that has turned in decentralising directions, thus making the 
concept of hegemony in global politics obsolete. As one observer puts it,
A nobody-in-charge world doesn’t mean a leaderless world. It just means
that the governments of leading countries have to exercise their leadership
15 For highlights of such debates, see Samuel P. Huntington, “The US—Decline or
Renewal? Foreign Affairs, Voi. 67 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 76-96; Bruce M. Russett,
“The Mysterious case of Vanishing Hegemony; or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?”
International Organisation Voi. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 207-31. Charles
Krauthammer, “America Rules: Thank God,” Time, August 4, 1997, pp. 28-29.
20 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Lung Peace, die end oflhc Cold War, and the failure 
of realism,” pp. 250-51.
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not by threatening or browbeating or invading or colonising peoples that 
don agree with them, but rather in ways that are more multilateral, more 
coherent, more consultative, and more consensual than ever.21
In contrast to the power transition concept, that focuses on the problem of 
hegemonic decline and its consequences, Donald Crone maintains that declining 
hegemony, may well press the hegemon towards the creation of, or participation, 
common institutions to pursue its interests, to share burdens, to solve common 
problems, and to generate international support and legitimacy for its policies. 
Some effects would thereby reflect on international politics. On the one hand, the 
declining hegemon would be particularly conducive to the creation of regional 
arrangements that could provide effective leadership. On the other hand, this 
possibility is balanced by the perception that declining power makes co-operation 
ever more necessary.22
The implications seem to suggest that the decline of hegemonic power may 
induce co-operation, and thereby international institutions could be strengthened by 
both hegemons and participants. This would provide an answer to the question that 
has long troubled international politics: what happens when the hegemon needed 
for hegemonic stability begins to decline? The answer is to be found in the 
persistence of international regimes which not only continue to support the 
interests of the hegemon but also promote the interests of all participants. In fact, 
hegemonic stability theory, or more precisely neo-realism, says little about regional 
co-operation and the ways in which the habits of sustained co-operation may 
involve institutional structures very different from the traditional concept of a
21 Harlan Cleveland, “The Future of International Governance: Managing a 
Nobody-in-Charge World,” Futurist ( May-June 19R8), p. 12.
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coalition, alliance, or international organisation. It also says very little about 
regional awareness, which is regarded as an essential part of the cohesion towards 
regional integration. But it has good deal to indicate about the importance of 
hegemony and its possible influence to regional states. From this perspective, 
declining hegemony, indeed, has provided a better chance for regional integration. 
But it could as well result in an enlarged set of internationally agreed constraints to 
maintain order in what otherwise, in the absence of the hegemon’s heavy hand, 
might be a destructively volatile period of sorting out new power relationships.
However, the possibility of a substantial US decline in its interest in the Asia- 
Pacific region in the short and even medium term is minimal, the widespread 
discussion of American withdrawal. In the longer term, even if there is a belief 
that the US will decline in relative importance and hesitate to seek hegemony over 
the region, its role may be moving from that of a hegemon to that o f a balancer.2 3 
Thus, the emergence of regional security regimes, like the ASEAN Regional 
Forum in the Asia-Pacific region, should not be viewed simply in terms of 
hegemonic stability, even though it does need Great Powers’ support. Rather, that 
consequence is based on the benefits it provides: by facilitating communication, 
information, transparency; by reducing mutual threat perceptions and worst-case 
thinking; and by undercutting the self-fulfilling prophecies that lie at the heart of 
the security dilemma. Nonetheless, the ARF is still at its embryonic stage, and the 
Asia-Pacific region is still in transformation. Would the formation o f the ARF in a 
period of declining hegemonic power give the declining hegemon a new lease of 
life or, alternatively, contribute to the consequence of a new hegemon?
22 Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganisation of the Pacific Political
Economy,” pp. 501-525.
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4.2.2 A BALANCE OF POWER?
There are many different ways to consider relationships between conflict and 
political, as well as economic, interactions. For realists, states are inevitably 
conflictual because the international system and its anarchical structure require 
that, in order to avoid war, the mechanisms of diplomacy, international law, and 
the balance of power operate effectively. They see war as a necessary evil or at 
least an inherent evil in the system. In his earlier book, Man, the State and War, 
Waltz even expresses a more pessimistic view about system in a very explicit way: 
“wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.”24 Later, he explains that it 
is an unequal distribution of power that causes conflict.25 This picture not only 
implies that the system somehow operates by the ebbs and flows of the power of 
states but also looks very deterministic, leaving little room for the policy-makers to 
act.
Yet this is only part of the realist picture; the central theoretical mechanism at 
work is again individuals. The pursuit of power is a primary motive underlying 
state behaviour, and this drive is assumed to be permanent. Relentless competition 
for domination inevitably produces disparities of strength among the powers. As a 
result of this competition, the distribution is constantly shifting. This is because 
the basis of order is the delicate adjustment of power to power, or what can be 
termed as the balance of power. Obviously, states are only interested in a balance 
or imbalance which is in their favour. Periodically, the perceived balance will be
21 Byung-Joon Ahn, “The United States in Asia: Defining a New Role,” Chee, ed., 
The New Asia-Pacific Order, pp. 135-141.
24 Waltz, Man, the State and War, p. 232.
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challenged or tested, and those tests and challenges tend to involve military power. 
John Vasquez summarises his findings when he states that “either a balance of 
power nor a preponderance of power is associated with peace, but rather each is 
associated with different types of war.”* 26
As noted earlier, during the Cold War period, owing to the direct military 
confrontation between the two blocs, the situation in the Asia-Pacific region was a 
loose kind of bipolar system because there existed a third party. Generally, the 
existing contradictions among regional states were less likely to lead to large-scale 
conflicts due in part to the high priority attached to economic growth and the lack 
of imminent threats to their national security. It is noteworthy that during this 
period the regional stability was fundamentally based on bilateral alliances, which 
indicated that regional security did benefit from the practice of a balance of power. 
However, the regional balance of power and alignment have undergone dramatic 
changes accompanied by the end of bipolarity. Some regional powers, the PRC 
and Japan in particular, have emerged and are contending for the dominating 
position in certain fields, and their long-term policies are not yet transparent. In the 
context of the Asia-Pacific region, it appears that a traditional bipolar system is 
gradually giving way to a multilateral system.
Despite a collapse of bipolarity and a fundamental change in Asian international 
politics, as Paul Dibb indicates, the concept of the balance of power is still valid 
and relevant to contemporary policy in Asia. According to his observation, four 
major actors, the US, Japan, China and India, have played important roles in the
” Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 67, and ch. 6.
“ John A. Vasquez, “World Politics Theory,” Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice
Kogan, eds., Encyclopaedia o f Government and Politics, Vol. 2 (London: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 852.
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changing power balance in the region.27 The changing distribution of power, a 
relative decline of American influence, the emergence of Japan and China, and an 
invitation of India to ASEAN, will ensure competition among the Great Powers 
and the formation of new power balances. The establishment of multilateral 
security mechanism as the ARF is unlikely to solve any substantial problems for 
some considerable time. In his conclusion, Dibb stresses that the solution for 
regional states is to rely on both self-reliance and co-operation with the Great 
Powers, and they need a new approach which “will be driven by the need to 
maintain a balance of power that avoids domination and reassures the middle (and 
small) powers that there is an alternative to great-power politics.”28 Similar to 
Dibb’s obsession with the balance of power framework that prevails in regional 
security, Leifer has regarded the ARF as having only an unstated role to restrain 
China’s increasing regional assertiveness, and the US is to be the balancer. He 
suspects that despite its lack of strong common interests and its putative structure, 
the ARF is still capable of solving problems and conflicts. Therefore, t is more 
realistic to regard the forum as a modest contribution to a viable balance or 
distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific by other than traditional means.”29 
If Dibb and Leifer are correct, it is the rule of the balance of power that appears 
to be the option for regional states to choose. Indeed, the fact that most Asian 
leaders, except for China, urged the US to maintain an “adequate military 
presence” in the region and play the role of “co-architect” in Asia’s new regional 
order has made it clear that no state would be willing to rely for its own security on
27 Paul Dibb, “Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia,” Adelphi Paper 295 
(London: IISS, 1995), pp. 3-5.
21 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
29 Leifer,, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN s model of regional 
security, pp. 48-50, and 59.
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the ARF alone.30 In this regard, the new structure in the Asia-Pacific could be 
viewed as a multilateral form of the balance of power, and an effective ARF is thus 
dependent on a stable balance of power in the region. Viewed in this way, a 
question arises concerning states behaviour in a balance of power. Traditional 
realists and neo-realists differ in their views of how much choice states have in 
balancing, although they agree with the balance of power in principle. Realists see 
considerable leeway for states. Neo-realists assume that balances arise naturally 
from the anarchy of the system. In either case, failure to balance is rather rare. But 
realists believe that balance may fail to arise when states have low perceptions of 
threat or have no other options.31
However, if multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific is on the rise and regional co­
operation has been increasing with hegemonic decline, or even if states change 
their perceptions about power, then the notion of balance of the power in this 
region might well be in question. First, in theory, power should be objectively 
measurable, as it can change markedly and rapidly in both quantity and quality. Its 
implications for international politics, thus, are continuously subject to significant 
change. In practice, as commonly understood, power is a multidimensional 
concept consisting of military, economic, and political potentials. Moreover, the 
measurement of a power also depends on the influence of one actor on another 
actor.32 Even so, it is still difficult to decide who is a power, for the problems of
“ Tommy Koh, “America’s Role in Asia: Asian Views,” CAPA (Centre for Asian 
Pacific Affairs) Report, Asia Foundation, San Francisco, November 1993, pp. 2-3.
31 For a discussion of their differences, see Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending 
Theories o f International Relations, pp. 30-35
,J Power as a concept refers to the ability to make others do what they would not 
otherwise have done. Traditionally, power is decided by its influence. A great 
power (or superpower) involves the capability of projecting large amounts of 
military force at all points in the world. See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, ch. 9.
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quantifying power exactly are too great. Moreover, states change their behaviours 
depending on the polarity o f the international system. This alteration is expressed 
through the operation of the balance of power. The balance, according to Ernst B. 
Haas, operates differently depending on the polarity of the system.” Thus, the 
question of which state is a Great Power needs to be clarified and clearly defined. 
Unlike a bipolar system in which “absolute power equals absolute impotence,”* 34 as 
some analysts argue, in a multilateral system alliances are constantly shifting with 
the aim of re-establishing balance. However, on the basis of their actual 
capabilities utilised for the purpose of coercing others, the US, without doubt, is a 
Great Power from any perspective, but it is debatable whether China and Japan, 
judging from their existing capabilities which are clearly far below those of the US, 
can be ranked as Great Powers. To a large extent, their influences are regional 
rather than global.
Second, some analysts argue that the balance of power is designed to check a 
potential or existing hegemon. Alliances are thus formed to ensure the continued 
existence of the state system by balancing hegemons through conquest.” Stated in 
a simplified form, the balance of power refers to the tendencies of states to align 
themselves with others to enhance their security or promote their own interests.
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Contending Theories o f  International Relations: A 
Comparative Survey, pp. 85-90; Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, pp. 129- 
32; K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall 1967), pp. 193-94; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Conflict: 
East Asia after the Cold War,” in Ross ed., East Asia in Transition: Toward a New 
Regional Order, pp. 22-29.
” Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?” pp. 442- 
477.
34 John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), p. 22. See also in Mearshimer’s “Back to the Future: 
Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” op., cit. pp. 14-16.
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According to this rule, states tend to join the weaker side, where they are both safer 
and more appreciated. Moreover, joining the weaker side will increase states’ 
influence within the alliance. From a realist perspective, the rise of China and 
Japan would be welcome by regional states because their emergence as powers 
would lead to a functional balance of power. Ironically, their growing strength has 
caused serious concerns, and a continued US military presence is therefore seen by 
many regional states as a necessary means to maintain regional stability. In Yuen 
Foong Khong’s view, the balance of power concept, when applied in the Asia- 
Pacific region, is theoretically imprecise, because the above-mentioned behaviour 
suggests that regional states do not intend to join either Japan or China against the 
United States. Their behaviour could be seen to be more consistent with the 
concept that states balance against threat instead of power.* 16 This tendency is not 
surprising, for balancing against existing or potential threats is safer than relying on 
the hope that states are likely to be rewarded for their contribution to the balance of 
power.
Third, would the ARF be “a balance of power regime?”17 It is generally assumed 
that the ARF is motivated by a desire to constrain China, and a balance of power 
can be operated ideally through the ARF mechanism. However, one should bear in
” For a detailed discussion about alliances formation see Walt, The Origins o f 
Alliances, ch. 2 and ch. 5; Inis L. Claude, “The Balance of Power Revisited,” pp. 
77-85.
16 Yuen Foong Khong, “Making Bricks Without Straw in the Asia Pacific? The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1997, pp. 289-290.
17 “A balance of power regime”, according to Richard K Ashley, refers to a “regime 
bound within the identities of the participant states that their observations of its 
rules and expectations become acts not of conscious obedience to something 
external but of self-realisation, of survival as what they have become.” See 
Ashley, “The Poverty of Neo-realism,” Keohane, ed., Neo-realism and its Critics, 
p. 294; also in Ashley’s The Political Economy o f War and Peace: The Sino- 
Sovict-American Triangle and Modern Security Problématique (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1980).
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mind that the ARF is not a military alliance, nor is it a collective defence 
community. And it would be unrealistic to expect a forum with only a consultative 
character effectively to restrain China’s territorial adventurism elsewhere, 
especially in the South China Sea. The worst possibility is that “the traditional 
instrument of balance of power, if expressed in a new multilateral form, is more 
likely to provoke than to protect, particularly regarding China.”38 Viewed in this 
way, it would be dangerous to regard the ARF as a balance of power regime. 
Besides, a balance of power should be viewed as a means, not an end, even though 
some political elites may seek influence as an end in itself, just as some people may 
value money not only for what it can buy but for its own sake. This is not to 
suggest that the interests of *he major participants are irrelevant to the balance of 
power. In fact, it suggests that a balance of power scheme rarely mirrors the 
pattern of interests and capabilities from which it originated. Therefore, the ARF, 
to a certain degree, could be viewed as a means of heading towards regional 
stability, but it can never be seen as a means of achieving a balance of power. 
Indeed, as Cossa asserts, “the return of a regional bi-polar struggle to pitting any 
two against the third serves no one’s interests.”39
In short, an examination of the ARF in the theoretical context reveals that it does 
not support traditional realist approaches to the explanation of ARF’s specific 
goals. The implication is that some serious rethinking o f realism is needed in view 
of the new security contexts in the region. For the time being, the security 
architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, as one observer puts it, can be described as 
“a complex amalgam of great power balancing, bilateral alliances (some of which
" Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's model o f regional 
security, op., cit., p.53.
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may decline in importance), unilateral defence policies (which will increase in 
importance) and emerging multilateral mechanisms. The latter may offer the best 
prospect for shaping the regional security environment in the longer term.”* 40
4.2.3 A NEW APPROACH?
If drives for hegemony and the balance of power were a normal consequence of 
power competition and anarchy, then one would expect to see them emerge from 
the regional-states systems. However, few reproductions of assumed and 
controversial patterns in the European experiences can be seen in the Asia-Pacific 
region, although some might argue that they may emerge in the future. This does 
not mean that a recurrence and reproduction of patterns of European experiences is 
not possible in other areas of the world. Rather, it is to suggest, as K. J. Holsti 
recommends, “two or more different international systems, linked in some ways, 
but having actors, dynamics, problems, and patterns of behaviour that may be 
unique to each.”41 Or, more precisely, there is rarely a sufficient condition or 
strategy for the assurance of peace in the contemporary Asia-Pacific region. It may 
be necessary to create an environment of peaceful interaction that enables regional 
states to engage in the politics and practice of co-operative security.
There should always be non-observable elements in a theory. Actually, the 
emerging “constructivist” perspective on critical theories in international relations
” Ralph A. Cossa, “US Foreign Policy in Asia: Churchill was Right!” Strategic 
Review (Winter 1995), p. 77.
40 Paul Dibb, “The Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 
Roy, ed., The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 117.
41 K. J. Holsti, “International Theory and War in the Third World,” Brian L. Job, 
7 he Insecurity Dilemma: National Security o f Third World States (Boulder & 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 58.
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exhibits a distinctive profile. It investigates the prospects for new forms of 
community in which individuals and groups can achieve a higher level of freedom. 
It rejects the conventional assumption that there is an unchanging universal 
yardstick for judging social developments and international political fate. In this 
respect, the specific forms of ARF are said to be part of the process of regional 
awareness and regional identity that focus on the shared sense of belonging to a 
particular regional community. This view is commonly known as constructivism.42 
At the core of its value lies the assumption that all social reality is constructed. 
There is a mutually causal relationship between general values or regimes on the 
one hand, and the nature of actors and their interests, on the other. Some scholars, 
including Stephen Haggard and Alexander Wendt, claim that all social phenomena 
are explicable that constructivism seeks to “identify common norms, principles, 
and knowledge that orient action across states”, and that “the norms that shape 
actor preferences themselves constitute an investigable structure.”43 Under these 
circumstances, collective identification indicates empathy and solidarity. Actors 
can be egoistic, but they respect each other as members of a community where 
decisions are taken consensually. More importantly, such identity on both 
structure and interaction makes it possible for more collective understandings of 
self and other to emerge from repeated co-operation as a generic form of strategic
42 John A. Vasquez, “The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry 
and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment’s Fall,” in Booth and 
Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today, pp. 217-39.
4) Stephen Haggard, “Structuralism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International 
Relations Theory,” Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., Progress in 
Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 
pp. 403-37. See also Alexander Wendt, Agent-Structure Problem in International 
Relations Theory,” International Organisation, Vol. 41, No. (Summer 1987), pp. 
340-44. Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International 
State,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-94.
155
interaction in international politics. According to Friedrich V. Kratochwil, norms, 
principles and rules constitute the international game by determining who the 
actors are and what rules they must follow. Norms do not always exhibit rule-like 
characteristics, but they provide reasons for actors to do so.* 44
The key implication of constructivism is that the definitions, perspectives and 
theories used both identify subjects and objects in international relations, and to 
frame particular questions and hypotheses, are somewhat misleading. Generally 
speaking, the strength of constructivism focuses on its critical voices, for it is 
against hegemonic ways of thinking. It attempts to modify traditional concepts 
formed by both realist and liberal mainstream theories in understanding or 
explaining the real world. Constructivists stress the importance of shared 
knowledge, learning, ideational forces, and normative and institutional structures. 
This is not to say that constructivism has negated all theoretical assumptions. 
Rather it reminds us that it is our way of understanding which is fixed, although the 
assumptions underpinning realism’s view of states and anarchy are deemed 
timeless and unchanging. In other words, instead of using texts to try to research 
the world, constructivists argue that one should be examining texts so as better to 
understand the historical, cultural and linguistic practices which lie behind our 
construction of the world. They also claim that by understanding intersubjective 
structures, one may trace the ways in which interests and identities change over 
time and new forms of co-operation and community can emerge. Further, they 
stress that international relations can not be separated from domestic politics, for
“International Institutions: Two Approaches,” Robert O. Keohane, International 
Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), ch. 7.
44 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Condition o f Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, ch. 1
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the two are interacting processes which construct international society. As 
Alexander Wendt puts it:
Constructivists are interested in the construction of identities and 
interests, and as such, take a more sociological than economic 
approach to systemic theory. On this basis, they have argued that 
states are not structurally or exogenously given but constructed by 
historically contingent interaction.45
Constructivism, indeed, has provided an alternative research programme. 
However, like any other theories, constructivist approaches have their own 
limitations. For example, constructivism overestimates the importance of regional 
identities and the discourse of regions and region-building since so-called regional 
awareness and regional identity are inherently imprecise and ambiguous. Further, 
it is argued that even within a highly integrated community with shared values and 
beliefs, conflicts have often occurred, which highlights the fluidity of regional 
identity. In addition, given the fact that constructivists stress the inseparability of 
international relations and domestic politics, for the two are interacting processes 
which construct international society, they have not explained the relationship 
between actors’ identities and their interests; for both, according to constructivists, 
are dependent variables rather than pre-theoretical givens that reside in human 
nature or domestic politics. Both identity and interest, under this condition, would 
be difficult to analyse because there is no explanation of what independent 
variables are and when actors decide to change and act against existing structures. 
Furthermore, if states’ identities, interests and international regimes are 
interrelated, which implies that when one component changes, the other two will
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soon follow, how can constructivism explain what induces the first component to 
change.45 6 In this respect, constructivist approaches have difficulty in convincing 
both realists and liberals of their explanation o f the processes of identity and 
interests that produce the motivations for a change in the international system. 
There is little doubt, as discussed earlier, that every theory, basically, has its own 
critics. The question is whether a theory can be tested.
Much of the discussion about the nature of security co-operation in the Asia- 
Pacific region focuses on the question of hegemonic stability and the balance of 
power. In a period of declining American domination, attention has gradually 
turned to the question of how to achieve international security through co-operation 
in a post-hegemonic era. Obviously, it is still very difficult at this stage to evaluate 
how far the ARF has gone and how long it will last. The answer may be different 
from one state to another according to the issue area. Some states may be in favour 
of further co-operation, while others may hesitate or resist such an agenda. There 
may even be some policy makers who are sceptical about the core of the ASEAN 
policy making process. Despite all these factors, what is important is that states 
that participate in the ARF forum, to some extent, share the perception of 
belonging to a particular community, in which norms, rules, and principles may 
shape the way for regional states to move towards collective understanding and 
identity in the long run.47 Building on this view, rules and norms may constitute an 
Asia-pacific community, within which interests are formulated. From this
45 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” op, cit., p.
385.
46 For more discussion about critics on constructivism see Andreas Hasenclever,
Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories o f International Regimes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 186-92. See also Haggard, op, cit., pp. 
413-15
perspective, the ARF could be regarded as a process of social learning and identity­
building in a regional context.
Basically, according to the ARF Concept Paper (see chapter. 4.1), the ARF is 
non-teleological, for it has not clear timetable for the completion of each stage, and 
it “is not so much about the substance or structure of multilateral interactions, but a 
claim about the process through which such interactions are carried out.”47 8 
Consensus characteristics the process of ARF’s decision-making mode, and thus no 
one would expect an easy decision being made, given there are more than 21 
participants in the ARF. Nonetheless, the ARF represents a significant departure 
from old-fashioned thinking towards a new Asian-style mechanism. For better or 
for worse, since its first debut, more and more states are keen to get involved in the 
process of dialogue. Even so, it is unrealistic to expect the ARF, a co-operative 
security arrangement in its initial stage, to achieve any substantial conflict 
avoidance, and as noted earlier, no states’ security will be helped by a “dialogue 
ARF”. There still exists a certain form of the balance of power supported by the 
US, the PRC, and Japan, by which all regional states will be able to engage in the 
process of confidence- building.
The ARF, in short, may temper “the coldness of pure balance of power politics,” 
as one analyst points out, for “it offers opportunities for small states to address 
their concerns with each other without reference to a great power.”49 However, a 
co-operative arrangement like ARF may be dangerous “when pursued alone, for it 
encourages the malevolent to grab their security interests without sufficient regard
47 Ibid., pp. 163-65. See also in Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the 
International State,” op, cit„ p. 385-391.
4* Acharya, “Multilateralism: From ‘ASEAN Way’ to ‘Asia Pacific Way’?” p. 51.
49 Chipman, “The New Regionalism: Avoiding S,.atcgic Hubris,” op. cit., pp. 29- 
30.
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4.3 CHALLENGES
4. 3. 1 STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS
Unlike the original ASEAN, in which security co-operation was excluded from its 
purview, even though there were bilateral security connections, the ARF 
recognises the implementation of security co-operation as the necessary element 
for preserving regional peace, prosperity and stability, and its announced means 
include not only military dimensions but also political, economic, social and other 
issues.50 But there is an evident paradox in the forum seeking to maintain regional 
security through both military and non-military means, since, according to the 
Concept Paper, it is not, and will not be a military alliance, nor can it impose any 
sanction against the member states. Its only strength rests on achieving a non-legal 
binding consensus or the so-called “regional identity.”
Questions can be raised as to whether errant behaviour will be punished, 
especially when the defector is a regional power, such as the PRC. The answer, for 
ASEAN states, is that in the past four decades ASEAN has never used punitive 
measures against any member state, for such measures might undermine its 
credibility and cohesiveness. In order to be in line with the practice of seeking 
consensus and inducing member states to co-operate, ASEAN has never been
for the declared interest of others.” Viewed in this way, the emerging multilateral 
security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region may be more promising than the 
creation of a military alliance. But this view clearly will not go unchallenged.
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induced to implement a ”Tit-for-Tat” policy, nor has it ever imposed any sanctions 
against its member states. According to Daljit Singh’s interpretation, every 
member state of ASEAN was encouraged to adhere to the rules and norms, 
especially following the principles of ASEAN way. The restraints against 
defectors would be peer pressure and considerations of political price instead of 
any substantial penalty.50 1 Such a policy is based on the assumptions that no state 
wants to be the target of aggression and no one can legitimately act aggressively 
itself. In addition, states that respect the principle of reciprocity do not insist on a 
right for themselves. In other words, member states of ASEAN willingly evaluate 
their own actions by the same standards that they hold for other states’ behaviours. 
There is little doubt that such principles have become norms accepted by all 
ASEAN participants.
Nevertheless, this may not necessarily be the case in ARF. The acceptance of 
certain norms does not mean a duty for all. In practice, when such a consensus­
seeking process is extended to a wider regional body like ARF with more members 
and a greater diversity of motivations, it might be violated frequently, in part 
because there is no institutional framework to encourage actors to respect the 
process. Indeed, a sanctioning problem may occur when too many actors are 
involved, for it is difficult to identify defection. Even if it is possible, none of the 
actors is willing to play the role of a policeman. Moreover, it is still difficult to 
focus retaliation on defectors with a large number of participants. In such 
circumstances, the above-mentioned assumptions are impossible to realise, and
50 See ARF Concept Paper, Chairman’s Statement of the Second Meeting of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, Brunei Darussalam, 1 August, 1995.
51 Daljit Singh, “ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia,” Chia Siow and 
Marcello Pacini, ASEAN in ihe New Asia: Issues and Trends (Singapore: ISEAS, 
1997), p. 138-39.
'when sanctioning problems are severe, co-operation is in danger of collapsing.52 In 
comparison with the ARP, ASEAN consists of a small number of actors, which 
implies that their relationships are relatively easy to structure. Thus, if the ARF is 
to be seen as an international regime that can be instrumental in mitigating the 
cheating problem and can play an important role in protecting the interests of its 
members, it may need some frameworks to underpin its structural weakness and 
further institutionalise the development o f reassurance in the region.
Another major structural constraint of ARF is its inclusiveness. It is generally 
accepted that the ARF is a co-operative security arrangement that is to bring 
potential adversaries into a co-operative framework through which certain norms 
and rules can be developed. Ideally, this could reduce possible misunderstandings 
and misperceptions that are major causes of war. According to the ARF’s Guiding 
Principles, as Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas remarked at the third ARF 
meeting in July 1996, “the ARF should only admit participants that can directly 
affect the peace and security of the region on which the ARF shall focus its peace­
building and peace-making efforts.”53 This guiding principle indicates that the 
ARF can be expected to bring all regional security concerns for either general 
discussion or bilateral consultation. In this sense, the absence of key regional 
security actors such as North Korea and Taiwan in the ARF obviously raises 
questions as to its inclusiveness which need to be resolved.
From the strategic perspective, the PRC has long been seen as a crucial strategic 
component in the region, not only because of its size, population and geographic 
proximity but also because of its economic and military potential. More
52 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Co-operation Under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions,” op., c i t , pp. 94-98.
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importantly, Its future intentions are uncertain. Thus, its participation in the forum 
has been seen as vital to the long-term regional stability. Understandably, the 
inclusion of the PRC in the ARF would imply the exclusion of Taiwan due to the 
persistent opposition of Beijing. North Korea, while its application for a 
membership of CSCAP was accepted, has not shown an interest in joining the 
security dialogue. It is apparent that the difficulty which the ARF, or ASEAN in 
effect, faces is that “the problems of Northeast Asia are unlikely to be addressed in 
any meaningful way in the forum and the great powers are likely to continue to 
prefer to handle their main regional security concerns on a bilateral basis.”54 
Obviously, ASEAN’s fear about drawing the complex disputes of Northeast Asia 
into the ARF’s ambit raises serious doubts about the ARF’s conflict prevention 
capability in the future regional context.
An additional constraint on the ARF’s inclusiveness is the impending extension 
of its membership. Basically, ASEAN PMCs (Post-Ministerial Conferences) have 
institutionalised ASEAN’s dealing with key actors outside the organisation. That 
is to say, only ASEAN states have the right to decide who may be a dialogue 
partner. So far, 21 members, including the ASEAN-9, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, the US, Japan, South Korea, the EU, China (PRC), Russia, India, Papua 
New Guinea, and Myanmar, are working together to address such issues as 
confidence-building, peacekeeping operations, and maritime search and rescue. 
These measures can be characterised as CBMs. However, Britain, France, Taiwan, 
Mexico, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan have all expressed their interest in separate
” Chairman’s Statement at the Third Meeting of the ARF, Jakarta, 23 July 1996, 
ASEAN Secretariat.
M Yahuda, The International Politics o f the Asia-Paci/ic, 1945-1995, p. 275. See 
also Evans, “The Prospects for Multilateral Security Co-operation in the
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membership of ARF. In the face of an over-populated regional body, the ARF, 
warned one scholar, would encounter the problems of formalisation and 
politicisation.55 The former would cause an argument about deeper structural 
arrangements and the latter would make the forum less effective, or even just a 
“talking club.” Under such circumstances, it will be very difficult for the ARF to 
proceed further, and the doubts raised about ASEAN’s capability to lead on matters 
of regional security since ARF’s inception would also be justified.
In acknowledgement of its structural weakness, the ARF could still be cited as 
being the basis for a comprehensive engagement. This is not to suggest that the 
ARF will not be an important security institution in enforcing future regional 
stability and security, but that it is unrealistic to envisage it providing a 
comprehensive regional framework in its infancy. Consequently, in order for the 
ARF to develop into an important regional mechanism, some practical approaches 
that would complement a more co-operative regional body might be necessary for 
it to cope with structural difficulty.
4. 3. 2 GREAT POWERS SUPPORT
A high level of Great Power support for an existing international system has been 
seen by many as an important element for maintaining international security, for 
Great Powers have a major stake in systemic stability. Through the development 
of an interlocking security framework, Great Powers have demonstrated their
Asia/Pacific Region,” in Ball, ed., The Transformation o f Security in the 
Asia/Pacifw Region, p. 211.
” Sheldon W. Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative Efforts 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum," Paper presented for the 30lh Anniversary of 
ASEAN, July 10-12, 1997, Mainz, Germany, pp. 17-21.
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crucial influence on international order and regional security. But the key question 
is how to create Great Power consensus on critical security issues. Many of the 
trends and processes evident in Europe and Asia have signalled a change of state’s 
behaviour, especially in the post-Cold War international system. Even the largest 
and most powerful states are nowadays being buffeted by strong gusts of 
interdependence and integration. They are driven by treaties and obligations or de 
facto arrangements that reveal that the buttress of sovereignty has been breached. 
Indeed, pushed less by public demand than by the sheer inability of individual 
states to address or resolve critical socioeconomic or political problems, the 
political leaders of Great Powers have set aside long-cherished notions of 
autonomous action and protectionism to join the international community and 
commit themselves to shared standards.
For realists, those who regard power as the core concept in understanding the 
international system have admitted that the concentration of the bipolar system 
evident during the Cold War period is no longer existent. In the Asia-Pacific 
region, the resulting diffusion of power reduces America’s ability to go it alone as 
a hegemon among friends, particularly vis-à-vis Japan and China.56 Alternatively, 
a decline of hegemony, as noted earlier, may provide both positive and negative 
effects for regional stability. For one thing, Great Powers may try to maintain their 
influence on regional politics by making an effort to redress regional imbalances 
through arms sales, technology transfers or more direct intervention. However, this 
could provide only short-term relief at great cost to long-term prospects for peace 
and stability. Another option for Great Powers is to facilitate regional co-operation
56 William P. Bundy, “The 1950s versus the 1990s.” ir> Edward K. Hamilton, ed., 
America 's Global Interests (New York: Norton, 1989), pp. 62-63.
by participating in regional organisations, although this trend might lead towards 
regionalism.
As a multilateral security arrangement that involves the development of close 
co-operation among states while each maintains its sovereignty, the ARF, without 
doubt, needs Great Power support. To make this possible, three main actors have 
to be taken into account: the United States, Japan and the PRC.
4. 3. 2. 1 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
The US did not oppose directly any idea of setting up a multilateral security 
mechanism created by ASEAN in the region, but it had reservations. An unhappy 
experience with multilateral security arrangements in the past, SEATO for 
instance, had proved it to be a fruitless programme. Furthermore, some observers, 
Lau Tei Soon and Paul Dibb for example, doubt that there is any reason to establish 
a multilateral security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, for American 
bilateral security frameworks already provide Japan, South Korea and Southeast 
Asian states with insurance. Even in a new era, there seems no direct threat to 
America and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. The US has thus found itself in 
no position to seek to orchestrate larger coalitions to deal with a specific problem 
or issue in the region. Still, bilateral relations are viewed as a better option for 
maintaining regional security.57 In this respect, the creation of an Asia-Pacific
57 Lau Teik Soon, “Regional Security Developments and ASEAN Responses: A 
Singapore View,” Strategic Papers, Vol. 4, No. 1, Jakarta, IISS, 1992, p. 7. See 
also Paul Dibb, The Future o f Australia's Relationship IVith The United States 
(Sydney: The Australian Centre for American Studies, 1993), p. 55. Scalapino, 
“The US Commitment to Asia,” in Hall, ed., The Transformation o f Security in the 
Asia/Pacific Region, pp. 69-72.
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economic institution for further trade liberalisation might appear a more alluring 
project for American policy.
At the same time, others, Robert Gilpin and Samuel Huntington for example, 
stress that because there is no immediate challenge to American security in the 
post-Cold War world, the US has changed its focus dramatically from one on 
military security to one on economic security. The implications for Asia in 
American economic interests, as the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
stated, represent “a primacy of opportunity” for American business.58 This market- 
led reorientation of US policy towards Asia appeared to be an attempt to include 
itself into regional development. APEC, then, was regarded as an ideal venue to 
demonstrate the benefits of economic liberalisation, although it is highly 
controversial whether the initial purpose of APEC was to counter the protectionist 
tide or to form itself as a system of regional protectionism. But there is little 
question that the APEC tended to be inclusive rather than exclusive.59 Getting 
involved in multilateral APEC, to a certain degree, did signal a change of US 
policy towards Asia. Yet the goals and implications of this strategic shift of 
American Asian policy are not clear.
One speculation is that the US might intend to use APEC as the principal vehicle 
for expanding economic, political and security links that would lead to regional 
stability. From the liberal institutionalist point of view, APEC, through economic 
interdependence between states, may be seen as a means to reduce potential 
conflict and contribute to regional peace. The US secretary of Defence, William
11 The Economist, July 31, 1993, p. 13. See also in Robert Gilpin’s “Economic 
Change and the Challenge of Uncertainty,” Ross, ed„ East Asia in Transition: 
Toward a New Regional Order, pp. 3-5. Huntington, “America’s Changing 
Strategic Interests,” pp. 3-11.
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Perry, made a proposal to transform APEC into a security forum in 1995, the idea 
was quickly turned down by many APEC members due to its sensitivity, especially 
for the ASEAN states and China. Later, even the government of the US itself 
rejected the proposal.60 And one major response to the formation of APEC from 
ASEAN states was the creation of EAEC. Clearly, the US has been acting to 
prevent the creation of an East Asian identity that is incompatible with its interests. 
Accordingly, the US has to play an active but realistic role consistent with its 
interests in dealing with Asian states by participating in multilateral institution­
building, as in the ARF. At the same time, any attempts made by the US to impose 
agendas that are unacceptable to its Asian partners may lead to counteraction.
In fact, the US government, soon after the election of Bill Clinton to the US 
presidency, has been considerably enthusiastic about institution-building in Asia. 
Its attitude towards both multilateral institutions, APEC and ARF, has changed 
from obstructive to passive on multilateral security mechanism, and from passive 
to positive on regional economic co-operation. Indeed, American participation in 
the ARF implies the meaningfulness of such a multilateral security structure and 
has assured its potential in the Asia-Pacific region.
4. 3. 2. 2 A MILITARISED JAPAN?
Another potential Great Power in the Asia-Pacific region is Japan. Given that 
Japan’s inert and passive security role in the region is based on its past behaviour 
that was determined by political structures—the US-imposed Peace Constitution.
” Higgott and Stubbs, “Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC 
versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific,” p. 519.
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Japan is a country with enormous potential, both economically and militarily. But 
it is unlikely that regional states will easily relinquish their suspicions about 
Japan’s brutal past until it demonstrates a greater sense of political maturity. Even 
so, arguably, Japan’s security strategy has been, and will be, dependent primarily 
upon the United States for a considerable time. The role America plays in Japan’s 
security, as US commander Lieutenant General Henry Stackpole stated in 
Okinawa, is that of a “cap in the bottle.”60 1 In that case, Japan’s self-help efforts 
would make no difference to security in the Asia-Pacific, and its Great Power 
status may be in question due to its limited influence to the region. However, 
Japan is pursuing a strategy of security autonomy, as its military expenditure has 
increased from US$ 14 billion in 1985 to US$ 25 billion in 1995, nearly three times 
more than China.62 From the perspective of a traditional sense of power, Japan is 
indeed a Great Power. It could easily shift from a defensive military posture to an 
active power projection if the US security commitment is no longer reliable. Or, 
Japan could change its defence policy as a result of rising and aggressive 
nationalism. The problem with this option is that it might aggravate the existing 
distrust of regional states. However, Japan could answer the political demands of 
other international actors such as the US and ASEAN states in order to practice a 
balance of power scheme in the region.
Indeed, the Japanese are conscious of the need to play an active role on global as 
well as regional issues, and the US has been pushing Japan in this direction, 
particularly since the Gulf War in 1991. Nevertheless, both pillars of the US-Japan
60 Yoichi Funabashi, “Bridging Asia’s Economic-Security Gap,” Survival, Vol. 38, 
No. 4 (Winter 1996-97), p. 106.
61 Daily Yomiuri, 20 March 1990.
H Panitan Wattanayagom and Desmond Ball, “A Regional Arms Race,” in Ball, 
cd.. The Transformation o f Security in the Asia/Paciflc Region, p. 157.
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relationship, economic interdependence and security co-operation, have run into 
difficulty in recent years. On the one hand, in the face of an increasingly 
acrimonious demand on burden sharing for maintaining international peace and 
stability, the Japanese government has been increasing its financial support of US 
forces in Japan. In addition, although a sound US-Japan security alliance is 
described as an important prerequisite for regional stability, and the Clinton 
government has promised its continued military support, Japan cannot rely on an 
indefinite US security guarantee.61 *3 On the other hand, the fact that bilateral trade 
friction has become increasingly tense could also point to the potential for the 
gradual erosion of the bilateral alliance. Faced with this dilemma, the proper 
course for Japan seems to continue cautiously to prepare for new options.
Further, Japan has been trying to reshape the old framework of the Cold War 
system by showing an interest in global as well as regional issues. ' At the global 
level, Ichiro Ozawa, a former Secretary-General of Japan’s ruling party (Liberal 
Democratic Party LDP) publicly stated that Japan would willingly shoulder greater 
international responsibilities, including a security role, and engage more fully in 
international co-operation on issues that affect the international community.64 The 
issue of Japanese membership of the United Nations Security Council, for 
example, has been regarded as a translation of Japan's economic power into 
political influence on international society. Even China has been careful not to 
oppose openly Japanese aspirations for fear of undermining its largest trading
61 Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Conflict: East Asia after the Cold War,”
Ross, ed., East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order, pp. 34-38.
M Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking o f a Nation (Tokyo:
Kondansha International, 1994), pp. 94-95.
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partner and largest donor of foreign aid.65 However, Wen Hui Bao, the influential 
Shanghai newspaper commented that Japan was still unqualified to be a permanent 
member in UN Security Council, for it failed to win the confidence of its 
neighbours.66
At the regional level, as Japanese economic power in Asia has become evident 
and bilateral relations with the US have become more paradoxical, the call for 
Japan to pursue a strategy of returning to Asia is increasingly stronger. In the 
meantime, some regional states have expressed their willingness to co-operate with 
Japan on both the economic and military fronts. Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines 
and Singapore all suggested that Japan should not limit itself to economic affairs.67 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir even urged Japan to become a leader in EAEC, 
which “is far better than every prime minister going around saying ‘I am Sorry’”.68 
All this is not to imply that Japan’s past has been eliminated from historical 
memories. However, as Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
pointed out if history should continue to stand in the way of Japan becoming a 
Great Power in Asia, it was because the Japanese government had not done enough 
to clean historical memories. Japan should be frank to its history so that the past 
would not cast a shadow on the future. And Japan should catch up with the train of 
“Asian Community” and play a leading role.69 In response to the new situation, the
65 Gerald L. Curtis, “Sino-Japanese Relations Through Chinese Eyes,” Institute
Reports, New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1993, p. 47 
“ Straits Times, 10 October 1994.
67 Kenneth B. Pyle, “Japan and the Future of Collective Security,” in Danny Unger 
and Paul Blackburn, eds., Japan ’s Emerging Global Role (Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 109-111. See also The Economist, 9 March 
1991. Japan Times, 4 April 1991.
61 Heng Pek Koon, “Mahathir Can’t get Japan to say yes,” ISEAS Trends, no. 58, 
Supplement in the Business Times (Singapore), 24-25 June 1995, p. 1.
'‘‘Straits Times, 1 January and 25 February 1995.
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Japanese government has been very cautious because any ill-considered act could 
have caused serious side effects.
A step-by-step approach is practical and important. Morihiro Hosokawa, soon 
after becoming Japan Prime Minister, explicitly apologised for his country’s 
responsibility for the Pacific War and brutal rule over Korea. Later, his successor 
Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama made the same statement in his visit to 
Southeast Asian states.™ Furthermore, Japan’s involvement in the peacekeeping 
operations in Cambodia marked a dramatic departure from its previous policy. In 
many ways, this action has displayed a fulfilment of the idea of “comprehensive 
security.” One of the most notable efforts the Japanese government made in the 
area of regional security was that it not only proposed an ASEAN-PMC with 
dialogue partners, which led to the establishment of the ARF, but it also became an 
important participant in the forum. The above-mentioned evidence suggests that 
Japan has been trying to play its role in regional security in line with its economic 
performance. The more it gets involved the more important it will be as time goes 
by.
4. 3. 2. 3 A RISING CHINA?
The last potential Great Power, but not the least, is the PRC (The Peoples Republic 
of China). In the post-Cold War era, the earlier US-USSR-PRC strategic triad, 
without doubt, has been replaced by an emergent US-Japan-PRC triad. Despite its 
statistical shortcomings, it is important not to exaggerate the PRC’s potential threat 
judging from its past records in the region. More importantly, recent economic
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growth and military expansion have made the PRC the centre of attention in the 
region. Yet, the PRC’s role in the face of a growing multilateral security 
framework can be characterised as being cautious and passive at best, and sceptical 
and dismissive at worst. To some extent, the PRC’s attitude towards regional 
security prefers bilateralism to multilateralism. This is partly because Chinese 
leaders attach priority more to the problem o f territorial integrity than that of 
transnational co-operation, and even the growing interdependence in the region 
does not constrain its behaviour.70 1 From the PRC perspective, the new 
international environment reflects an increasing emphasis on state sovereignty and 
non-interference in domestic affairs. “ Any theory claiming sovereignty to be 
outdated is groundless,”72 says one Chinese analyst. The sceptics, in regional states 
and in the US, focus on the more belligerent aspects of the PRC’s behaviour on 
territorial issues. For example, the PRC’s missile tests and military exercises 
carried out during the period of the presidential election in Taiwan in March 1996 
were clearly sending a message that PRC’s understanding of the post-Cold War 
world is one o f realism.
Furthermore, the underlying factors that discourage the PRC from getting fully 
involved in a multilateral security framework could be identified as its concern that 
a multilateral security dialogue might be used, on the one hand, to invalidate its 
assertiveness about territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea and, on the other
70 Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan as an Asia-Pacific Power,” Ross, ed„ East Asia in 
Transition: Toward a New Regional Order, p. 124.
71 Gerald Segal, “Constraintment of China,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 
(Spring 1996), pp. 107-135. See also Segal’s “China Changes Shape: Regionalism 
and Foreign Policy,” Adelphi Paper No. 287 (London: Oxford University, IISS, 
1994), pp. 54-64. David Shambaugh, “Growing Strong: China’s Challenge to 
Asian Security,” Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 43-59.
72 Quoted in David Armstrong, “Chinese Perspectives on the New World Order,” 
The Journal o f  East Asian Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer/ Fall 1994), p. 471.
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hand, to constrain its military buildup. The institutionalisation of security 
arrangements could also mean a need to partially cede state sovereignty. Another 
possible assumption that may prevent the PRC from embracing a multilateral 
security forum is that Beijing assumes that future US-Japan conflict would be the 
centrepiece of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, and the PRC might 
therefore be in a position to play an arbitrating role between Tokyo and 
Washington.73 In this regard, a multilateral architecture, in a sense, would 
minimise the PRC’s importance in regional affairs.
If these above-mentioned assumptions hold, the PRC could be depicted as a 
major obstacle to the success of a multilateral regional security structure because of 
its unwillingness to follow the principles of multilateralism. The “Chinese threat 
theory”, consequently, has been cited by those who have constantly stressed that 
the PRC must be contained in the international system.74 However, a containment 
of the PRC could be potentially dangerous and might destabilise relative peace in 
the region, for a containment policy would accelerate, not dampen, the PRC’s 
efforts to amass military and economic power. More importantly, formulating a 
containment policy requires regional states to co-operate and support. Sadly to say, 
there is no evidence among the regional states to show such willingness. In that 
case, perhaps a policy of tying the PRC into the international system may be more 
realistic because as Gerald Segal suggests, “the more PRC sees the benefits from 71
71 “Post-Gulf War Strategic Pattem,” Beijing Review, November 25-December 1, 
1991, pp. 11-13. See also “Japan Seeks Greater Role in the World,” Beijing 
Review, February 3-16, 1992, p. 10.
u People 's Daily, 20 April 1993. See also in Shambaugh, “Growing Strong: 
China's Challenge to Asian Security,” op., cit., p. 43.
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genuinely multilateral diplomacy, the less paranoid it will feel about the world and 
the less paranoid the world will feel about it.”75
In many circumstances, the PRC has not refused to accept cny possible form of 
multilateral security structure in the region. Actually, it is a founding member of 
the ARF, and its attitude towards the multilateral framework in the Asia-Pacific 
region has undergone noticeable changes. This is in part because the PRC has 
gradually acknowledged the utility of multilateralism despite' its hesitation about 
adopting an institutionalised mechanism immediately. From the PRC’s 
perspective, a security mechanism like the ARF copied from an European-style 
CSCE, is not appropriate for the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region. A multi- 
channelled, multi-tierd dialogue that is both bilateral and multilateral, 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental is more practical for the region.76 In other 
words, in the PRC’s interpretation, existing bilateral problems in the region can 
only be solved within the bilateral framework of the countries concerned. The 
Regional security-building process should be based on bilateral dialogues, and 
should slowly move to sub-regional, then eventually region-wide, arrangements. 
Indeed, such a gradualist approach has been a vital element in the development of 
the PRC’s policy, and it is also helpful in not allowing specific disputes, such as 
those over Taiwan and the South China Sea issues, to prevent it from pursuing 
national interests in a multilateral mechanism. More specifically, the PRC’s
7! Gerald Segal, “Tying China into the International System,” Survival, Vol. 37, No. 
2 (Summer 1995), pp. 60-73.
74 China’s Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Chien Chichen, during the 1994 
ARF’s meeting in Bangkok, stated five principles, one of these was “promoting 
bilateral and multilateral security dialogues and consultations in various forms in 
order to enhance understanding and confidence.” See Beijing Review, Vol. 37, No. 
32 (8-14 August 1994), pp. 21-22. People's Daily, 24 March 1992. James C. 
Hsiung, “China’s Omni-Directional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope with 
Monopolar US Power,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 6 (June 1995), pp. 573-86.
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suspicion of current stands of ARF is because the principles, norms, and rules are 
still in the process of being discussed and suggested. In this respect, the PRC’s 
involvement in the ARF will be more appealing simply because a routined process 
will enmesh the PRC in co-operative patterns of behaviour. In the meantime, if a 
deeper engagement with the PRC through the ARF has been ASEAN’s purposeful 
design in maintaining regional stability, then the ARF could also be seen as a way 
to invite the US and Japan to join in.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that despite neo-realism’s inability to articulate the 
multilateral ARF phenomenon in the Asia-Pacific, it is still able to produce some 
explanations of international politics that are seen in the distribution of power in 
the ARF. View as a whole, these results mean that changes among powers are 
unlikely to make much difference and that only an enormous shift in this balance 
will lead regional powers to alter their international commitments significantly. In 
sum, on the positive side, the embryonic multilateral security framework in the 
Asia-Pacific region has been supported by the three most influential Great Powers 
in the region in spite of their different interpretations and expectations. The ARF 
could thus be regarded as a means of limiting the impact of Great Power influence 
in the region, on the one hand, and increasing manoeuvrability for the small states 
in the forum on the other. On the negative side, mainly from the PRC, to suggest 
that the PRC is less than forthcoming toward a multilateral regional security 
framework would only raise questions concerning the serious debate about 
international co-operation and the behaviour of Great Powers. A more significant
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question is how the PRC is different from other Great Powers with regard to its 
interests in the multilateral security structure. Nevertheless, a setback for the PRC 
in the Taiwan Strait as a result of American military intervention in March 1996 
has caused serious concern for regional states over the future prospects of the ARF. 
There is little doubt that the PRC’s opposition could cripple a multilateral security 
undertaking in its early stage. In that sense, regional stability will be sorely tested 
by the PRC’s assertiveness on the Taiwan issue, and this may possibly lead to 
hostilities between the US and the PRC. If so, a collapse of the ARF in its infancy 
cannot be ruled out. The next chapter will try to assess Taiwan’s role in a regional 
context and how it interacts with its rival state.
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CHAPTER 5
TAIWAN: THE MODEL OF A TRANSFORMED WORLD?
As suggested in the previous chapter, a multilateral ARF mechanism needs Great 
Powers support. Among them, the PRC has been recognised as a very important 
factor. But its policy towards ARF, to some extent, relies on its relations with 
Taiwan. In this regard, the central aspect of this chapter involves debates over the 
fundamental inquiry about Taiwan’s sovereignty. The chapter will suggest an 
interpretation of Taiwan’s theoretical legitimacy and international political reality. 
In addition, this chapter argues that a state’s policy change according to its 
interest as well as its perception of security. It attempts to make these 
relationships clear and explicit.
Toward this end, the first section is structured to examine a theoretical 
understanding of Taiwan’s status and its international standing. Unlike most 
Third World states, where the state fully controls time and presents formidable 
countervailing pressure against the state, in Taiwan, social, economic, and 
political forces provide important incentives for the regime to change and reform. 
Some major changes have greatly complicated Taipei-Beijing, Beijing- 
Washington, and Washington-Taipei relations.
For Taiwan, the world attention it caught in the 1996 crisis symbolised the 
island’s political maturity and international vulnerabilities. Sadly, as a country 
with a gross national product of well over US$ 200 billion, a GNP per capita of 
US$ 13,000, the third largest foreign reserves (US$ 85 billion in 1998) in the 
world, the world’s 13th largest trading economy, and a maturing democratic
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system, its role in the international community has still remained ambiguous and 
uncertain.
The second section presents an interpretation of how systemic change 
underway in Taiwan and its relations with Beijing. The démocratisation of 
Taiwan, its growing international economic importance, its more pragmatic 
foreign policy, its rapidly expanding contacts with mainland China, and a 
continued US support are major factors influencing Taiwan’s security. However, 
no one accurately knows whether the growth of Taiwan’s identity and the 
increasing self-determination of decision-making processes will eventually lead to 
a declaration of Taiwan’s independence from China. The so-called Taiwan crisis 
in March 1996 can thus be interpreted on the one hand as a warning to Taiwan, 
and, on the other hand, as a declaration by Beijing that outside powers should 
refrain from intervening in China’s internal affairs.1
Unfortunately, the myth of the PRC’s declared “internal affairs” over the 
Taiwan issue was broken by the United States military interference in 1996. By 
sending two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, Washington committed 
itself, according to the TRA (Taiwan Relations Act), to a peaceful solution of the 
Taiwan issue. The implications of such a development suggest that the 
reunification of China could not be translated by Beijing into a simple 
formula—reunification of China by military means. It would be difficult for 
Beijing successfully to use force against Taiwan if Washington intervened on 
Taipei’s behalf. The question is how long the US will continue its commitments
' The PRC’s Prime Minister Li Peng made a speech to senior party officials on 
Chinese New Year on 18 February 1996. People 's Daily, 20 February, 1996. 
See also China Times (Jong Kuo Shih Pao), February 21 1996.
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to Taiwan according to the TRA? This will be discussed in the final section of 
this chapter.
5. 1 TAIWAN?? STATUS
5. 1. 1 A SOVEREIGN STATE?
Taiwan is known officially by the name of the Republic of China (ROC), with 
many common names such as Formosa (“beautiful island” in Portuguese), 
Nationalist China, Island China, the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT), and 
Chinese Taipei. However, the PRC refers to it as Taiwan Province, or a province 
of China. Its political fortune, like its given names has fluctuated. On the one 
hand growing economic prosperity and political démocratisation have given 
Taiwan confidence and resources to cope with its foreign relations on the one 
hand. On the other hand its achievements have also given rise to the freeing of 
the domestic debate about once-taboo fundamental questions of national identity. 
Some are thinking that the time may be ripe for it to present itself for what it has 
become—an independent and sovereign state, recognisable in international law. 
Others acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of China, and do not challenge the 
PRC’s claims to Taiwan. Interestingly, over 60 per cent of Taiwanese people 
support the status quo of a separate and independent Taiwan, with the possibility 
of unification if both sides of the Taiwan Strait are at the same level of prosperity
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and democracy.2 The fact is that although there is a strong sense of Chinese 
nationality amongst the Taiwanese, there seems to be little demand for 
reunification with mainland China, at least under present circumstances. Apart 
from this, there is also some debate about whether Taiwan is an independent state, 
or as the PRC’s claim, an inseparable part of China.
Traditionally, a state is seen as a human community that successfully claims its 
legitimacy within a given territory. Max Weber regarded the state as “the highest 
and ultimate thing in the world.”3 But critics argue that the traditional definition 
of state is purely in terms of its means rather than its ends. As one dictionary of 
politics defines it, “the state is arguably the most central concept in the study of 
politics and its definition is therefore the object of intense scholarly 
contestation.”4 Indeed, the state itself has long been the focus of argument and 
controversy. It is a complex and elusive term in politics. However, there is a 
general recognition that a sovereign state contains four interrelated elements: 
territory, population, legitimacy and force.5 Because of space constraints, a 
detailed investigation of theoretical debate concerning the state is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. The emphasis here is a key points regarding the controversy 
of territory and sovereignty which is related to Taiwan’s present status.
Two points are particularly worth noting. The first is that all concepts of 
territory are part of political beliefs and myths about the unity of a people, or “an
2 Conducted by Gallop Poll and Public Opinion Poll Foundation, Quoted in 
Central Daily News (Chung-Yang Jlh Pao), 5 January 1995.
1 Quoted in Gianfranco Poggi, The Development o f the Modern State, 1978.
4 Iain Mclcan, ed., Oxford : Concise Dictionary o f Politics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 472-76.
' John Hall and John G. Ikenbcrry, The State (Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press. 1989), pp. 1-2. See also H. Gerth and Mills C. Wright, eds.. From Max to 
Weber (London: Routlcdge, 1991), p. 78.
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oral component” of sovereignty.6 Territories, in the traditional sense, allude to the 
natural” unity within a limited space. They are linked to the most powerful form 
of ideological bonding in the modem states—nationalism. Such “imagined
communities,” in Benedict Anderson’s term,7 are now a universal phenomenon 
and usually have deep historical roots. Imagined communities can be created or 
transformed with remarkable rapidity during wars, revolution and political 
upheavals. In this sense, territories could become associated with historical 
images, symbols and traditions, and such territorial imaginations may transcend 
the confines of the state. Moreover, all territories have a psychological 
component”, in Alistair Lamb’s phrase.8 Any threat to the imagined territories 
may provoke emotional reactions of anxiety or hostility and a prickly nationalistic 
response. According to Lamb, in the Third World, especially in Asia where many 
are still struggling in the process of state-building, territories have been seen by 
regimes and local nationalists as an important emotional and psychological 
component to unite disparate peoples.9 It was, for example, not unusual when an 
independent India reacted emotionally and with incomprehension to the PRC’s 
claims for territory on its northern frontiers in the 1950s.
However, all modem states, like traditional states, are confronted by those who 
do not accept the territorial identity ascribed to them. The more radical the 
dissenters, the less likely they are to see themselves as members of the nation” 
and subscribe to the dominant political culture in terms o f which the state
" Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1985), pp. 220-221.
7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflexions on the Origin and 
Spread o f Nationalism (New York: Verso, Revised Edition, 1991), ch. 1.
’ Alistair Lamb, Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem (London: Pall 
Mall Press. 1968). p 8.
5 Ibid.
182
identifies itself. Besides, states often disagree on boundaries and claim quasi- 
jurisdictional interests beyond these boundaries. Challenges thus come not just 
between territories but within territories as well. The more vigorously the state 
asserts its territorial integrity and identity, the more manifest is the challenge from 
within and without. Territory, in this sense, is not an entirely safe or definite 
guide,”10 *and the traditional concept that the sole, exclusive fount of all powers 
and prerogatives of rules”11 of a state could be fully realised if its frontiers were 
made impermeable to unwanted influences is now also open to question.
For instance, attitudes towards territories in highly industrialised states, 
particularly in Europe, have undergone a dramatic change in recent years. Nine of 
the fifteen member states of the EU have already agreed to dismantle border 
controls between them. Border crossings by individuals and the transnational 
communication of information have transformed the psychological and practical 
importance of border controls. In addition, the incapacity of states, more 
precisely of governments, in the modem world to control much of the traffic of 
people, goods and information across their territories is changing the nature of 
states. The important implication of this conceptual change for territories is that 
they are not necessarily exclusive.
As for Taiwan, its development since 1949 has spoken against the PRC 
suggestion that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. Taiwan was indeed the 
place of refuge of the Nationalist (Kuomintang KMT) government in 1949, after 
its defeat by the Chinese Communists. The Taiwanese government, under US 
protection, retained the objective of the reunification of China under its
10 Ibid.
" Gianfranco Poggi, The Development o f  Modern State (London: Hutchinson. 
1978), p. 92.
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leadership, while the PRC consistently adopted the position that Taiwan was part 
of its territory. De facto and then de jure, the international community recognised 
them as two separate states. The economic and social development of the two 
countries diverged, with Taiwan participating fully in the dynamic economic 
growth of the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the démocratisation of Taiwan has 
placed an additional barrier to the reunification of the two states. An assessment 
of the major ingredients of a state suggests that Taiwan is indeed a sovereign 
state.12 Unless Beijing takes military action (which has proved inadmissible) or 
the US and other states change their policies, territorial reunification, under such 
circumstance, can now only be seen as a political myth.
Another important point is whether the idea of legitimacy indicates an absolute 
right to extend one’s rule to those who have never been ruled. Legitimacy can be 
identified in hierarchical form, which implies the power which conforms to rules 
and involves consent from those subordinates. It is generally accepted that a state 
has to impose a force which rightfully commands the obedience of subjects and 
works for the good of all. This argument, however, evokes much unease. For 
using force against its own people for whatever the reasons violates social 
relationships by treating subjects as objects, and hence both the administrator and 
the victim of force are degraded. In other words, when force is applied, the 
people have become a mere object. It is argued that force itself, when the state 
uses it, destroys the relationship between the state and its people and undermines 
the legitimacy of the administrator and the society as well.11 More importantly, if 
legitimacy is a necessary part of a state overall identity, then the self-
12 Michael Yahuda, “The International Standing of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, No. 148 (December 1996), pp. 1319-1339.
184
determination of its part means to deny the state’s right to enforce its commands. 
That is to say, the state is legitimate simply because it successfully claims its 
legitimacy. However, a state is no more legitimate when it fails to extend its 
identity.
From both the legitimacy and the jurisdiction points of view, it is quite clear 
that Taiwan has never been ruled by the mainland government, just as Taipei has 
never extended its legitimacy over the mainland. In that sense, Taiwan enjoys de 
facto independence because the PRC has never had the right to claim it. Taiwan 
is not “an integral part of China”, any more than the United States is part of 
Britain. Moreover, Taiwan has a population of more than twenty million, a 
modem armed force, one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and a 
successful democratic system. If boundaries define identities,14 as Malcolm 
Anderson claims, the logic of Taiwan’s situation is that it is a de jure sovereign 
state within its own frontier and its own legitimacy, and one whose right to self- 
determination has never been yielded to mainland China.
On the other hand, if a decision about Taiwan’s status were based on the 
traditional criteria of international legal forms, Taiwan would certainly be 
absolutely a sovereign state, for it has adequate territory, sufficient population, a 
ruling government of its own, and diplomatic ties. Although its diplomatic ties 
are weak, its territory is larger than many nation-states in the world today; its 
population is quite larger than average. More importantly, its government is more 
stable than most Third World countries and seeks to assume more international 
responsibilities. In short, Taiwan is easily qualified as an independent state from
'* For a detailed discussion of the problem of legitimacy see John Hoffman,
Beyond the State (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 76-93.
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a modem view point, especially in terms of the practice established by the United 
Nations and the international law.
5. 1. 2 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS
So then, is Taiwan a Chinese island like Singapore? Or is it both independent 
from China while nominally part of it? Or is it an undefined entity that is state­
like and non-state? The nub of these questions and uncertainties is in practice a 
matter of politics rather than international law. The issue of recognition by other 
states, insists one analyst, is decided basically by the consideration of interest 
instead of legal principle.14 5 Indeed, it is the international political reality that 
Taiwan drifts towards a kind of ambiguity.
Given Taiwan’s success in economics, political democracy, present level of ties 
with the outside world, as well as its sovereignty viewed from any theoretical 
perspective, its status in the international community still remains unclear. More 
than 140 countries nowadays formally recognise the PRC as the legitimate 
government of China and acknowledge that Taiwan is “a part of China”, despite 
the fact that Taiwan maintains official diplomatic relations with 30 countries, 
mostly in Central America and Africa. Nevertheless, Taiwan is, in a sense, 
recognised by most countries in the world as a separate independent political 
entity. As a de facto sovereign state, the questions which constantly haunt the 
Taiwanese people are: Why is Taiwan not, or cannot be formally accepted by the
14 Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern 
World (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 4-5.
15 See, for example, Hungdah Chiu, The International Legal Status o f the Republic 
o f China (Baltimore. Maryland: Occasional Paper / Reprint Series in 
Contemporary Asian Studies, revised edition. No. 5, 1995), pp. 3-7.
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international community? Why cannot it express its identity through its 
relationships with others?
The questions are unlikely to be answered easily. Theoretically, there is only 
one China. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that. But in reality there are two 
or at least one China, one Taiwan. The difference is that the majority part of 
China is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); while a small part of 
China is governed by the KMT. Most countries in the world want to deal with 
both sides and hope that the issues between them can be solved peacefully. 
However, the contest for international recognition from both sides has never 
ceased since 1949 because Taiwan hopes for consideration and support for its 
right to choose, while the PRC claims that China’s sovereignty resides in the PRC 
and has been relentless in its efforts to suppress Taiwan in the international 
community. Taiwan’s position, for more than two decades since 1949, was to 
maintain the basic principle of a “one China” policy in the hope that China would 
one day be reunified by the Nationalist government. For Beijing, its position in 
the first twenty years after its establishment seemed more to be based on 
consolidating its regime than in pursuing a “one China” policy.
Taiwan’s ability to implement such a policy be ascribed to various factors: the 
PRC’s intervention in the Korean War and its condemnation by the UN as an 
aggressor; the strong opposition of the US to the recognition of Beijing and the 
inclination in many countries to follow the lead of the US; fears of PRC-instigated 
subversion by leaders in countries with large overseas Chinese minorities; and the 
PRC’s activities during the Cultural Revolution (1966-77), which provoked anger
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and suspicion in certain countries.16 US support seemed to be the single most 
important factor for Taiwan to maintain that course. In fact, many countries 
would have established diplomatic ties with both the PRC and the ROC on 
Taiwan if they had not been forced to choose, but any arrangement that might 
have caused a suspicion of two Chinas” was immediately rejected by both Beijing 
and Taipei.
In the 1970s, two serious diplomatic setbacks faced Taiwan. The first was the 
loss of its UN seat, which was seen as its greatest asset in presenting itself 
internationally as a credible national government, rather than simply as a US 
surrogate. With its failure in the UN, Taiwan had to fight hard to preserve its 
representation in a number of other international organisations at a time when too 
many countries too easily deferred to Beijing’s one China principle. Although 
Taiwan remained in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for 
several years after 1971, it was eventually forced out under the PRC’s pressure. 
By the end of the 1970s, Taiwan remained active in a fairly large number but less 
significant and less political international bodies. Its diplomatic recognition 
dropped sharply from 68 to 26 countries, mostly small states in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.17 In December 1978, another setback came when the US and the 
PRC suddenly announced the full normalisation of diplomatic relations. Although 
the shock was softened by actions taken by the US Congress, which enacted the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) signed into the law in April 1979, Taiwan, without 
American assistance, became isolated from the international community. Yet,
16 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 
pp. 153-155.
17 Ibid., p. 154. See also Simon Long, Taiwan: China 's Last Frontier (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1991), pp. 129-130.
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Taipei’s non-official relations with other countries in the world, such as sports, 
cultural and economic ties, still remained volatile.
In the 1980s, as Taiwan experienced fast surges of economic growth on the 
back of soaring exports, the dislocation between its economic capacity and 
international status became acute and evident. The logic of this posture was clear. 
Since 1949, the KMT had consistently used the “anti-communism”, the role 
legitimate government of China, and the recovery of mainland China myths as 
legal guidelines for its foreign policy. It was a rigidly ideological foreign policy 
that meant swallowing diplomatic pride and accepting a limited re-emergence on 
the international political stage as a player in its own right. In other words, 
Taiwan’s isolation in the international community was largely erected by its own 
government’s “one China” policy rather than by the international community 
itself. It was not until the late 1980s that the Taiwanese government was forced to 
accept new realities by adopting a more realistic foreign policy.
Since 1988, when Lee Teng-Hui succeeded as the President of the ROC on 
Taiwan, Taipei has embarked on a less ideological foreign policy—the so-called 
pragmatic or “flexible” diplomacy. This has meant that in order to break its 
stalemate in foreign relations, the KMT government has no longer insisted that it 
is the sole legitimate government of China and has subsequently renounced the 
use of force to recover the mainland China. This policy change was viewed by 
Beijing as a ploy covered by the “one China” flag but actually designed to secure 
the international recognition of Taiwan as a separate state.18 In fact, pressures on 
the KMT government to make such a change were generated by various factors. 
On the one hand, domestically, political démocratisation and growing discontent
" Beijing Review, 22 May 1989, p. 19.
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with the one China” myth precipitated the political crisis of China identity”. On 
the other hand, Taiwan’s financial credentials made its government and people 
seek to be accepted as an economically important and effective political entity in 
the world. In the past, between the 1970s and the early 1980s, Taiwan’s public 
opinion had strongly supported economic growth by maintaining good relations 
with the developed Western countries which provided capital investments and 
markets for Taiwan’s foreign trade even as Taiwan’s global status declined. But 
rapid economic growth, the growing cosmopolitan nature of the country, and the 
démocratisation of the political system markedly increased the pressure of public 
opinion on the formulation of some important foreign policy decisions. In the 
December 1989 elections, the opposition party politicians (Democratic 
Progressive Party DPP), who represented the opinion of a significant percentage 
of the island’s inhabitants, won nearly half the seats in the Legislative Yuan. 
They openly expressed support for Taiwan independence, which caused great 
concerns for both the KMT government and Communist China. This outcome, 
helped to push the KMT government forward to test the international waters as to 
formal recognition and readmission to international institutions so that the 
existing government could be seen to be in line with the public opinion in Taiwan. 
Trade and economic relations were thus translated into potential diplomatic 
commitments and future support for Taiwan’s sovereignty as circumstances 
greatly enhanced Taiwan’s international economic influence when its diplomatic 
ties seemed to be tenuous.
Internationally, diplomatic isolation undermined the legitimacy of the existing 
government, and international recognition and acceptance enhanced its prospects 
for consolidation. As the world situation changed, Taiwan also adjusted its
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foreign policy. The government and the people on Taiwan realised that time was 
not on their side in the struggle with Beijing for international recognition, and that 
their previous position was untenable, which implied that the one China” principle 
had to be revised. Taiwan’s new approach was to move in several directions: 
developing official ties wherever possible, upgrading existing non-official 
relations, and actively participating in international organisations.” Taiwan 
became more flexible and sophisticated in the conduct of its foreign relations. The 
implication was that whatever the formally stated policy might be, in practice 
Taiwan was prepared to live with dual recognition or some suitable formula that 
suited the unspoken reality of two Chinas, or one China and one Taiwan. For one 
thing, in 1988, President Lee Teng-Hui visited Singapore as the President of 
Taiwan rather than the President of the Republic of China because, as he said on 
his return, it is unnecessary for us to care too much about the name.”20 Moreover, 
he took a series of new diplomatic initiatives: seeking dual recognition, applying 
for membership in the WTO, conducting unofficial state visits, and launching a 
bid for a seat in the UN General Assembly.21 In July 1989, Grenada, one typical 
example, made history by establishing what was regarded as dual recognition”. It 
established diplomatic relations with Taiwan without at the same time breaking 
formal ties with the PRC. But this situation lasted only few months.
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that although Taiwan constantly portrayed itself 
as a small state being bullied by the PRC in order to win prestige and sympathy in
'* ROC Foreign Affairs Report, GIO (Government Information Office), 1993, p. 6.
20 United Daily (Lian-Ho Pao), 21 March 1988. See also Far Eastern Economic 
Review 23 March 1988.
21 Yun-han Chu, Fu Hu and Chung-in Moon, “South Korea and Taiwan: The 
International Context,” in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Planner, Yun-han Chu, and 
Hung-mao Tien, eds.. Consolidation the Third Wave Democracies: Regional
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the international community, it also decided to open its mainland China policy 
after four decades of separation in the hope that by transferring Taiwan 
successful economic experiences and political démocratisation to mainland China, 
the PRC could be transformed peacefully.22 Apart from this, Taipei took the one 
China but not now” and one China two governments” initiatives in response to 
Beijing’s one China two systems” propaganda. In the face of an increasing 
demand for Taiwan’s independence, Beijing reluctantly adopted a more peaceful 
way to reach reunification by calling on Taipei to place national interests first, to 
consider the time and trend, and behave itself.”23 The implication of Taipei- 
Beijing interaction suggested that policy change undertaken by one party through 
unilateral actions for its own interests might also lead to policy change on the part 
of the other party. But deep-rooted suspicions between the two sides made any 
concrete confidence-building measures extremely difficult.
In sum, Taiwan has been moderately successful in its effort to avoid being 
isolated from the international community. Most countries that want to deal with 
both Beijing and Taipei will have to continue to finesse the two relationships to 
avoid offending either, and so far they have managed remarkably well. It is also 
true that whatever the formal titles Taiwan might use in international venues, 
leaders of the PRC will never cease to reject any implicit recognition of Taiwan as 
an independent state. Even so, Taiwan’s policy will still remain separate and
'X
independent. It will preserve the present ambiguity (status quo) on the questions 
of reunification and independence because the Taiwanese government does not
Challenges (Baltimore and London: the John Hopkings University Press, 1997), 
p. 274.
22 Ramon Myers, “Transferring the Republic of China’s Modernisation Experience 
to the People’s Republic of China," in Klintworth, ed., Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific 
in the 1990s, pp. 169-94.
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want to create a crisis with Beijing or problems for the United States and 
neighbouring countries. The key question is: how long can a modernised Taiwan 
endure such an ambiguity.
5.1.3 TAIWAN^ MODERNISATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In his article entitled The Clash of Civilization?” and the book The Third Wave: 
Démocratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Samuel Huntington suggests that 
the peoples and governments of non-western civilizations, most significantly 
Taiwan and South Korea, are no longer objects of history, but have joined the 
West as fellow movers and shapers. However, he sees democracy as a result 
rather than a variable. That is, either democracy exists or it does not. It can not 
exist in degrees. He argues that Confucian and Islamic cultures are incompatible 
with democracy.23 4 From his point of view, the prospects for democracy in 
countries cultivated by Confucian culture” are pessimistic. In other words, a 
country like Taiwan would never be considered democratic even with a 
democratic form of direct presidential election. Later, in his recent book The 
Clash o f Civilisations and the Remaking o f World Order, Huntington concludes 
that in East Asia , while Christian leaders promoted movement to democracy in 
South Korea and Taiwan. . . .  By the 1990s, except for Cuba, democratic 
transitions had occurred in most of the countries, outside Africa, whose peoples
23 People 's Daily (Overseas edition), July 13, 1989.
24 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 
No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49. See also in Huntington’s “Religion and the 
Third Wave,” The National Interest, Vol. 24 (Summer 1991), pp. 29-42; and 
Huntington’s The Third Wave: Démocratisation in the late Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1991), pp. 6-7.
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espoused Western Christianity or where major Christian influences existed.”25 
Apparently, Huntington has attributed political liberalisation in Taiwan and Korea 
to the promotion of “Christian leaders”, rather than seeking it as an interaction 
between economic prosperity and the evolution of democracy. As far as Taiwan 
is concerned, Huntington’s explanation seems unconvincing.
Taiwan’s successful political transformation has attributed to many causes, but 
Christianity has not yet appeared to be significant. Taiwan’s experience suggests 
that an authoritarian regime with a highly educated population can transform itself 
quite peacefully while its economic growth continues. Apart from this, “political 
liberalisation in Taiwan has become possible because of maturing socioeconomic 
preconditions, the ruling elite’s responsive decision to undertake major reforms, 
and successful interplays between the ruling party and the oppositions that have 
averted full-scale violence,”26 says Hung-mao Tien, a leading Taiwanese analyst. 
Democracy involves recognising both “difference” and the existence of common 
interests which enable people with different identities to change their places and 
share common principles. More broadly, because democracy is about individuals, 
it embraces localities, nations and regions and an increasingly interdependent 
international community in which the freedom of one individual can be sustained 
only by the freedom of all others. Hence democracy is international as well as 
national. In this regard, a democratic society in Taiwan could lead to the 
emergence of “Taiwanese identity” or “Taiwanisation” to use the common term.
25 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilisations and the Remaking o f  World 
Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 192-93.
26 Hung-mao Tien, “Taiwan’s Evolution Toward Democracy: A Historical 
Perspective”, in Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau, eds., Taiwan: Beyond 
the Economic Miracle (New York: M. E. Sharp, 1992), p. 21.
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Such separate identity based on liberal democratic values “has made the island the 
first Chinese democracy,” according to some scholars.27
Equally important, economic modernisation plays a major role in many of the 
important social and political changes seen in Taiwan in recent years. A 
prevailing understanding in the study of political and economic development 
stresses that economic modernisation creates an irresistible pressure for liberal 
democratic political change. Authoritarian politics may provide the initial 
stability necessary for economic growth, but as fully developed modernity 
approaches it becomes increasingly redundant and reluctantly withers away.28 
Indeed, the legitimacy crisis in an authoritarian government could stem more from 
modernisation rather than repression. This is the fruits of the economic growth 
often run counter to the traditional values and beliefs of the people, on which 
many authoritarian regimes are based. Furthermore, economic modernisation 
could increasingly challenge regime stability by introducing new criteria of 
legitimacy and Western concepts of political participation. This is exactly the 
case in Taiwan and South Korea. However, some cases in Arabian and Asian 
states have demonstrated that authoritarian regimes might wage a war with other 
states so that their survival could be justified. Viewed in this way, Taiwan’s 
experiences in political liberalisation without serious violence and economic
27 L. Chao and R. Myers, “The First Chinese Democracy: Political Development 
of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1986-1994,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV,
No. 3, 1994, pp. 213-30.
21 Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” 
Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor o f Seymour Martin Upset, Gary 
Marks and Larry Diamond, eds. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992), pp. 93-139.
See also Edward N. Muller, “Economic Determinants of Democracy,” in Manus I. 
Midlarsky. ed Inequality. Democracy, and Economic Development (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 133-53.
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disruption are highly significant for other developing states in the Asia-Pacific 
region.
Nevertheless, a democratic Taiwan certainly causes serious concerns for the 
PRC. A democratically elected president in Taiwan, in Beijing’s view, is 
tantamount to sending a signal of Taiwan’s independence. No one really knows 
whether Taiwanisation would be translated into independence. But a 
democratically elected president and the démocratisation of the political system 
and decision-making process would greatly increase such a possibility. This is 
what the PRC fears most, and measures to highlight Beijing’s intransigent 
position, under this situation, are necessary.
In this regard, democracy in Taiwan could be a double-edged sword. On the 
negative side, it could invite the PRC’s strong reactions, possibly a military 
invasion. On the one hand, the démocratisation of Taiwan would inevitably 
discredit the PRC’s sovereignty claim over the island and nullify Beijing’s 
peaceful unification campaign. Also, it might fuel PRC’s nationalism and provide 
an excuse for ultra-nationalists to justify military activity toward the island. 
Meanwhile, it would set a bad example for Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia, 
which have long been struggling for their independence, if Beijing took no action. 
On the other hand, Taiwan’s political modernisation might cause internal 
upheavals and thereby limit its own capacity to mobilise against external 
aggression. Evidently, such a perceived threat to regime survival was experienced 
over the tensions in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. Despite the US willingness to 
safeguard the right of self-rule and democratic election in Taiwan, it is still 
unlikely that Washington would bear the responsibility of military confrontation 
with Beijing. That, in Washington’s view, would destabilise the Asia-Pacific
region and lead to “a new Cold War” in which the US might well find itself 
isolated from its Asian and European allies.
From this perspective, démocratisation in Taiwan has incurred an acute security 
dilemma not only for itself but also for all states that cherish it.29 For Taiwan, 
démocratisation has won an international reputation and moral support, but 
questions about its international status and cross-strait relations still remain 
unsolved. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that democracy has become an 
essential ingredient of Taiwan’s national security as long as Beijing is prepared to 
use force to interrupt it.
5. 2 TAIWAN’S MAINLAND POLICY
Cheng-Yi Lin suggests that in the face of the primary threat to its survival from 
the PRC, Taiwan has several options to deal with mainland China: balance of 
power, collective security, and functional co-operation.10 In terms of the balance 
of power, there exists an obvious gap in military capability between Taiwan and 
the PRC, which will be addressed later. Although some may see Taiwan’s 
purchase of modem military equipments, such as F-16s and Mirages-2000, as a 
successful application of this strategy, most believe that Taiwan could not prevent 
the PRC from achieving military superiority in the long run. Moreover, there 
seems no formal and reliable military alliances to support Taiwan against 
mainland China. This also implies an impossible option for Taiwan to participate
” A detailed Taiwan’s democratic security see Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, 
“Building Democracy in Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, No. 148 (December 
1996), pp. 1141-70.
10 Cheng-Yi Lin, “Taiwan’s Security Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era,” Issues 
and Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (April 19*3), pp. 87-97.
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in collective security, for it needs the commitment of member states to come to 
the rescue in case of being invaded. In contrast to the balance of power and 
collective security, a functional approach starts from economic, cultural and social 
co-operation, through which natural spillover effects will extend to security 
related issues. More significantly, such an approach has also been used as a way 
of promoting the reunification of divided nations.51 Accordingly, the following 
sections examine whether a functional approach really reflects on Taiwan’s 
mainland policy.
5. 2. 1 ECONOMIC COMPLEMENTARITY
“To keep the status quo is simply a way to escape the reality for a temporary ease. 
It is tantamount to having no policy, giving up one initiative and drifting with 
the events.”32 Two Chinese scholars offered this critique of Taiwan’s mainland 
policy in the mid-1980s. Indeed, it had long been clear that Taiwan’s mainland 
policy was the product mostly of domestic political determinants, and in that 
sphere the situation seemed quite apparent. A small group of elderly hard-liners 
had taken power, and the only policy toward the mainland was “Three NOs”—  no 
contact, no negotiation, and no compromise. The reforms were not merely 
impossible but sometimes dangerous, and political and economic rightism and 
repression were the orders of the day. 31*
31 Michael Haas, “The Functionalist Approach to Korean Reunification,” in
Michael Haas, ed., Korean Reunification: Alternative Pathways (New York:
Praeger, 1989), pp. 37-38.
31 Li Shengzhi and Zi Zhongyun, “Taiwan in the Next Decade”, Paper prepared for
Atlantic Council Conference on Taiwan, Washington, DC, March 1985, p. 17.
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But the situation has changed rapidly since the late 1980s, and political 
démocratisation amidst further economic development has proceeded at a fast 
pace. The result for long-term KMT government was, for the first time since 
1949, uncertain. The breakthrough in relations with the mainland occurred in 
October 1987, when Taipei announced that visits to mainland relatives would be 
legalised.” Such a policy, approved by the people on Taiwan and welcomed by 
the PRC, radically changed the cross-strait relationship by opening the gateway to 
a flood of visitors from Taiwan to the mainland. To a certain extent, these visitors 
have constructed a network of economic interdependence between two sides. 
Both Taiwan and the PRC have recognised the advantages of this economic 
interaction. Although the KMT government continued to prohibit direct trade and 
investment between Taiwan and mainland, trade and investment proceeded in 
tandem through Hong Kong. According to Hong Kong’s customs statistics, 
Taiwan-PRC trade via Hong Kong increased from US$ 1.22 billion in 1987 to 
US$ 8.69 billion in 1993.34 (see Table 5.1) These figures, according to Kao 
Chang, an economist in Taipei, understated the actual amount of trade between 
the two sides. He believed that the real figure, if one included goods via Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, and other countries, would amount to US$ 13.6 billion.15 
The rapid and steady increase in trade and investment between two sides reflected 
the complementarity of the two economies. In reality, Taiwan gained more 
economic benefit than the mainland.
” Central Daily (Jung Yung Zih Pao), 21 October 1987 and United Daily, October 
21 and 23 1987.
34 China Post, 12 March 1994. See also Chamg Kao, “Economic Interdependence 
Between Taiwan and Mainland China,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (April 
1993), pp. 54-55.
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From an international trade perspective, the growing dependence of Taiwan’s 
trade on the mainland, or the so-called “mainland fever”, is quite natural and 
inesistible trend. In the face of growing high wages and labour shortage in 
Taiwan, factories that produced such items as toys, footwear, umbrellas, clothing 
and cheap electronic products became less competitive in the global market. The 
mainland advantages of proximity, common language, similar customs, cheaper 
labour and land, and natural resources would certainly offer a great incentive for 
Taiwan businessmen to relocate their factories. Furthermore, the mainland itself 
also offers an enormous domestic market for the consumption of Taiwan products. 
The mainland has already become Taiwan’s third largest economic partner (after 
the US and Japan), its second buyer (US$ 19 billion in 1996) and first investment 
destination (US$ 2.8 billion in 1995).36 By the end of 1996, more than 3,000 
companies and over 100,000 Taiwanese inhabited the mainland. Under such 
circumstances, Taiwan's economic policy makers could no longer ignore the 
significance of mainland China, and the calls for a policy change were strong.
Indeed, pressures to allow direct travel and trade between two sides have been 
increasing, particularly after Hong Kong returned to the PRC in 1997. Even 
within the KMT government itself, debates on the issue commenced. While 
recognising the economic advantages of investment and trade between Taiwan 
and the mainland, many government officials in Taiwan suspected the PRC’s 
political motivations as the ultimate goal of reunification. For instance, the PRC’s 
trade policy toward Taiwanese businessmen has been different from that towards
” Quoted in Philip Liu, “Mixed Diagnosis for Mainland Fever,” Free China 
Review, Vol. 43, No. 9 (September 1993), p. 44. See also China Post, 27 January 
1994.
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other nationals. By setting up many special-purpose offices at various levels to 
deal with economic and other relations with Taiwan, Beijing has centralised its 
Taiwan policy even in business affairs.37 Apart from this, Taipei has also feared 
that too large an economic investment and too heavy a dependence on exports to 
the mainland would give Beijing powerful economic leverage against Taiwan. As 
one Taiwan high-ranking official put it: “the PRC’s policy is to absorb us 
economically, isolate us internationally, subvert us politically, and suppress us 
militarily.”38 Another possible side-effect caused by direct travel and trade would 
be smuggling and illegal entry into Taiwan, which could create serious social 
unrest on the island.
But one critic argues that if the government in Taiwan intended to turn itself 
into an Asia-Pacific financial and commercial operation centre, it would be 
unlikely to achieve this when its direct travel and trade to the mainland were 
officially banned.39 Even the DPP party leader, Shu Shih-Lian, publicly urged the 
government of Taiwan to adopt a “Westward” strategy. He insisted that only 
through such a policy could Taiwan survive and become an inseparable partner of 
mainland China. By doing so, misperceptions and miscalculations could be
,6 China News, 3 February 1996, p. 10 and 17 February 1996, p. 9. See also Jean- 
Pierre Cabestan, “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy: Normalisation, Yes; Reunification, 
Later,” The China Quarterly, No. 148 (December 1996), p. 1272.
” Raymond J. M Chang and Pei-chen Chang, “Taiwan’s Emerging Economic 
Relations with the PRC,” in Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau, eds., 
Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (New York: M. E. Sharp, 1992), pp. 291- 
94
" Quoted in David Shambaugh, “Thinking the Unthinkable”, Free China Review, 
Vol. 46, No. 3, (June 1996), p. 57.
” Philip Bowring, “Regional Role Re-evaluated,” Free China Review, Vol. 46, 
No. 3 (March 1996), pp. 39-40.
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minimised.40 But the KMT government still remained cautious on its mainland 
policy.
Suffice it to say, Shu is right. It has long been clear that economic and trade 
links between Taiwan and the mainland in recent years have increased their 
interdependence and, to some degree, also reduced the hostility between the 
people on both sides. However, the fundamental difference between Taiwan and 
the PRC in their views of the status of Taiwan retards their interaction in their 
pursuit of an agreement on how to co-operate with each other. Moreover, there 
still exist too many other variables, and there is no good way to order them, weigh 
their comparative importance, and choose a most likely future. And reality in any 
case is always the product as much of surprises and unforeseen events as it is of 
the projection into the future of current trends. All that could be done is to spell 
out some of the prospects. And a progressive change in the PRC, of course, 
would be seen as one of the most important variables. Taiwan, expectantly, plays 
a major role.
5.2.2 POLITICAL IMPASSE
The multiplicity of contacts between the people on both sides inevitably posed 
problems that were difficult to resolve in the absence of direct and official 
communication between the two governments. The Mainland Affairs Council 
(MAC) was thus founded in Taipei in 1988 by the Executive Yuan to co-ordinate 
the various government agencies in charge of implementing mainland policy and 
to control the pace of exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. Under the National
* China Times (Jung gou shih pau) and United Daily, 14 and 15 February 1998.
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Unification Guidelines (NUG) that were accepted by the cabinet, the Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF), a quasi-official institution, was established in Taipei 
in February 1991.'" It was commissioned by the MAC to negotiate with PRC 
officials on matters related to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the 
meantime, the PRC also established the Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Straits (ARATS) to serve as the SEF negotiating partner.
Although both the SEF and the ARATS were instructed to negotiate technical 
problems related to people-to-people relations and avoid political matters, the 
institutions found it very difficult, largely because of their basic disagreement on 
that issue of Taiwan’s status. The ARATS insisted on the one China” principle, 
which meant that Taiwan was a province of the PRC, while the SEF rejected such 
a proposal. Consequently, it took these two bodies two years to reach agreement 
on the verification of documents notarised by the PRC.41 2 However, such talks did 
at least provide a channel for communication. Compromise eventually made 
possible the signing agreements at the first meeting of the chairman of the SEF 
and ARATS, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, in Singapore in April 1993. 
Interestingly, both sides stressed their victory in the meeting with different 
interpretations. The PRC portrayed the meeting as a step toward unification, 
while the Taiwanese government emphasised it in terms of equality. The ROC 
Premier, now the vice president. Lien Chan, declared that the meeting was the
41 The ROC government‘s National Unification Guidelines proposed a three-stage 
process of national unification. The first stage was based on the principles of 
“exchanges and reciprocity.” The second stage, or the mid-term objective, was 
based on the principles of “mutual trust and co-operation.” The final stage, or the 
long-term objective, would be “consultation and unification.” For a detailed 
discussion, see Ying-jeou Ma, “The Republic of China’s Policy Toward the 
Chinese Mainland,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2 (February 1992), pp. 1-10.
42 Ralph Clough. Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 172-174.
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political reality that “Taiwan and the mainland are two equal and separate political 
entities.”43 Even so, delegates from both sides still sought to bypass the 
impediment arising from Taiwan’s judicial autonomy. Such de facto govemment- 
to-govemment contacts did achieve a number of results, and the 
institutionalisation of two agencies channel by such talks allowed a subsequent 
consensus in principle on the repatriation of hijackers, illegal immigrants, and 
fisheries disputes.
As noted above, the gap between Taipei and Beijing’s discourses on the 
reunification of China has not been narrowed by growing people-to-people 
contacts. On the contrary, the démocratisation of Taiwan’s political system and 
the PRC’s insisting on extending its sovereignty over Taiwan through the one 
country, two systems” arrangement actually widened this gap. For example, the 
two sides were unable to reach an agreement on the protection of Taiwan 
investments on the mainland because Taipei wanted Beijing to sign a bilateral 
investment accord and regard Taiwan as an equal political entity in relations with 
the mainland. In response to Taipei’s request, Beijing issued a document entitled 
“The Taiwan Question and the Unification of China”, in which the PRC 
government highlighted its position on four principles—only one China, 
coexistence of two systems, a high degree of autonomy, and peace negotiations.44 
This so-called PRC “White Paper” sounded a warning that the use of force might 
not be ruled out to achieve unification.
For Taipei, it made clear that there is no Taiwan question; there is only “China 
question,” and thereby it released a document drafted by the MAC, namely 41*
41 China Post, 4 May 1991.
" Beijing Review, 6-12 September 1993, pp. I-V1II.
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“relations across the Taiwan Strait” (Taihai lianan guanxi shuomingshu). The 
document states:
The ROC government is firm in its advocacy of one China,” and it is 
opposed to two Chinas” or one China, one Taiwan.” But at the same 
time, given that the division of the country between two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait is a historical and political fact, the ROC government 
also holds that the two sides should be fully aware that each has 
jurisdiction over its respective territory and that they should coexist as 
two legal entities in the international arena. . . As democracy matures 
in Taiwan, public opinion will necessarily become the government 
most important reference for formulating mainland policy.45
Obviously, the ROC government had two fundamental interests: avoiding a 
military confrontation with the PRC, and maintaining the political support of the 
majority of the Taiwanese people. In other words, maintaining the status quo 
served these dual interests and objectives. In this regard, little progress was 
therefore made on both sides after early 1994, despite the fact that negotiators of 
the two sides managed to continue their discussions with a less formal agenda. As 
official talks between the two sides remained impossible because differences over 
definitions of Taiwan’s sovereignty effectively blocked any substantial 
agreements, the reunification of China became a more complicated issue in 
political talks than in discussion of economic interdependence between the two 
governments.
In short, if the strong, mutually complementary economic relationship that led 
to an increase in interdependence between both Taiwan and the mainland could be 
seen as a positive sign of a peaceful unification in the future, then political talks 
on both sides shed a rather pessimistic light on their future. From the recent
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history of divided states, a formal acknowledgement of the actual separation may 
be a necessary prelude to political unification, as seen in the examples of 
Germany and Korea. From mutual de facto recognition, de jure recognition, to 
cross recognition, several preliminary stages, for instance, could be characterised 
by amity or enmity. If states at least recognise each other’s existence as states, 
then they may gradually come to appreciate the need for unification.45 6 
Nevertheless, in this case the result of the talks reflected the caution with which 
Taipei approached political contact with Beijing. The PRC, on the other hand, 
sought to expand contact with Taiwan to the official level as soon as possible. 
This coincided with the apparent interests of the two governments. The ROC 
government wanted to postpone reunification possibly until such time as the 
Chinese Communists Party could no longer dominate the mainland's political 
system, or as the PRC government could eventually accept Taiwan as an 
independent state. The PRC wanted to expedite reunification while it was still in 
a dominant position. Under such circumstances, the determining variable, in 
Beijing’s view, would perhaps rely more on unilateral military activity than on 
bilateral talks.
45 Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, Relations Across 
the Taiwan Strait (Taipei, 1994), p. 14.
46 Germany has already completed its reunification, while Korea still remains 
divided. However, a treaty was signed between the two Koreas in 1991: 
Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Co-operation 
between the South and the North. See Helmut Schmidt, “Lessons of the German 
Reunification for Korea,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No. 44 (December 1993), 
pp. 397-408; Yang Sung-Chul, “The Lessons of United Germany for Divided 
Korea,” in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World Beyond the Cold War 
(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 261-278; Tae Hwan Ok, “The Process 
of South-North Dialogue and Perspective for Unification of Korea,” The Korea 
Journal o f  National Unification (Seoul: Research Institute for National 
Unification, RINU), Vol. 1, 1992, pp. 85-106.
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5. 2. 3 M IL IT A R Y  D E T E R R E N C E
War has long been regarded as the natural means to pursue national objectives, 
either in the sense that states actually fought wars to see who won and who lost, or 
in the sense that statesmen assessed their chances of prevailing in possible wars 
and acted accordingly. By implication, most states might therefore claim to be 
mistakenly divided” in the sense of having lost parts previously belonging to 
them. In this respect, territorial aggrandisement was also regarded as a perfect 
legitimate endeavour for states. But what had been seen as legitimate in the past 
is now regarded by the international community as unlawful and wrongful. The 
key questions are: such concepts are applicable to Taiwan’s case, and how many 
countries would support Taiwan if the PRC launched a military invasion? Even 
though Beijing might not use force to speed up the reunification process, due to 
the steady integration of Taiwan and the mainland through economic and cultural 
links, the PRC is still seen by Taiwan as a major threat to its national security.47
From 1949 to 1997 Taiwan was attacked or coerced by the PRC on four 
occasions: in 1940, 1958, 1995 and 1996 respectively. Its defence policy, unlike 
its ambiguous international identity and status, seeks to protect national security 
from being threatened by the PRC.48 Indeed, the PRC’s intentions to use force 
against Taiwan are crucial determinants of ROC security. Although the PRC has 
been seeking cordial relations with the US, focusing on its domestic economic 
development, and lacking substantial military capabilities across the Taiwan Strait 
(probably the most powerful reasons for it not to use force against Taiwan), 
Beijing has never relinquished the possibility of using force to liberate” Taiwan,
47 ROC National Defence Report 1993-1994, pp. 83-85.
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and it has always been explicit about the conditions under which it might use 
force against Taiwan. These conditions include:
• If and when Taiwan declares itself independent"
• If and when an internal upheaval occurs on the island
• If and when the ROC Armed Forces on Taiwan are comparatively weak
• If and when any foreign power interferes in Taiwan’s internal affairs
• If and when Taiwan protractedly refuses to talk with the PRC about the issue 
of unification
• If and when Taiwan develops nuclear weapons49
If the possible triggers for a PRC use of force against Taiwan, the most 
probable would be a clear indication from Taipei authorities that they intended to 
move toward de jure independence from mainland China,” according to one 
view.50 Indeed, a democratic Taiwan, as noted earlier, suggests such probability. 
Many analysts—William Perry, Anthony Lake and Joseph S. Nye for 
example—have argued that because the PRC has not yet had enough military 
capability to cross the Taiwan Strait, despite its verbal criticism, the likelihood of 
an invasion of Taiwan is remote. But they warn that it would still be regarded as 
dangerous to provoke mainland China by announcing Taiwan’s independence and 
underestimating Beijing’s reactions.51 A different view, however, is expressed by 
Chiang Chung-lin, the ROC’s Defence Minister. He pointed out that Beijing’s
41 Ibid.
^ Ibid., pp. 86-87. See also Long’s Taiwan: China 's Last Frontier, pp. 239-43.
50 Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., I f  China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: 
The International Response (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), p. 
vii. See also Martin L. Lasater, “US-ROC-PRC Relations in an Era of Systemic 
Change”, Paper presented at the 4th Tamkang University-University of Illinois 
Conference at Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan, 1992, pp. 39-58.
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desire to “liberate” Taiwan is as strong as ever and foreigners know very little 
about this, their viewpoints are purely theoretical. In practice, if Beijing decides 
to take over Taiwan it would invade by any means not just traditional military 
aggression as foreign analysts could imagine.”52 ROC has the capability, Chiang 
stressed, to defend itself from the PRC’s military strike.
In fact, Taiwan’s answer to Beijing’s threat to use military force is to purchase 
weapons wherever possible. Reacting to Taiwan’s large military transactions with 
the Netherlands and France (frigates and fighters), the PRC took such strong 
retaliatory measures that both countries were forced either to forego new arms 
deals or to risk exclusion from the huge mainland market. Only the US is in a 
position to ignore Beijing’s pressure effectively, and America therefore remains 
the only reliable arms supplier to Taiwan. However, a suggestion made by Chas 
W. Freeman, a former diplomat in Beijing, in Foreign Affairs argues that the way 
to prevent war in the Taiwan Strait is to restrain arms sale to Taiwan, for it may 
create an illusion for leaders of Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties that they 
could rely on US support, which would reduce their willingness to negotiate with 
its Beijing counterpart, and trigger an arms race in the region.5’
Is it true that Taiwan’s military strength is strong enough to deter the PRC’s 
military threat? A comparison of military power between Beijing and Taipei 
reveals the PRC’s overwhelming superiority in manpower; Taipei has one-eighth 
or less of the military manpower of Beijing. This disproportion applies to both 
the army and navy; the air forces of the two sides favour Beijing somewhat less.
51 China Post, 17 January and 6 March 1998. See also Washington Post, 8 March 
1998.
52 Central Daily News, 7 March 1998.
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Beijing has eight times the number of ships and aircraft and twenty to twenty-five 
times the number of submarines (see Table 5.2). In addition the PRC has nuclear 
weapons; Taipei does not. Taipei can match only in the quality of its weapons 
and the training of its military personnel.
But the situation is not so simple. Strong as the PRC’s army is, there are some 
significant military limitations to its gaining superiority in the Taiwan Strait. 
These limitations include the short range of most PLA (People’s Liberation 
Army) aircraft, the lack of amphibious vessels to carry heavy equipment and 
troops, the modernised defensive capabilities of the ROC armed forces, and, more 
importantly, the ever-present possibility of American military intervention.54 For 
all these reasons, any use by the PRC of its military muscle against Taiwan in the 
near future remains unlikely, despite the PLA’s attempting to overcome its 
weakness through a programme of rapid modernisation.
For all these reasons, when ballistic missiles fired from the PRC began landing 
near Taiwan in August 1995, it caused the Taipei stock market to plunge to a two- 
year low. Taiwan’s huge foreign reserves had dropped from more than US$ 100 
billion to US$ 85 billion due to the outflow of foreign currency since July 1995. 
Throughout East Asia newspapers were full of scenarios of a coming war between 
Taiwan and PRC. The missile tests in March 1996 caused another shock, and the 
Taipei stock market plummeted even further. Moreover, between 6 and 23 March 
all flights to Australia, New Zealand, the US, Canada and Europe were fully
” Chas W. Freeman, “Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining 
Taiwan—and Beijing”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4 (July / August 1998), pp. 
6-13.
M Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Cross-Strait Relationships in the Post Cold War Era: 
Neither Unification Nor “Win-Win” Ciame”, issues and Studies, Vol. 31. No. 1 
(January 1995), pp. 41-44.
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booked.55 Questions of what i f ’ remained prevalent in the island: if America had 
not sent two carrier battle groups, would the situation have escalated into a serious 
military clash with a highly unpredictable outcome? Would Taiwan stand still in 
the face of the PRC’s threat?
In view of this, Taiwan’s major problem lies not in its military strength but in 
its psychological and economic vulnerability. If ROC’s national security derives 
mainly from its economic well-being and social and political stability, it is clear 
that the PRC’s military intimidation by firing missiles did undermine the island’s 
national security from a psychological as well as economic point of view. Apart 
from large-scale military operation, even the low-level warfare waged by the PRC 
against Taiwan, ranging from military harassment to blockade, could also be 
harmful to the island’s economy in the long run.
Implications of the events of 1995-96 are thus evident. The most vulnerable 
part of ROC’s national security lies not in its military sphere but in its economic 
vulnerability. Although a large-scale amphibious assault against Taiwan would 
be impossible for Beijing at the moment, the PRC might use whatever means 
necessary, either by firing missiles or taking military exercises, to force Taiwan to 
change its course whenever Taipei intended to move away from mainland China. 
Yet one primary factor to be considered by Beijing in its military activities against 
Taiwan would be the adverse reaction of the United States, because that could in 
effect damage American broad interests in East Asia and its commitment to 
Taiwan.
In short, the inherent weakness of a functional approach is its understatement of 
the political and security problems between Taiwan and mainland China.
" Willem Van Kemcnadc, Ch:na, Hong, Taiwan, INC: The Dynamics o f a New
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Basically, the major purpose of the functionalist approach is to minimise the 
concepts of sovereignty between states. But the approach seems unable to go 
further whenever it encounters the problem of politically related issues. The 
apparent disadvantage for Taiwan arising from the functionalist approach is that 
whenever Beijing tries to limit Taiwan’s international standing in the name of 
sovereignty, Taipei becomes more resistant to developing economic relations with 
mainland China.
5. 3 TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES
What if démocratisation continues in Taiwan, as most analysts expect, the Taiwan 
independence movement overpowers the KMT, and Beijing decides to fulfil its 
promise by using military means to prevent secession? Has the US government 
seriously tried to figure out what it should or would do in such circumstances? Is 
TRA (Taiwan Relations ACT) a genuine US security commitment to Taiwan? 
Washington has in fact made no clear commitment. It was not too hard for the US 
to fail to support Taiwan in the 1970s, when it was an authoritarian regime, but a 
democratic Taiwan would be harder to abandon to a repressive Beijing’s 
“legitimate” sphere of influence. And it would seem difficult to justify a major 
war and the risk of nuclear escalation to defend the island. Apparently, pressures 
in both directions, defending Taiwan or standing aside, would be extreme, 
because the consequences either way could be catastrophic. Accordingly, the 
following sections will examine relations between ROC on Taiwan and the US 
from different perspectives.
Empire (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998), pp. 134-35.
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5. 3. 1 A N  U N C E R T A IN  A L L Y
“It is easier to be an American enemy than to be a friend,” said Seng Chien-Hun, 
the last ROC ambassador to the US in 1978. Indeed, relations between Taiwan 
and the United States have never been easy, for all Taiwan’s dependence on 
American support, both economic as well as military. Throughout its separated 
entity since 1949, Taiwan’s existence remained all to the US. The reason that 
Taipei had to rely so much on American support was that otherwise the KMT 
government’s very existence could not last long under the threat of Chinese 
Communist invasion in the 1950s. From Washington’s perspective, US assistance 
to Taiwan was partly justified because its broader concern in East Asia was to 
compete with the Soviet Union in global influence and to prevent domination of 
the region by a single power, and partly because the US intended to consolidate 
the vital alliance with the regional states, Taiwan fortunately stood in the centre of 
such an alliance.56 A high level of financial assistance to Taiwan over the next 
two decades after 1949 thus played an important role in the island’s economic 
success and political stability. Unfortunately, the US influence was reflected in 
every aspect of Taiwanese life. Even Taiwan’s cultural appearance became very 
“Americanised”, as is reflected in the island's widely spoken American English.57
On the other hand, heavy dependence on the US did not mask a deep sentiment 
of American betrayal in Taiwan. In the late 1940s, the people on Taiwan felt let 
down when the US adopted a “hands-off’ policy and issued the so-called “China
’6 For a detailed discussion of US interests in Taiwan see Clough, Island China, 
pp 1-32.
” Long, op. cit., p. 131.
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White Paper,” in which the US government declared its decision not to get 
involved in the Civil conflict in China, thereby providing no military aid to 
Taiwan.58 Again, in December 1978, the US government, when it no longer 
viewed Taiwan as a strategic base for potential use by the US forces against the 
PRC, suddenly switched its recognition from Taipei to Beijing by using the name 
“Taiwan” instead of “the Republic of China.” These two unpleasant experiences 
to a large extent yielded the well-spring of anti-American resentment in Taiwan. 
But the KMT government and the people in Taiwan fully realised their need for 
US assistance. Even now, it is sadly true that only the US has the power and 
moral obligation to stop Beijing from bringing Taiwan into submission by force, 
while Taipei is pursuing its national goals, both seeking international recognition 
and maintaining a democratic system.
It is the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a Congressional draft legislation ratified 
by the US president to regulate future unofficial relations with Taiwan, that is in 
fact the product of strong Congressional support for Taipei, particularly with 
respect to the question of Taiwan’s future.59 In Martin L. Lasater’s view, the 
United States is deeply involved in Taiwan’s security because of the TRA. The 
document, although not perfectly clear, provides some basic principles as follows:
’* Hungdah Chiu, China and the Question o f Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1973), 
pp. 217-220. See also the US Department o f  State Bulletin, January 16, 1950, p. 
78-79.
” The TRA (Public Law 96-8, 10 April 1979) requires the US administration to 
“consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the 
Western Pacific area are of grave concern to the US.” It also warrants the US 
government to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,” and to 
“maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of 
coercion that would jeopardise the security, or the social or economic system, of 
the people on Taiwan.” For a detailed discussion about how the TRA was 
enacted and how the US President and members of Congress interacted with each
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• Washington is the principal external deterrent to a PRC use of force against 
Taiwan.
• The United States is the principle supplier of arms and defence technology to 
Taiwan.
• The US is Taiwan’s most important trading partner and a key source of 
investment and civilian technology.
• Washington is Taipei’s most important political ally in the international 
community.
• For its own interests, the US reinforces Beijing’s policy of peaceful 
reunification.
• US efforts to maintain a favourable balance of power in East Asia usually 
works to Taipei’s advantage.60
In general, the TRA is more a moral responsibility than a defence treaty to the 
US. However, the broad public support for Taiwan’s security in the US Congress 
made it expedient for the US government to accommodate Taiwan’s vital interests 
by selling defensive weapons to the island. Therefore, very little criticism was 
heard over the Bush administration’s decision to sell 150 F-16s to Taiwan in 
1992, despite the PRC’s fierce objection. Another example was that two US 
aircraft carriers and their escorts were sent to the Taiwan Strait in 1996 to protect 
Taiwan from being threatened by the PRC’s missile bombardment.
In fact, the US government had its own strategy for dealing with “two Chinas.” 
Broadly speaking, the US has long been playing its role as a balancer in the Asia-
other, see Robert Downen, The Taiwan Pawn in the China Game: Congress to 
Rescue (Washington, D.C: CSIS, 1979), ch. I and II.
60 Martin L. Lasater, The Changing o f the Guard: President Clinton and the 
Security o f  Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 166.
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Pacific region by establishing alliances, selling arms, and building its military 
presence since the Cold War era. As noted in the previous section and chapter 
two, the major US interests in the region have been to prevent domination by any 
single power. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the only possible challenge 
to US interests in the region would be China, even if the US wished to maintain 
good relations with the PRC. In this respect, selling F-16 fighters and dispatching 
two battle groups to Taiwan should not be seen simply as a realisation of 
commitment bonded by the TRA. Rather, it should be viewed “as part of 
American geopolitical strategy at a time of great sensitivity in East Asia, and an 
attempt to balance Taiwan’s air force against the Chinese purchase of Su-27s from 
the Russians.”61 Or it could also be seen as an American attempt to win market 
share that might have been taken by other countries.
Clearly, Taiwan’s future will be both special and relevant to US interests in the 
region. It is certainly possible that the US will continue to play such role to 
safeguard both Taiwan and itself. In that sense, it is also possible Taiwan’s status 
will become the subject of an international agreement, involving Washington and 
Beijing. Nonetheless, there always exists the slight but ever-present danger of 
Taiwan being “sold-out” by the US, and the growing self-rule and furtherance of 
democracy in Taiwan has created an acute security dilemma not only for Taiwan 
itself but also for the US. At present it seems that Taiwan has been too close to 
the US for its own safety reason, and that shows no sign of diminution.
61 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “An Island Alone: Taiwan and the Asian Arms 
Race,” the Journal o f East Asian Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Summer / Fall 1997), pp. 
498-99. See also Gerald Segal, “The East Asian Balance after the F-16 Sale to 
Taiwan,” Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies. Taipei, 1992, No. 3, pn. 
3-4.
216
5. 3. 2 T H E  U S D IL E M M A
According to Andrew Yang the present US policy toward Taiwan is becoming 
outdated and dysfunctional in some instances, largely because “the US 
government failed to understand the real nature of Taiwan and ignored the fact 
that Taiwan has already become a truly democratic society, which means no one 
but its own people has the right to decide their destiny.”62 Yang further criticises 
the US’s naivety about its ”win-win-win” (US-PRC-ROC) strategy proposed by 
some former US government officials, including William Perry, Anthony Lake, 
Harry Harding, and Joseph S. Nye. These Clinton government’s “salesmen”, 
according to Yang, have tried to sell a three “Nos” policy— no support for 
Taiwan’s independence; no support for two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan; and 
no support for Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations and IGOs. The PRC 
would thus leave more room for Taiwan to join international organisations such as 
the Olympic movement and APEC in the name of Chinese Taipei.63 The proposal 
seems to demonstrate that circumstances between both Taiwan and mainland 
China could go beyond the control of Washington, and perhaps beyond the 
control of Beijing and Taipei. The 1996 missiles crisis in the Taiwan Strait was 
an example of a clear underestimation by the US administration.
Logically, the most important interest for the US in the Taiwan Strait is to 
avoid military conflict, for any military clash would inevitably force Washington 
to make a choice, either risking a war with Beijing in honour of its long-term 
commitment to Taiwan or failing to resist Communist China’s aggression. The
“ Central Daily News (overseas), 4 March 1998.
*' Centr il Daily News (overseas), 6 March 1998.
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so-called “strategic ambiguity”, according to Joseph S. Nye, has long been 
Washington’s China policy. This policy suggests two basic points. On the one 
hand, the US government would not support any form of Taiwan independence, 
even if the DPP dominated the political system in Taiwan. This is because an 
independent Taiwan would incur a serious response from mainland China, and 
thereby jeopardising American interests and the regional stability. Even if it did 
happen, Taiwan would never change its international status without US support. 
On the other hand, the US government would strongly oppose any possible PRC 
military threat to Taiwan, for such an option would violate the principles of US- 
PRC diplomatic agreement.64 In practice, this ambiguous US strategy has become 
more problematic in recent years.
First, as a sovereign state, Taiwan would never hesitate to test both the US and 
the PRC bottom lines. For example, the US government stumbled on a policy­
making issue when it granted a visa for Lee Teng-Hui in 1995. Although 
Washington declared that it was merely a tourist visa for Lee’s personal visit to 
his US alma mater, it was seen as a recognition of Taiwan’s independence 
because Lee is the President of the Republic o f China on Taiwan. In Beijing’s 
interpretation, the US decision definitely violated the “one China” principle with 
the PRC. Thus there was no surprise at Beijing’s retaliation in recalling its 
ambassadors, suspending high-level exchanges, and transferring missile 
technology to other states, such as Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. Moreover, in 
Beijing’s argument, the US is in no position to require the PRC to abide by a non-
M China Post and Central Daily News (overseas), 10 January 1998.
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proliferation agreement. Why should Beijing do so when Washington continues 
to sell arms to Taiwan?65
Another example was an effort made by the ROC government to restore its 
membership in the United Nations. In September 1993, the Washington Post, 
New York Times and other major US newspapers simultaneously issued an 
advertisement arguing that “this is the time for the UN to respect and protect the 
basic human rights and dignity of the 21 million people of the ROC on Taiwan. 
This is also the time for nations around the world to separate fiction from fact, 
rhetoric from reality.”66 In the meantime, two subcommittees of the US House of 
Representatives held a joint hearing to consider Taiwan’s participation in the UN. 
the Chairman of the subcommittee, Tom Lantos, indicated that “Taiwan’s 
exclusion from the UN cannot be justified in terms of international law as Taiwan 
more than meets the traditional criteria of statehood. Nor would granting Taiwan 
UN representation in any way prejudice the resolution of Taiwan’s ultimate 
status.”67 These were no doubt that Taiwan’s bid for UN membership remained 
unsuccessful due to the PRC’s high position on the Security Council. But the 
declaration did reflect Taiwan’s strong base of political support in the Congress 
and among the US public. And this has become the US government’s major 
concern in its policy making.
Second, as a democratic society, Taiwan is less likely to become a bargaining 
chip between the US and the PRC. Nor would the Taiwanese people accept 
unreasonable US government’s arrangements, including a renouncement of 
Taiwan’s independence and its bid to join the UN. For the majority of Taiwanese
45 Beijing Review, June 29-July 5, 1998, p. 9.
44 Washington Post, September 21 and December 24, 1993, p. 15 and 16.
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people, it is a ridiculous myth made by the US to regard a democratic Taiwan as 
“a part of Communist China.”68 The most dangerous scenario would begin with 
an upsurge of identity on the island, and a democratic process of decision-making 
in Taiwan could fuel such a possibility. From Taiwan’s perspective, it cannot 
suspend decisiveness on the question of reunification and independence. The 
increasing popularity of the DPP on Taiwan, in this regard, could intensify 
relations with mainland China. It is certainly not in the US interest to become 
embroiled in a war over Taiwan, and both Washington and Beijing have sought to 
avoid such a confrontation since the Korean War. But too much negative US 
influence on Taiwan might trigger something unthinkable. For example, 
Taiwan’s warning that it might, if necessary, develop nuclear weapons, according 
to Gerald Segal, was typically a response to its sense of insecurity in the face of 
the Clinton’s “Three NOs” to Taiwan announced in Shanghai in July 1998.69
Third, one crucial determinant of Taiwan’s security is the PRC’s intention. It 
appears reasonable to expect that as long as Beijing maintains an open door policy 
toward the outside world, concentrates on its economic development, keeps good 
relations with the US, and, above all, retains the status quo in Taiwan, the PRC 
will not use force against Taiwan. All the above-mentioned conditions seem to 
fail to understand the PRC’s real intention and high priority. It should be noted, 
as indicated earlier, that territorial integrity and the sovereignty of China are listed 
as the vital interests of the PRC government. Beijing may use force to “defend” 
its territory at any time, even at the price of its economic disadvantage, if its 
sovereignty is challenged. In Beijing’s view, Taiwan’s reunification with China is
67 Lasater, The Changing o f the Guard: President Clinton and the Security o f  
Taiwan p. 144.
61 China Times and United Daily, 3 and 5 March 1998, p. 2 ar. J 3.
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its top priority in the 1990s. Unfortunately it has been interrupted because of the 
American government’s interference and obstruction in China’s internal affairs.70 
Thus most of the blame for tne continued division of China is caused by the US, 
and the US shall be held fully responsible for all the consequences. In that sense, 
the modernisation of the PLA, to some extent, is seen as an attempt to strengthen 
its capability for a military take-over Taiwan in the future, on the one hand, and to 
increase its bargaining power with the US on the other.
Indeed, the PRC has never pledged to anybody (including Washington) that it 
would not use military force against Taiwan, and no US government has ever 
articulated what concrete action it would take if Beijing did use force in the 
Taiwan Strait. Beijing might thus persistently but cautiously test the US bottom 
line. In theory, although the TRA sets the linkage between its security interests 
and the peaceful reunification of China, misperceptions and miscalculations, the 
major causes of war, are highly possible due to an ambiguous strategy that 
characterises the “China” issue, resulting in vastly different assessments of key 
issues such as the nature of the PRC threat to Taiwan and the likelihood o f US 
assistance to Taiwan in case of war. In practice, as long as the US honours its 
commitment to Taiwan, as it did in 1996, and the PRC is not strong enough to 
challenge the US over Taiwan, it will be peaceful in the Taiwan Strait. Generally, 
when Washington-Beijing relations are strained, the US is more supportive of 
Taipei, but not to the point of disrupting US-PRC relations. When US-PRC 
relations are co-operative, Washington tends to be more circumspect in its 
dealings with Taipei, but not at the price of sacrificing Taiwan’s security interest.
M Asian Wall Street Journal. August 3, 1998.
70 See Beijing Review, 6-12 September 1993, pp. I-VIII.
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In sum, Taiwan has a complex and contradictory security environment. The 
factors influencing Taiwan’s security include a broad range of geographical, 
international, domestic, cross-Straits, as well as US-PRC-ROC interactions. An 
assessment of some of these factors suggests that the PRC threat may be minimal. 
Other factors suggest that the threat may be increasing. Overall, it appears that 
the present threat from the PRC is low but increasing. Taiwan will always require 
external assistance, especially from the US. But the difficulty Washington faces 
is that a balancing policy between Taipei and Beijing is becoming increasingly 
hard to manage and maintain.
CONCLUSION
In the international community, few “nations” are simultaneously pariahs and 
models, sovereign nation-states and provinces, and isolated outcasts and centres of 
attention. Few nations that have been or are at either extreme have changed so 
quickly. Few other countries in the world have been so much a part of the East- 
West struggle, the dynamic in the Asia-Pacific region, or a changing international 
politics as has Taiwan. Some argue that Taiwan is not qualified to be called a 
nation, but they can not suggest what it should be called. Some say its status 
could be resolved by dropping the name o f the Republic of China and using the 
name of Taiwan or some variations. It would thus be a nation. But its legal and 
political identity problem would still persist. Most reckon that Taiwan is a nation 
because it qualifies or because there is no suitable alternative.71
71 See, for example, Yahuda, “The International Standing of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan,” pp. 1319-39; C'ough, Island China, pp 135-55; Klintworth. Taiwan 
in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s, pp. XII-XV.
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It is clear that Taiwan will remain an anomaly. In its relationship with China, it 
is part of a divided nation. But that status is fading much faster than it is in the 
case of the two Germanies or the two Koreas. Taiwan seems most likely to 
remain separate from China, as has been the case since 1949. It will continue to 
be a unique political entity. It will be Taiwan as well as the Republic of China. It 
will be somewhat isolated diplomatically, yet decreasingly so, and it will be a 
global activist in trade and financial matters and will remain vast and increasing 
informal ties with other countries. It may remain a true international actor whose 
nation-state status is permanently unclear or weak or unique, but it will be a 
barometer reflecting the status of relations between Washington and Beijing. 
More importantly, Its struggle for survival will never cease.
The findings of this chapter are that international co-operation can be seen 
between adversaries, despite the fact that such co-operation is based on economic 
complemntarity. When states face no significant external threats, international co­
operation becomes feasible, but when threats are perceptible, states change their 
policies. In other words, incentives are important causes for co-operation, but it is 
also incentives that make further co-operation virtually difficult. This is the case 
found in Taiwan-PRC mutual interactions. The next chapter will show the 
characteristic response in such circumstance and evaluate how functional co­
operation between Taiwan and ASEAN may spill over from economic front to the 
political related area.
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Table 5. 1
Trade between Taiwan and Mainland via Hong Kong (in US$ million)
Year Value (US$) Growth rate % As total Export %
1987 1.22 nil 2.30
1988 2.24 82.81 3.65
1989 2.89 29.18 4.38
1990 3.27 13.18 4.88
1991 4.69 42.74 6.14
1992 6.20 32.20 7.58
1993 8.69 43.38 9.17
Sources: The Customs Statistics Office of the Hong Kong Government: Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book (1994). See also Chamg Kao, conomic Interdependence 
Between Taiwan and Mainland China,” p. 54 (Table 1)
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Table 5. 2
A Comparison of the Military Forces of the PRC and ROC 1995-96
PRC ROC (Taiwan)
Regular Forces 2,930,000 376,000
Defence Budget 
billion)
7.48 (US$ billion) 9.55 (US$
Army (total) 2,200,000 240,000
Tanks 7,500+ 570
Towed Artillery 14,500 1,070
Missiles M 9&  MU Nil
Air Force (total) 470,000 68,000
Combat Aircraft 5,000+ 1000
Fighters 4,000+ 890
Bombers 420 Nil
Navy (total) 260,000 68,000
Destroyers 18 22
Frigates 32 16
Sumarines 52 4
Amphibious Ships 21 54
Nuclear Forces 17 (ICBMs) 
70 (IRBMs) 
12 (SLBNs)
Nil
Sources: I1SS The Military Balance 1995 / 96.
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CHAPTER 6
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN ACTION: 
TAIWAN AND ASEAN
In this chapter, I examine a number of hypotheses about states’ behaviour. When 
confronted by a significant external threat, states tend to balance by allying with 
others against the prevailing threat. My analysis supports the concept that states 
choosing their partners are highly conditional. Moreover, as outlined in chapter 5, 
if economic co-operation has a powerful impact on states choices, then it should 
wield considerable leverage over political-related sector, because partners will be 
reluctant to jeopardise the benefits of co-operation. However, states will also 
consider their political gains by balancing their policies.
The first section provides a theoretical analysis of Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation. 
In 1993, a “Southward Policy” aimed at diverting Taiwan’s trade and investment 
flows from mainland China to the ASEAN region, necessary for spreading possible 
economic and political risks, was announced by Taipei. It reshaped the ROC 
government’s strategic priority. By June 1995, Taiwan’s investment in the 
ASEAN states and Vietnam reached US$ 25 billion, almost keeping up with its 
estimated total investment in mainland China. If Taiwan’s foreign policy is 
economically led, as discussed in the previous chapter, we need to consider the 
political and strategic implications behind its pursuit. More importantly, as chapter 
5 has demonstrated, while a functionalist approach may be applied successfully to 
the initial stage of co-operation between Taiwan and the PRC, it is less useful when 
the problem of sovereignty is encountered. Thus, we need to consider: what is the
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major difference between Taiwan-PRC and Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation from the 
perspective of functionalism?
The second section examines the PRC’s impact on Taiwan-ASEAN 
relationships. None of the ASEAN member states has formal diplomatic relations 
with Taipei, but they are all aware of Taiwan’s explicit intention to mix its 
economic impulse with political manoeuvrability. How, then do the ASEAN states 
directly affected by this policy respond to it? In their view, the PRC’s increasing 
assertiveness in the region can not be ignored. But the issue then arises as to how 
ASEAN can maintain a balance between the economic benefits it receives from 
Taiwan and its security concerns with the PRC?
As the Asian economic crisis is far from over, the final section of this chapter 
will locate Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation in a wider regional context and see how 
their co-operation may provide positive effects on regional economic growth.
6. 1 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
6. 1. 1 ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
As demonstrated in this thesis, there are a number of concepts in international 
relations theory relevant to the issue of co-operation. From a realist perspective, 
economic strength is viewed as an instrument of political power, and states worry 
that co-operation may lead to increased vulnerability. Even for states deeply 
involved in economic interdependence with others, economic issues will never take 
precedence over security issues because states must always be primarily concerned 
with their survival. Only the most primitive kinds of warfare are altogether
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independent of the economic factor. Liberals, on the contrary, take a different view 
by arguing that states tend to co-operate with others for mutual enrichment. 
Economic co-operation, in their view, can emerge among egoists under conditions 
of interdependence.' Some, functionalists, for instance, even argue that the 
significance of economic co-operation can spill over to the political realm, and thus 
common and shared political values may inhibit states from using force against 
each other. Although economic disputes may be possible, they are more likely to 
be a response, than cause, a breakdown in relations leading to hostilities.2
Viewed in this way, economic co-operation can be seen both as a process and a 
result. The question whether economic co-operation will become a path leading 
towards economic integration is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is 
noteworthy that economic co-operation requires a high degree of government 
coordination of the rules and organisations managing economic exchanges and 
activities. This is not to suggest that the dynamics of co-operation are fostering a 
decline of in-group cohesion. The impulse to elevate self-interest” is probably as 
common as ever. However, as indicated in chapters 1 -4, the focus of the impulse is 
undergoing change. The peremptory declaration that this is strictly an internal 
affair” no longer holds in modem international relations. Officials of one state can 
openly talk of bringing about alterations in the regime of another, and the 
articulation of such aspirations no longer invariably provokes complaints about the 
violation of sovereignty.
' For a detailed discussion of cooperation between realists and liberals in chapter 
1.4.
2 Krasner, “The Accomplishments of International Political Economy,” Smith, 
Booth and Zalewski.. eds., International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, pp. 111- 
113.
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Broadly speaking, in the Asia-Pacific region, economic co-operation has been 
discussed predominantly as a process instead of a result. The main purpose of 
states in the region is to encourage a more benign and stable political environment 
by increasing economic co-operation. However, security concerns are still crucial 
in their national agenda. The establishment of APEC and increasing economic co­
operation in various subregional contexts, Northeast and Southeast Asia for 
example, has a positive effect on the dilution of political conflict. It seems fair to 
say that economic co-operation in this region is still in its early stage, and it 
inevitably takes time to mature.
Regarding the relationships between Taiwan and ASEAN, the motivations for 
mutual economic co-operation are many—some economic and some political. 
Although economic co-operation is a two-way track between buyers and sellers, 
trade links between Taiwan and ASEAN were viewed as a monopolistic feature at 
the initial stage because the government in Taiwan took the initiative and became 
the dominant actor. The “Southward Policy” issued in 1993 highlighted two major 
purposes. First, Taiwan had to diversify its overseas markets and reduce 
investment away from excessive concentration on mainland China, and this might 
cause the Taiwanese government to lose advantage in cross-Straits negotiations. 
Second, ASEAN states possess huge workforces and abundant resources that 
Taiwan lacks. If Taiwan could help these countries to develop their economies, it 
would also profit in terms of both increasing exports and improving relations, 
which in turn could strengthen Taiwan’s national security and promote its 
international profile.’ In other words, the “Southward policy” was primarily an
' P. K. Chiang. A Report on Southward Policy (in Chinese), a report made by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs at the Economic Committee o f the Legislative Yuan,
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economic policy, but implications were primary political and strategic. If Taiwan 
moves were built on strong economic incentives, it is understandable that its 
policy-making was also driven by economic considerations. In this regard, 
economic co-operation with Southeast Asian states was seen as no less important 
than trade with the US, Europe or Japan.
Apart from motivations, institution-building, in which governments play a major 
role, is also of vital important here. In order to facilitate economic co-operation 
with ASEAN states (including Vietnam), Taiwan’s government-financed Overseas 
Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) was set up to support private business and to 
promote trade and investment in the region. In addition, Economic Co-operation 
Centres (ECCs) were founded in such major cities as Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, 
Manila, Bandung, Penang and Ho Chi Min City to deal with mutual economic co­
operation. For example, by December 1995, a low interest loan of US$ 60 million 
through the OECF was signed by the Philippines to improve Subic Bay 
infrastructure. The OECF also provided US$ 45 million to help Vietnam improve 
its business infrastructure.4
For ASEAN, Taiwan “Southward Policy” was welcome because most of the 
member states needed foreign investment and technical expertise, and Taiwan’s 
economic achievements also acted as a model for their own development. In order 
to attract Taiwan’s investment, the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines allowed Taiwanese companies to have 100 per cent equity 
ownership. The Philippine government even offered Taiwan some of its textile and
27 December, 1993. See in China Post and Central Daily News, 28 December 
1993. Also in United Daily (Lian He Bao), 18 February 1994.
4 Hsueh, op., cit. pp. 28-30. See also in Xianming Chen, “Taiwan Investment in 
China and Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey, Voi. XXXVI, No. 5 (May 1996), p. 463.
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garment quotas for exports to the US.5 More recently, Indonesia has granted two 
major investments for Taiwan in Medan, east of Sumatra, and Batam Island, 20 
miles offshore from Singapore. By the end of 1999, with these two projects in 
operation, Taiwan will become the second largest foreign investor in Indonesia. 
Indeed, Taiwan has become one of the major investors in the region, and is already 
the top investor in both Malaysia and Vietnam. Trade between Taiwan and 
ASEAN nearly doubled from 1989 to 1995. The geographic proximity and the 
complementary nature of Taiwan and ASEAN have encouraged the progress of 
mutual economic co-operation.
Gains from co-operative action could also be warranted on the grounds that co­
operation creates a framework or environment of rules and understandings about 
the conduct of economic interchange. Thus, an effective economic co-operation 
policy by one state to cooperate with others can usually lead to positive economic 
feedback. If co-operation implies a two-way sensitivity and mutual profits, then an 
examination of the case of Taiwan and ASEAN economic co-operation shows that 
the benefits are apparently greater if co-operation could be interpreted broadly.
In contrast to a traditional concept, in which economic strength merely serves 
the purpose of political intention and links to an aggrandisement of territory, 
international economic co-operation could mean an important source of wealth, 
and economic strength could also be seen as a valuable contribution added to 
peace. Taiwan’s rapid domestic economic growth does indeed have a profound 
effect on both the relative priority of domestic and foreign goals and on the 
substance of each. But economic growth offers only a partial explanation of the
' Chen Humg-Yu, “Taiwan’s Economic Relations With Southeast Asia,” in Gary 
Klintworth, ed., Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s, pp. 121-133. See also 
Xianining Chen, “Taiwan Investment in China and Southeast Asia,” pp. 453-56.
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transformation of foreign policy goals. It is economic strength that leads Taiwan 
towards the pole of co-operation rather than the pole of conflict. More importantly, 
networking and learning the habit of co-operation “getting to know one another” 
have become important characteristics of Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation. In this 
sense, economic prosperity does not stimulate the use of force as traditional 
research suggests; rather it can facilitate international co-operation and promote 
international security in the broadest sense of the term.”6
On the other hand, it is important to point out that economic co-operation with 
others could also enhance one’s own security. In theory, Taiwan “Southward 
Strategy” could help to minimise a possible threat from Beijing (a detailed 
discussion is presented in 5.2). By globalising its business relations with ASEAN 
states and proceeding with incorporation into the capitalist world, Taiwan could 
better protect itself from Beijing’s economic sanctions. In this respect, economic 
co-operation with ASEAN would contribute to Taiwan’s effort to reduce the risks 
of putting all its eggs in a basket. In practice, Taipei’s effort to spread risks has 
encountered some problems. The primary argument against the “Southward 
strategy” was that some barriers such as those of culture, religion and language, 
made it more difficult for Taiwan businessmen to invest in Southeast Asia than in 
mainland China. Moreover, a majority of small and medium-sized companies 
would find it difficult to split their limited capital between mainland China and
6 Robert Gilpin, “The Economic Dimension of International Security,” in Henry 
Bienen, ed., Power, Economics and Security: The United States and Japan in 
Focus (Boulder Co: Westview, 1992), p. 51. See also Barry Buzan, “Economic 
Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case,” Internationa! 
Organisation, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 597-624.
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Southeast Asia.7 A survey conducted by Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1994 
revealed that 48 per cent of Taiwanese companies intended to invest in mainland 
China in the next five years, compared with 21 per cent planning to invest in 
Southeast Asian states.8 Indeed, mainland China is too large a market to be 
ignored. Such a development suggests that although governments play a crucial 
role in forming economic policy, individual trading units can also be influential in 
transnational economic co-operation. Government influence tends to be more on 
domestic front than in the international arena.
In brief, the question whether economic co-operation between Taiwan and 
ASEAN states will move towards full economic integration, as most observers 
used to cite in a European world of “co-operation”,9 is not an important question 
for this thesis. Nor is it an important question whether or not co-operation will 
pave the way for achieving strong institutions. What is important is whether 
economic co-operation could spill over to the politically related sphere, which in 
turn would enhance participants' security. In view of this, transferring Taiwan’s 
modernisation experiences to ASEAN states by way of economic co-operation can 
also be seen as a possibility.
6. 1. 2 DEMOCRATIC PEACE: A SHARED VALUE?
Scholars and practitioners in international politics now advocate a broadening of 
the field of security studies in two directions, encompassing non-military issues
7 Raymond J. M. Chang and Pei-Chen Chang, “Taiwan’s Emerging Economic 
Relations with the PRC,” in Simon and Kau, eds., Taiwan: Beyond the Economic 
Miracle, pp. 278-79.
* Quoted in Xianming Chen, “Taiwan Investment in China and Southeast Asia,” p. 
460.
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and non-states actors.10 It is widely accepted that the economic aspect of security 
has now been more effectively integrated into security structures and policy­
making. Moreover, security studies should also concentrate on broader issues such 
as the domestic, cultural, societal, psychological, and environmental dimensions of 
security. Security studies should not be narrowly restricted to states and questions 
of military security only, neither should it be broadened so much that it comes to 
encompass all issues relating directly or indirectly to the violence between 
individuals and collectivities,” argues Peter J. Katzenstein. He also stresses that 
broader security studies can add to the traditional analysis of national security if the 
issues and actors that it studies have some demonstrable links to states and 
questions of military importance.”" In many ways, security studies is still 
conditioned by the linkage of military security or military importance to the state. 
However, if security is defined as the “duality or state of being secure,” freedom 
from danger,” “freedom from fear or anxiety,”12 then the major character of 
security seems to imply a relative freedom from violence. Even so, such 
definitions are still murky and difficult to measure. It is not the aim of this section 
to discuss different explanations of security. The main concern is to take a broadly 
inclusive approach. More specifically, it is to link economic factors with political 
security and explain how they mutually reinforce each other in a wider context of 
security. That is, “lesson drawing”, a modelling of Taiwan, may encourage
’ Ibid.
10 See, for example, Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security 
Affairs,” in Baldwin, ed.. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary 
Debate, pp. 60-61; Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International 
Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, ch. 1 & 2.
11 “Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, 
ed., The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 525.
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ASEAN states to make a political transformation. By encouraging ASEAN states 
to change from authoritarian politics to a democratic system, regional security 
could be better enhanced.13 The current economic crisis, as Paul Dibb, David D. 
Hale and Peter Prince argue, is Asian political nature, not only in terms of its 
effects, but also its causes.” 14 This seems especially true for those authoritarian 
politics which depend for their legitimacy on economic growth rather than 
democratic approval.
Indeed, authoritarian regimes suffer three profound and inherent weaknesses. 
First, in authoritarian politics, the policy-making process is generally vague and 
highlights the self-interest of a few political leaders. They tend to integrate the 
regime’s survival into the survival of the state. In this respect, corruption, 
nepotism and cronyism have all become deeply ingrained in the system established 
by the political leaders to guide the country. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest 
that all authoritarian governments have the same problems. A somewhat different 
situation obtains in Singapore, which has an effective government and has also 
achieved a high rate of economic growth. More importantly, its government is 
widely supported by the people because of the lack of corruption in the political 
system. Even so, there is little doubt that in such a system severe social 
inequalities are inevitable and are intolerable to political opposition.
Second, authoritarian politics lacks any feedback mechanism and tends to ignore 
emerging disasters. As noted above, authoritarian governments tend to cover their
11 See, for example, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield,
Mass: Merriam-Webster, 1988), p. 1062.
13 Traditionally, an authoritarian system refers to a style of government in which the 
rulers demand unquestioning obedience from the ruled. In such a system, the 
rulers would brutally repress their political opponents, but they might leave a larger 
sphere for private life. See Oxford Concise Dictionary o f Politics, p. 26.
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in te re s t s  in  th e  nam e o f  n a tio n a l in te re s t s  and are concerned m o re  a b o u t th e ir
existence or re-election than any oncoming crisis. It is generally accepted that a 
period of rapid economic growth will be followed by an economic down-turn. 
Unlike the democratic system, in which such a short period of reversal could be 
seen a normal economic cycle, an authoritarian system, however, could face a 
serious challenge from its people, because a set-back in prosperity after a period of 
rapidly rising economic growth would bring frustrations and demands for 
revolutionary change. Revolutions are most likely to occur [in authoritarian 
politics] when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is 
followed by a short period of sharp reversal,”14 5 contends one analyst. There is 
certainly a possibility that such developments would push authoritarian 
governments in the direction of democracy. Although it is far from clear whether 
such developments would have a democratic outcome in the ASEAN region, 
authoritarian rule has coincided with the recent economic crisis and social 
uprisings have revealed regime’s vulnerability. In this respect, it is a sad testament 
to the nature of authoritarian rule in Indonesia that the country must once again be 
brought to the brink of anarchy before leadership can be transferred.
Third, the assumption that authoritarian politics may produce economic wealth 
as well as general well-being is highly contentious. There is little doubt that 
authoritarian governments are more effective than democratic governments in 
terms of the mobilisation and distribution of national resources. In a relatively 
short period, economic wealth can be swiftly accumulated and general well-being
14 Paul Dibb, David D. Hale and Peter Prince, “The Strategic Implications of Asia’s 
Econoic Crisis,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 6.
15 J. C. Davies, “Toward a theory of Revolution,” in D. H. Wrong and H. L. Gracey, 
cds., Reading in Introductory Sociology (London: Collier-Macmillan 2nd ed,
1972), pp. 136-7.
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increases. However, rapid growth concentrates material gains in relatively few 
hands as prices increase faster than wages, and these are no welfare arrangements 
to compensate for economic hardship. A minority may make absolute gains from 
economic growth, but the majority find that their relative position has deteriorated. 
Therefore, an authoritarian government may have the ability to impose its decisions 
and may be relatively effective in the early stage of modernisation. But, in the long 
run, it is questionable whether the government is able to use its authority to consult 
and to elicit co-operative responses from the private sector. This is not the sort of 
power over society that one associates with authoritarian government. It is the 
power through society, which is much more potent in developmental terms.
However, a transformation from an authoritarian system to political democracy 
is by no means simple, particularly in the ASEAN region. In many situations, 
ASEAN leaders— Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir Mohammed and Suharto, for 
example—have repeatedly reminded their international and domestic audiences 
that ASEAN must resist pressures for Western-style democracy because what 
ASEAN people need is not a democratic government, but a government that can 
provide economic well-being, political stability, social order, communal harmony, 
and efficient administration. They have either resisted the universality of Western 
concepts of democracy, right and law, or suggested that there are different, non­
liberal, but equally valid “Asian” understandings of these terms.16 Confidence in 
the “East Asian Economic Miracle” has been severely shaken when the Asian 
economic crises started in 1997. And no more theoretical substitute for a Western- 
style democratic system could be justified when high economic growth and relative
16 See, for example, Straits Times, 31 August 1993 and 6 February 1995. See also 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 December 1992, pp. 4 and 29. Richard
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political stability of ASEAN was followed by the frustration of economic 
downturn.
Is economic development really relevant to the political system? This is a highly 
contentious issue. Two cases are worth noting here: the Philippines and Singapore. 
The Philippines has demonstrated that a low level economic development is not 
necessarily incompatible with democracy. Singapore example, on the contrary, 
has shown that a high level of development does not necessarily produce a 
democratic result. Interestingly, the Philippine President Fidel Ramos rejected the 
former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s proposal to sacrifice a degree of 
democracy for the sake of political stability and economic growth.17 For all these 
reasons, there is a general assumption that a high level of development can increase 
the demand and support for democracy through increases in income, education, 
pluralism and foreign contacts. It is also logical that a high level of development 
could also destabilise traditional forms of authority by increasing demands for the 
change of laws, the removal of government constraints, fair elections, a responsive 
legislature, and constitutional reform.
In the case of Taiwan, a state which used to be characterised as authoritarian 
state and is seen to share similar “Asian Values” to those of ASEAN states, it has 
demonstrated a compatibility of political culture with democracy and economic 
development. More importantly, Taiwan’s political démocratisation has not been 
followed by social disorder and political turmoil, (see chapter 5.1) For this reason, 
it is not impossible to draw lessons from Taiwan’s experience for the ASEAN 
states.
Robinson, “Looking North: Myths and Strategies,” in Richard Robinson, ed„ 
Pathways to Asia: The Politics o f Engagement, pp. 3-8.
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In sum, the above-mentioned descriptions are schematic and hypothetical, and 
no two states have identical historical experiences, but it seems reasonable to 
assume that Taiwan’s pattern might logically apply to ASEAN states. Because 
most ASEAN governments have tended to achieve high economic growth so that 
their political regimes have survived. At the same time, political leaders of 
ASEAN continue to justify their political rules by maintaining the political status 
quo. However, in the face of increased demands for greater freedom from the 
public, especially when economic, social and political developments mutually 
reinforce one another, regimes become powerless and are forced to make a choice. 
In this regard, although the dynamic of economic growth does not automatically 
lead to démocratisation of ASEAN states, it may improve its chances. Taiwan has 
thus become a major promoter of ASEAN’s modernisation in both its economic 
and political dimensions.
6. 1.3 A FUNCTIONAL SPILLOVER?
Spillover”, a key character of functionalist theory, is viewed as one possible variety 
of expansion or growth during international co-operation. A functional approach is 
based on the premise that co-operative efforts, as the interactions between social 
and economic forces get stronger, will gradually expand into more politically 
controversial areas, and an initial successful experience of co-operation can be 
transmitted to related sectors.18 Functionalists also believe that experiences 
accumulated from co-operation can ease disputes and encourage states to integrate
17 Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., “The Philippines in 1992: Ready to Take Off?” Asian 
Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (February 1993), p. 228.
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with others. Ernst B. Haas for example, further advocate the formation of 
organisations of interdependent states.19 Basically, such an approach, according to 
David Easton, refers to an interest in the means by which the system converts 
inputs into outputs. Functionalism focuses more on process than on result and is 
said to establish spontaneous networks which effectively, if not legally, bind 
societies together in complex and multilayered relationships.20 More importantly, 
functional co-operation involves allocations of significant economic and political 
value to important national, subnational and transnational interests.
However, the functionalist approach has its own weakness. Contrary to a realist 
approach, the functionalist approach de-emphasises state actors and addresses 
economic exchange, shared attitudes and common beliefs between states. Further 
successful co-operation based on spillover effects may eventually realise the idea 
of “creating a common sovereignty.”21 But the basic problem o f this approach is 
that it fails to explain how technical co-operation can spill over to a value- 
significant authorisation. Furthermore, no theoretical justification explains how 
functional co-operation can prevent the spillover from eroding the sovereign 
prerogatives of national governments. Far from offering a detailed discussion of 
functionalism and its critics, this section aims to examine the possibility that
" Emst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International 
Organisation (Stanford:, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 21-22.
19 Ibid.
20 David Easton, A Framework for Political analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 25-50. See also James E. Dougherty and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., Contending Theories o f International Relations: A 
Comparative Survey, 3rd ed, pp. 146-7. Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso, 
‘“And Still it Moves!’ State Interests and Social Forces in the European 
Community,” in James N. Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance 
Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, pp. 236-43.
21 Quoted in Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso, “‘And Still it Moves!’ State 
Interests and Social Forces in the European Community,” p.241.
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economic co-operation between states could spill over to the value-significant 
political agenda, which may help to mitigate the problem.
In the case of Taiwan and ASEAN co-operation, two phenomena are important 
in seeking to explain how Taiwan-ASEAN economic co-operation may spill over 
to political related areas. First, there has been a clear change of ASEAN attitudes 
toward Taiwan as a result o f their economic ties getting closer, despite the fact that 
there are no formal relations between the two sides. Without doubt, it is difficult 
for ASEAN states to remain politically “neutral”, but a functional “neutrality” is 
possible, which will be addressed later. Second, ASEAN states sought to find a 
balanced approach attempted to mitigate the problem by providing themselves as 
venues for confidence-building talks between Taipei and Beijing.
To be sure, if Taiwan’s national security derives primarily from the nation 
economic strength and foreign trade, as argued in the previous chapter, then 
relations with ASEAN states would in a sense define the island’s national security. 
This is not to suggest that Taiwan’s national security depends on its economic co­
operation with ASEAN states. In fact, it would be naive to believe that Taiwan's 
security could be effectively achieved simply through close relations with the 
ASEAN states. And it would be also unrealistic for ASEAN to make an alliance 
with Taiwan so as to balance the PRC’s aggressive ambitions in the region. 
However, it is highly possible that ASEAN states could provide certain benefits for 
Taiwan through close economic co-operation, especially from the perspective of 
mitigating confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, given their small size and limited 
capability.
As noted above, functional schemes are at best complementary. Successful co­
operation could bring partners into a situation o f functional neutrality. For
example, the idea of “holiday diplomacy”, a strategy to cover political motivations 
by using economic links with countries that have no formal relations with Taipei, 
was successfully employed by Taiwan Premier Lien Chan and President Lee 
teng-hui in their trips to most ASEAN states, apart from Brunei, in 1994 and 
1997.22 Although these visits were not official in nature, they symbolised the 
strength of economic co-operation between two sides and demonstrated an 
effective spillover from the economic domain to the related areas. In response to 
the PRC’s serious warning, ASEAN leaders, though not necessarily being 
interpreted as being politically “neutral”, did not make any compromise to 
Beijing’s pressures. Thailand’s Prime Minister Chuan Leekphai, for example, 
stressed that he should show principle in conducting our policy, we have the 
absolute freedom to do so.”23 More importantly, these visits have promoted 
complementary and reciprocal relations between two sides and established a 
pattern for high-level contacts between Taiwan and these ASEAN members. 
Indeed, such an approach, developing from cultural change and economic co­
operation to political contacts, is a typical manifestation of functionalism.
Another example of functional spillover from economic front to politically 
related issues is the way in which ASEAN states voluntarily provided themselves 
as venues for talks between Taiwan and the PRC. For instance, Taiwan and 
mainland China held their first high-ranking meeting in more than forty years in 
Singapore in April 1993. Other ASEAN leaders also expressed their wishes to 
provide spaces and facilities for SEF and ARATS to conduct talks.24 Through such 
channels, both Taipei and Beijing representative offices had a chance to make
22 United Daily, 10 February 1994. Central Daily News (Southward Policy 
calendar), 5 January 1998.
22 See South China Morning Post, 14 February ¡994.
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direct contact with their respective governments and acted accordingly. In this 
regard, ASEAN states, Singapore in particular, played a very important 
intermediary role in facilitating substantive confidence-building talks between 
Taiwan and mainland China.
The above-mentioned examples have demonstrated that spillover effects do exist 
between states. The key advantage for ASEAN and Taiwan arising from 
functional cooperation is that the two sides have become economically and, to a 
lesser extent, politically interlocked as a result. The public appeal by ASEAN 
states for a cessation of arms hostilities in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 reflected such 
facts. However, the weakness of the functionalist approach is that states are not 
necessarily willing to engage in deeper social and economic co-operation before 
political as well as security problems are resolved. Taiwan’s application for 
membership of the ARF, and even its desire to become an ASEAN dialogue 
partner, were rejected simply because of Beijing’s opposition. In this sense, it is 
also true that small ASEAN states have to be particularly cautious about the likely 
response from Beijing over any dealings with Taipei. As they will be reluctant to 
sacrifice relations with the PRC for the sake of political relations with Taiwan, they 
will have to rely on non-official ties with Taipei.
6. 2 THE PRC FACTOR
6. 2. 1 CO-OPERATION OR COMPETITION? 24
24 See South China Morning Post and Central Daily News, 6,7 March 1998.
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The PRC’s role among the ASEAN states, unlike its role in Northeast Asia, where 
it is viewed by Moscow and Seoul as both an economic and strategic asset, is most 
limited. This is partly because Beijing has been preoccupied with other more 
important issues related to its struggle with the superpowers, and partly because, in 
Beijing’s perception, ASEAN states were not a major threat to its survival but 
merely “collaborators” of the United States during the Cold War period. Thus, 
ASEAN’s role in Beijing’s policy was only peripheral. But an adjustment was 
made by Beijing after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. One reason, 
according to Lee Lai To, was that ASEAN states were rather self-restrained in 
comparison with other states in the West following the Tiananmen massacre.25 
Another reason was that most ASEAN states, to a certain degree, had the same 
political system as the PRC. What happened in Tiananmen square in mainland 
China might easily have happened in these states. Moreover, the PRC’s “open 
door” policy and “four modernisations” forced the government from the late 1980s 
to look for external assistance. For these reasons, ASEAN’s rational response to 
the Tiananmen Square incident was greatly appreciated by Beijing. The possibility 
of more interactions with ASEAN states was thus taken into account by the PRC.
Such a policy reorientation by Beijing did achieve significant results, including 
the establishment of formal ties with Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei in 1991, the 
improvment of PRC-ASEAN bilateral economic relations, and participation in the 
ARF in 1994. For all these efforts, Beijing’s role in the ASEAN region seemed to 
be confined largely by security considerations instead of pragmatic interests.
” Lee Lai To, “ASEAN-PRC Political and Security Cooperation: Problems, 
Proposals, and Prospects,” Asian Survey, Vol. xxxiii, No. 11 (November 1993), p. 
1095. See also in Lee Lai To, “Domestic Changes in China Since the June Incident 
and Their Implications for Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, 
No. 1 (June 1991), pp. 35-42.
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Compared with Taiwan’s remarkable economic performance and its deliberate 
policy of linking economic strength with political standing toward ASEAN states, 
Beijing’s “one China” policy °eemed less attractive than Taiwan “Southward 
policy” and even less serious than the South China Sea disputes. Even though any 
official contact between Taiwan and ASEAN would still lead to protests by 
Beijing, the PRC factor in Taiwan-ASEAN relations would continue to be 
marginal. In this regard, it would be logical for ASEAN states to pursue a de facto 
“one China” and “one Taiwan” policy. In other words, Beijing’s threats and 
protests about Taiwan’s “quasi-official” relations with ASEAN states had no 
substantial effect. Moreover, the “Taiwan issue” has continued to prompt ASEAN 
states to show their displeasure at signs of the hegemonism displayed by a hard­
line PRC, in particular in relation to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, 
which will be discussed in following section.
Indeed, despite the PRC’s rapid economic growth and modernisation, its 
economic exchange with most ASEAN states has remained relatively small. In 
Beijing’s calculations, compared with other industrialised countries, ASEAN states 
have yet to become significant strategic as well as economic partners, for their 
small size and resulting weakness could not meet Beijing’s demands. Another 
reason is that mainland China remained primarily a competitor of Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and its trade with the ASEAN six was only US$ 10.5 billion 
in 1993, considerably less than the total trade (US$ 14.13 billion) between Taiwan 
and ASEAN.26 ASEAN ranked only seventh in total trade among the PRC’s trade 
partners the same year. Similarly, the ASEAN states have not participated in 
significant direct foreign investment elsewhere in the world, including mainland
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China. Although Singapore was the largest ASEAN investor in the PRC, its 
investment in mainland China was less than US$ 500 million in 1993.27 The 
consequence of limited trade and investment between the PRC and ASEAN is that 
they have yet to develop significant economic incentives to consider each others’ 
interests. However, in the context of an increased need for cooperation to 
minimise their competition-based economic disputes, multilateral economic policy 
will certainly assume growing importance in the regional affairs. Indeed, the 
impetus for regional economic co-operation may arise from the problems 
associated with competition among the countries with close trade relations. But 
Beijing has yet to take any substantial measures apart from joining APEC.
In fact, Beijing recognised that it could not rely on its economic capability to 
make its voice heard in the ASEAN region. It also realised that bilateral and 
multilateral economic co-operation that could be very helpful to its economic 
modernisation. If, as noted above, economic issues have replaced security 
concerns as the first priority in the region since the end of the Cold War, the PRC’s 
economic weakness would consequently lead to a reduction of its influence on its 
southern periphery. This is not to imply that Beijing’s role in the ASEAN region 
would be determined solely by the trends in the PRC’s economic relations with the 
ASEAN states. The limited economic co-operation between two sides merely 
reflected the fact that both ASEAN and the PRC, compared with the NIEs, were 
listed lower in the regional economic hierarchy. There is little doubt that should 
economic ties between the PRC and ASEAN fail to expand significantly due to 
their weak complementarity in international markets, Beijing would in this regard
“ Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1994, Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, Taipei (June 1994), pp. 197-99.
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lack the ability to compete with other states for political influence through 
economic competition unless it attempted to increase its political standing by 
Hexing its military muscle in the name of sovereignty, which now is seen as an 
inappropriate strategy in the international community. But its territorial disputes 
with several regional states have assumed increased importance for the PRC’s 
relations with the ASEAN region. Although using forces could undermine not 
only the PRC’s efforts to develop a positive regional presence but also its 
economic development as well, Beijing persistently declares its inflexible principle 
on sovereignty. In addition, the PRC’s national defence policy of modernising its 
military power and exercising in neighbouring waters, such as the Taiwan Strait 
and the South China Sea, has further complicated Beijing’s role in the ASEAN 
region.
Judging from its past records, Beijing seems unlikely to relinquish its political 
influence in the region, but has not yet had the capability to finesse the issue 
through economic diplomacy. For fear of being excluded from the major economic 
and political trends in regional affairs, the PRC has reluctantly participated in 
regional institutions, such as APEC and ARF. This probably explains why the 
PRC’s policies have remained distinctly suspicious in substance.28 Wang Shu, one 
Chinese analyst, has pointed out that “all countries, strong or weak, poor or rich, 
should be equal in economic cooperation and should consult with one another 27
27 “China and the Stability of East Asia,” Robert S. Ross, East Asia in Transition: 
Toward a New Regional Order, pp. 106-107.
21 For a more detailed discussion of the PRC’s suspicion on regional affairs, see 
David Armstrong, “Chinese Perspectives on the New World Order, pp. 471-75.
247
patiently in the Asia-Pacific region. . . cooperation would be incomplete without 
the participation of China.”29
Despite the problems mentioned above, there is still considerable room for 
higher level economic co-operation between ASEAN and the PRC because 
mainland China has a large market and can provide complex high-tech products. 
Moreover, it has been argued that competition could be healthy to both the PRC 
and ASEAN because it would promote the necessary structural adjustment, 
diversification and value-addition for the products concerned.30 Optimistically, 
should the PRC’s economic presence significantly expand in the ASEAN region, in 
theory, it would seem logical to assume that Beijing’s need to increase its political 
influence by relying on military power, under such circumstances, would be 
minimised. In practice, it is debatable whether even an economic power has the 
capability to satisfy its territorial claims without military support, let alone a state 
like the PRC whose economic growth is still in its early stage. Thus it is still 
uncertain whether the PRC would reduce its military presence in the region, even if 
its economic modernisation greatly improved. And the PRC’s present national 
defence policy further complicates its relations with the ASEAN states.
6. 2. 2 POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
29 Wang Shu, “Study thoroughly the Global Competition for Economic Power- 
Grasp the Foundation of Changes in the International Situation,” Liaowang, 9 April 
1992, pp. 3-4.
10 See, for example, Lee Lai-To, “China and ASEAN in the 1990s: Cooperation or 
Competition,” in Denis F. Simon and Hong Pyo Lee, eds., Globalization and 
Regionalization o f  China 's Economy: Implications for the Pacific Rim and Korea 
(Seoul: Scjong Institute, 1995), pp. 141-63. See also in People 's Dopy. 21 July 
and 1 September 1993.
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Generally, the ASEAN states are currently experiencing a period of remarkable 
peace and prosperity, apart from Indonesia, but each state has nevertheless 
upgraded the quality of its armed forces, and considerable political capital has been 
invested in designing a workable “security framework” for the region. Thus we 
must ask: Why proceed with arms acquisition and at the same time engage in 
regional dialogues? What tire the motivations? Perhaps, for ASEAN states, there is 
a sense of foreboding about Beijing’s long-term intentions in the region. Or, more 
specifically, the main issue is the PRC’s emergence as a regional military power 
with uncertain political intentions. “China’s size, proximity, ethnic outreach and 
its renewed dynamism could still be fears in some of the small states of the 
ASEAN region,”31 as one analyst remarks. However, the policies of ASEAN states 
toward the PRC, as noted earlier, are varied among themselves. Some see 
mainland China as a huge market, but others argue that the PRC is more a 
challenge than an ally from any perspective. Despite all their differences, all 
ASEAN states have agreed to deal with the PRC in every area, including the 
development of economic relations with Beijing, at the same time maintaining 
close ties with other powers, such as US, Japan and India, and forming solidarity to 
show that they will not be easily coerced.32 As a result, the ASEAN states, even 
those inclined to downplay Beijing’s military capabilities, have relatively less 
interest in developing very close relations with mainland China. The exception is 
Singapore.
For the PRC, its political culture and historical experiences basically constitute 
the large milieu in which its specific security calculations are made. It has a
51 Ibid., 149-50. See also Buszynski, “ASEAN Security Dilemmas,” pp. 90-107.
12 See David B. H. Denson and Wendy Frieman, “China’s Security Strategy: The 
View from Beijing, ASEAN, and Washington,” pp. 422-23
249
fundamental distrust of interdependence and alliances, for collaboration with 
foreign countries is potentially harmful. In Beijing’s view, the history of alliance 
formation in the region offers only support for the stronger states which tend to 
manipulate their partners for their own purposes and draw allies into extended 
disputes with their adversaries. The belief that mainland China could be drawn 
into a power struggle in collaboration with foreign countries has prevented it from 
co-operating with other states. Beijing’s frequent abstention in Security Council 
votes on the peacekeeping role of the UN has shown that it has little interest in 
intervening in other states’ affairs.33 Furthermore, the historical experience of 
modem China leads it to believe that a weak state and a divided nation invites 
foreign aggression. The PRC has thus sought to transform itself from a poor and 
backward country into a modem and powerful nation. To some extent, the PRC’s 
military build-up, coupled with its economic growth, is a natural corollary to such 
an impetus.
However, many analysts, Denny Roy, David Shambough and Aaron L. 
Friedberg for instance, argue that states in the Asia-Pacific region are embarking 
on an arms race because of a suspicion of the PRC’s intention. Despite Premier Li 
Peng’s statement (in his visit to ASEAN states in December 1991) that the PRC 
“will not pose any threat to any country in this region in the remaining years of this 
century nor will it be a threat to any country in this region in the next century,”34 no
” Ibid. See also in Jing-dong Yuan “Conditional Multilateralism: Chinese Views 
on Order and Regional Security,” Working Paper No. 9, Centre for International 
and Security Studies, York University, Toronto (May 1996), pp. 1-25; David 
Shambaugh, “Growing Strong: China’s Challenge to Asian Security,” pp. 44-45; 
Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural Dimension o f Authority, pp. 
182-91.
M Quoted in Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to 
the Post-Cold War Environment.” in Sheldon W. Simon, ed„ East Asian Security 
in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 133.
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one really believed that. And such promises quickly came to an end in January 
1995 when the Philippine government discovered that the PRC had occupied 
Mischief Reef, which created an overwhelming sense of resentment in ASEAN 
states. A subsequent missile threat to Taiwan in 1996 provided another example of 
the PRC’s uncertain behaviour.
In fact, the PRC’s policy goals and means in the Southeast Asian region are 
highly complex and to some extent contradictory. On the one hand, the Southeast 
Asian region is characterised by growing economic prosperity, with the exception 
of the Philippines and the Indochinese states. The PRC can undoubtedly profit 
from economic co-operation with the ASEAN states. Moreover, making friends or 
seeking realignment, especially with ASEAN states, by increasing its diplomatic 
initiative, could add to Beijing’s bargaining power within the PRC-Japan-US 
strategic triad. On the other hand, the PRC has its own strategic goals that are 
considered more important than economic growth. But these strategic goals, such 
as territorial claims and sovereignty significances that are crucial ingredients for 
PRC’s national cohesion, are seen as disruptive by ASEAN states. Beijing’s 
dilemma thus requires a delicate policy to balance these conflicting goals and the 
possible results of the policies calculated to achieve them, and the PRC must 
decide which set of policies is most productive for the its own interests. According 
to Gerald Segal and Michael Leifer, increasing economic interdependence between 
the PRC and regional states has so far done little to restrain Beijing’s calculations 
in territorial disputes with ASEAN states.''
15 Michael Leifer, “Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South 
China Sea Connection,” Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 49-57. See 
also Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy, p. 46.
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Apart from this, the PRC continues to have a large potential for destabilising 
behaviour, as shown by its arms sales and nuclear assistance policies. There is no 
simple way to understand the PRC’s concepts on security according to the Western 
definition of national security, which is based mainly on the idea of military 
strength. The PRC has its own logic on security calculations. Its national security 
oes beyond the mere military protection of national borders,” and it as strong 
social and political connotations,”36 as David Shambough points out. The extent to 
which the PRC has the potential for disrupting regional stability depends on its 
leadership’s perceptions of the cost of behaviour. Political consensus, national 
cohesion and nationalism thus play a very important part in the PRC’s decision­
making. Experience has demonstrated that if the PRC went through future internal 
convulsions, this would inevitably send shock waves through the whole region.
In contrast to Segal’s pessimistic view, Harry Harding argues that Beijing’s 
recent attitude toward regional states, especially in the ASEAN region, appears 
largely benign and more constructive than ever. Three major features of the PRC’s 
foreign policy toward the region are welcome by regional states: the attempt to 
reduce tensions with its neighbours, increasing activity and responsibility to 
international organisations and regimes, and participation in the UN’s 
peacekeeping mission in Cambodia. Harding also admits that although Beijing has 
generally behaved responsibly, it still has reservations about some key issues, such 
as national sovereignty and territorial claims, which are presently controlled by
14 Shambaugh. “Growing Strone: China’s Challenge to Asian Security,” op., cit, p. 
45.
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o th e r sta te s. B u t  he  s t re s se s  tha t su c h  c la im s  sh o u ld  no t be o ve rsta te d  because
Beijing is trying to resolve them peacefully.37
Harding is perhaps right in terms of Beijing’s efforts on the economic as .veil as 
diplomatic fronts with other states and the present strategic environment in the 
region, but this is still uncertain in the long run. Some major variables may be 
beyond Beijing’s control. To start with, its relations with Taiwan seems more 
uncertain recently, the issues which have been addressed in previous chapter. The 
second factor is the constellation of major powers. For instance, there would be a 
major impact if Japan were significantly to increase its military capabilities for 
reasons such as a US withdrawal or the nuclearisation of North Korea. 
Furthermore, the PRC had serious military clashes With Vietnam on borders and 
the South China Sea in recent years. Such unpleasant experiences would heighten 
following Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN. It remains to be seen whether Vietnam's 
role would fuel territorial disputes between ASEAN and PRC. Another major 
difficulty faced by ASEAN in dealing with Beijing, according to some analysts, 
lies in ambiguous information about PRC’s long-term intentions and capabilities 
that leads to a range of possible interpretation.”38 In other words, if discerning 
Beijing’s intentions is regarded as difficult and controversial, and if the PRC’s 
policy and regional claims are viewed as ambiguous, then the South China Sea 
dispute between Beijing and the ASEAN states, under such circumstances, would 
become a major test of the contrast between PRC’s rhetoric and action.
6. 2. 3 THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IMBROGLIOS
” Harry Harding, “A Chinese Colossus?” in Desmond Ball, ed.. The 
Transformation o f  Security in the Asia/Paciflc Region, pp. 109-113.
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Undoubtedly, a major factor complicating the PRC’s relations with ASEAN states 
is its claim to the South China Sea, because portions of the South China Sea are 
also claimed by Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam and Taiwan. Unlike 
the claims of the other states, PRC’s territorial claim encompasses all the islands 
and extends to the waters just off the coast of Malaysia and Brunei, drawing an 
imaginary boundary line covering about 75 per cent of the South China Sea and 
creating legitimate security concerns in both these countries. Beijing refuses to 
accept any one of the states that has a claim to sovereignty. In 1992, Beijing 
announced that the South China Sea “as a part of China’s inland waters,” and 
authorised the use of military force to stop the illegal passage of vessels.39 Further, 
the PRC unilaterally applied the UN Conventional Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),40 
which came into force in 1994, to the South China Sea on the basis of its assertions 
of sovereignty. That is, the PRC claims all of the more than 200 islands, reefs, and 
shoals in the South China Sea. The question is : why? Is it in the interest of PRC to 
bear the brunt of ASEAN criticism and international condemnation at a time when 
Beijing is attempting to improve relations with both ASEAN and other states in the 
region? The fact that Beijing, as a modem nation-state, would maintain its claims 1
11 Denoon and Frieman, “China’s Security Strategy: The View from Beijing, 
ASEAN, and Washington,” op. cit., pp. 437.
” South China Morning Post, 8 March 1992. See also Buszynski, ASEAN Security 
Dilemmas, pp. 91-92.
40 The UN Conventional Law of the Sea accepts the 200 nautical miles Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) within which the state has the right to exploit and manage 
the living and nonliving resources (Article 2 and 3). The question of jurisdiction 
over nonliving resources raises the issue of overlapping Continental Shelf Zones 
which extend beyond the territorial subsea to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles, whichever is further. See Malcolm 
Chalmcr, “Opencss and Security Policy in South east Asia,” Survival, Vo! 38, No. 
3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 82-98.
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on the South China Sea according to ancient notions of cultural primacy instead of 
modern-day concepts of state sovereignty has made the issue ever more perplexing.
To answer this question is not as easy as it appears to be. Generally, it is argued, 
from the economic perspective, because the South China Sea is thought to have 
rich oil, from 1 billion to 105 billion barrels, and gas reserves which ranks the 
fourth largest deposit in the world thus could be very helpful to the PRC’s 
prosperity.41 Apart from this, the South China Sea is also rich in minerals, fishery 
and other natural resources, taken together, these could be of great support to the 
PRC’s economic as well as military modernisation. In this respect, the PRC’s 
possession of these islands would be certainly meaningful, especially in a world of 
shrinking natural resources. However, such a claim would certainly encounter 
some problems. For example, the PRC so far lacks the technology to drill and 
mine the southern waters of the South China Sea. Even if the PRC attempted to 
co-operate with international corporations, the uncertainty over ownership would 
still prevent these corporations from seeking co-operation with the PRC. 
Moreover, despite its efforts to increase its power projection capability, Beijing’s 
military muscle is not yet sufficient to protect such an ambition in a short term.42 
Accordingly, economic considerations might not be the most significant issue for 
the PRC. Yet, the PRC’s claim to the southern islands, Spratly in particular, has
41 John W. Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of 
Bureaucratic and National Interests,” The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December 
1992), p. 1015. See also Michael G. Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat to the 
South China Sea,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 171- 
2. Leifer, “Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea 
Connection,” op. cit., p. 44. “Oil Under the Trouble Waters,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review, March 15 1984, pp. 30-33.
4! Chong-Pin Lin, “ Red Fist: China’s Army in Transition,” International Defence 
R eview, 2 / 1995, pp. 30-34. Chalmer, “Openess and Security Policy in Sou*h-cast 
Asia,” op. cit., p. 82.
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created enough uncertainty to inhibit other states from drilling and mining in the 
surrounding waters.
Apart from economic considerations, one of the PRC’s major concerns about the 
South China Sea is the influence of China’s historical legacy. Despite limited 
historical evidence to support its claims to the islands, Beijing put itself in a 
morally superior position by citing that its claim to the South China Sea dated back 
1700 years to the time of the Han Dynasty. The National People’s Congress of the 
PRC even ratified an announcement in 1992, stating that the South China Sea, 
including the Spratly Islands, was an integral part of the PRC and that the Chinese 
people had indisputable sovereignty: “It is a sacred territory” of PRC. The PRC 
thereby claims the right to use force to defend its maritime interests in the region. 
The PRC has put its words into practice by strengthening its naval and air capacity 
and trying to purchase aircraft carrier from Ukraine.43 The subsequent military 
buildups on Mischief Reef, Hainan and Woody Island, the largest island in the 
Paracels group, are examples. In Michael T. Klare’s view, the PRC’s behaviour 
signals an inclination to dominate the South China Sea by force rather than 
negotiate shared control with the other claimants to the Spratelys.”44
Another reason for the PRC’s concern with the South China Sea is its strategic 
significance for sealane defence, interdiction and surveillance. The sea straddles a 
strategic sea route linking the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. A large volume of 
international maritime traffic crosses this area. All such trade funnels through the 
southern Straits of the Indonesian Archipelago and transits the South China Sea.
41 Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of 
Bureaucratic and National Interests,” p. 1019. See also Stephen Parksmith, 
“Sprately Claims Conflict " Asian Pacific Defence Reporter: Annual Reference 
Edition, 1993, p. 48. Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, 23 March 1992, pp. 1-3.
256
Once fully claimed, the PRC, according to one observer, “would be left in virtual 
control of this major seaway between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and it would 
reach deep into the maritime heart of Southeast Asia."45 In addition, these islands 
are excellent sites for military bases and could provide the PRC with aircraft carrier 
equivalents, potentially enabling China to prevent Japanese naval domination of 
the South China Sea, should Tokyo decide to resurrect its aircraft carrier 
production industry in the context of heightened regional tension,”46 as Robert S. 
Ross points out. Furthermore, the PRC might use these islands for effective 
control and for sustaining pressure on Vietnam on its southern flank. All these 
possibilities present a potential threat to stability in the region.
Thus, the significance of these islands for the PRC seems to extend far beyond 
their actual size. But Beijing is aware of the fact that any overstatement of its 
sovereignty over the South China Sea could trigger public anger and raise serious 
disputes with neighbouring states. To make matters worse, the disputes would 
inevitably involve the interests of the US and Japan and could become a serious 
security problem affecting the entire region. The PRC’s capability, as noted 
earlier, for naval power-projection still remains weak, at least compared with the 
US and Japan. It may not even yet have the power to hold all its claimed territory 
against determined ASEAN opposition in the South China Sea. Hence, Beijing has 
publicly urged a joint development between claimants. Premier Li peng, on his 
visit to Singapore in 1990, made an announcement that the PRC was prepared to 4
44 Michael T. Clare, “The Next Great Arms Race,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 
(Summer 1993), p. 142.
41 Yahuda, The International Politics o f the Asia-Pacific, I 945-1995, pp. 216-17. 
“ “China and the Stability of East Asia,” Robert S. Ross, East Asia in Transition: 
Toward a New Regional Order, p. 107
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put aside the question of sovereignty and jointly develop the Sprately area.47 But, 
such co-operation would be based on bilateral talks rather than multilateral 
negotiations by all countries involved.
In response to the PRC’s actions, ASEAN presented united front against 
Beijing’s approach. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Manila in 1992 
issued a declaration calling for restraint, co-operation and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes. Co-operation would include ensuring the safety of maritime navigation 
and communication, protection against pollution, the co-ordination of search and 
rescue operations, and collaboration in the campaign against drug trafficking.48 
Despite its more conciliatory attitude toward ASEAN states, Beijing’s proposal for 
joint co-operation on a bilateral basis was rejected by Vietnam and the Philippines. 
The ARF, to some extent, is seen a structure to prevent the PRC from expansion. 
However, as noted in the previous chapter, dialogue alone would seem to be 
inadequately to contain the PRC’s claims in the South China Sea. The fact that all 
claimants but Brunei have increased their military spending in recent years makes 
it even more difficult to believe that the PRC’s intransigence could easily be 
dissuaded.
For all these reasons, some hopes that through economic interdependence and 
“constructive engagement” with the PRC by ASEAN and its dialogue partners, the 
US and Japan in particular, Beijing would be drawn into a peaceful orbit in the 
international community. More importantly, if ASEAN states could maintain 
united front in a multilateral mechanism like the ARF, with the support of the US
" “ Reef Knots,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 August 1990, p. 11.
41 “Fangs of the Dragon,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August, p. 21. See 
also in Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper 
298 (London: Brassey’s for the 1ISS 1995); Mark J. Valencia, “The Sprately
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and Japan, the PRC, under these circumstances, would be more cooperative.49 
Constraining Beijing by “enlightening” and “tying China [PRC] into the 
international system,” argues Gerald Segal, despite his realist inclination, would 
bring benefit for all. The PRC would co-operate with others, not because it is 
forced to but because of the power and trend o f the forces of the international 
community.50
Compared with the PRC’s aggressive attitude in the South China Sea, Taiwan 
action has seemed moderate but rather ambiguous. Although Taiwan has adopted a 
policy of self-restraint, it, just like the PRC, claimed all the islands in the South 
China Sea and has troops on the largest island in the Sprately group. Besides, other 
claimants have tended to suspect there might be a tacit understanding, even 
military co-operation, between Taiwan and the PRC. Such a suspicion is not 
groundless. For example, Taiwan’s Defence Minister Sun Cheng stated that 
Taiwan would help the PRC to defend the South China Sea island group if 
necessary. Chang Ching-yu, Director of the Institute of International Relations in 
Taipei, even suggested that the government in Taiwan should co-operate with the
Imbroglio in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Wurfel and Burton, eds., Southeast Asia in 
the New World Order: The Political Economy o f a Dynamic Region, pp. 248-49.
"  See, for example, Wolfram Wallraf, “Regional and Global Structures in the 
World Economy: The Role of China,” Conference on Strategic Regional Change: 
The Cases o f Europe and East Asia, Bonn, Germany, 11-12 October 1994, pp. 44- 
53. See also Jane's Defense Weekly, 17 July 1993, p. 32; Juwono Sudarsono, 
“China as an Economic Power: A Regional View,” in Chee, ed., The New Asia- 
Pacific Order, pp. 90-106. Chalmers, “Openess and Security Policy in South-east 
Asia,” pp. 82-98. Paul M. Evans, Proposals for Confidence Building and Conflict 
Reduction Mechanisms for the Pacific: The Prospect for Multilateralism, The Fifth 
Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 6-10 June 1991, ISIS, Malaysia.
50 Segal, “Enlightening China”, Denny Roy, ed.. The New Security Agenda in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, pp. 131-37. Gerald Segal, “Tying China into the International 
System,” pp. 60-73. Gerald Semi, China Changes Shane • Regionalism and 
Foreign Policy, pp. 45-58.
259
PRC to map jointly the waters and exercise jurisdiction accordingly.51 It was 
reported in 1995 that the Chinese Petroleum Corporation of Taiwan and PRC 
National Offshore Oil Corporation had formed a joint venture for oil exploration in 
the East China and South China Sea in spite of heightened tension between both 
Taipei and Beijing due to President Lee’s visit to the US.52 Indeed, the fact that 
Both Taipei and Beijing have not seriously challenged each others’ claims and 
have avoided military conflict over the islands deepens such suspicion and 
increases the difficulty for Taiwan in seeking co-operation with ASEAN.
However, others in both government and academic circles in Taiwan have 
argued that co-operation with the PRC in the South China Sea as a way to build 
confidence in the Taiwan Strait would further isolate Taiwan’s foreign relations 
with other states in the region. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Frederick Chien, for 
instance, publicly stated that it was unlikely there would be an official joint 
exploration in the South China Sea between Taipei and Beijing, because Taiwan 
“prefers a multilateral co-operation in technical fields in which controversy is 
minimal, such as navigation safety, ocean pollution control, rescue operations, and 
ecological preservation.” Chien further argued that it would be better for Taiwan 
to side with regional states than to co-operate with Beijing in an effort to 
counterbalance the PRC’s aggressive posture in the region.”
51 Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China’s Earlier 
Territorial Settlements,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 51-53; 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 May 1988, p. 26; Jane's Defence Weekly, July 
17, 1993, p. 32; Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, p. 
10- 11.
” “China, Taiwan United on Oil Exploration,” Asian Wall Street Journal, August 
31 1995, p. 2,United Daily, October 21 1995.
" UnLedDaily and China Times, 9 December 1993. Sec also Michael Hind!; and 
James Bridge, “Disputed Islands,” Free China Review (August 1994), pp. 42-47.
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In sum, in Taiwan’s struggle to improve its eco-political relations with ASEAN 
states, the PRC factor is indeed a serious concern of ASEAN. Although Beijing’s 
economic importance, compared with that of Taiwan, seems far less in ASEAN’s 
calculation, ASEAN has to find a balance between Taiwan’s economic significance 
to the region and the dangers inherent in singling out the PRC as the primary threat 
to regional stability. Moreover, Beijing’s uncertain political ambition, coupled 
with military modernisation, has alarmed ASEAN states. Despite differences 
amongst themselves, ASEAN states are aware that the best way of influencing the 
PRC’s actions is through their unity, especially following the PRC’s occupation of 
Mischief Reef in the early 1990s. Beijing might then understand that a consensus 
in ASEAN would lead to internationalise the South China Sea issue. 
Consequently, it may be useful for Beijing to have more dialogues on political and 
security issues, not just talks on a bilateral basis but also in a multilateral form. In 
this regard, participation in the ARF at the expense of Taiwan’s exclusion, in 
Beijing’s view, would mean that ASEAN states might be unable to use the PRC- 
Taiwan conflict to complicate its claims over the South China Sea. On the other 
hand, it would also be ASEAN’s primary objective to entangle the PRC into the 
large web of a regional security system as the price for Taiwan’s exclusion. In this 
regard, although Beijing is aware that ASEAN states are very amenable to 
Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy and even maintain quasi-official links with Taipei, 
it is not worried that the ASEAN states would establish official ties with Taiwan 
and formally recognise it as a sovereign political entity. Accordingly, the PRC has 
had a major impact on ASEAN and Taiwan co-operation; and ASEAN’s as already
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a taste of the problem in building bridges with PRC and Taiwan,”5'* as one analyst 
puts it.
6. 3 ASEAN AND TAIWAN IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
6. 3. 1 AN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY?
The World Bank 1993 ’’East Asian Miracle” study identified fundamental factors, 
including high factor accumulation, macroeconomic stability, outward orientation, 
and policy institutions, as being necessary for successful economic development. 
This report was widely quoted by academic circles and business as proof of 
confidence in Asian development. The World Bank made explicit the significance 
of building and maintaining a market infrastructure and the indispensable role of 
government in this process. Such a miracle, according to the World Bank, was not 
very surprising, because regional states followed the line of what a miracle 
recognised.54 5 But why does the region, which was once frequently quoted as an 
ideal model for development and was even characterised as the natural economic 
territories” (NETs)56, now faces serious economic crisis. We thus must ask: Is it
54 Lee Lai To, “Some Thoughts on ASEAN and China: Institutional Linkages,” 
Richard Grant, cd., China and Southeast Asia into the Twenty-First Century 
(Washington: CSIS, 1993), p.49.
55 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, pp. 
1-26.
56 The natural economic territories (Nets), according to Robert A. Scalapino, means 
natural economic complementarities that cross political boundaries. The “natural” 
does not imply lack of government involvement but can include government action 
that removes barriers to realise pre-existing complementarities. See Robert A. 
Scalapino, The Last Leninists: The Uncertain Future of Asia’s Communist States 
(Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), p. 20. See 
also Robert A. Scalapino “The United States and Asia: Future Prospects,” Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5 (Winter 1991-92), pp. 19-40; Amos A. Jordan and Jane
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still a “miracle” now? Furthermore, will the hope of building a regional 
community be shattered by economic difficulties? Or is the crisis said to be a 
“creative destruction” leading towards the next miracle?
To answer these questions is by no means easy, even for an economist. When 
World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund) officials flew to Bangkok, 
Jakarta, and Seoul to devise a bail-out for these countries in the mid-1997, it 
signalled a formal announcement of an end of “East Asian miracle”. Many 
analysts believe that governments had turned a blind eye to growing evidence of a 
corrupt banking system, which had contributed to a dangerous level of bad debts, 
and bad financial management had been alluded to continue. East Asia’s crisis 
rested in large part on the regional intricately developed system. If banks in 
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea had started writing bad loans off the books far more 
quickly, as Mexico did in 1994, they would probably now be seeing signs of 
recovery. The scale of bad loans throughout Asia is so large that recapitalisation of 
the whole economy is necessary. Others argue that the core problems are corrupt 
crony capitalism, in which personal connections trump the rule of law or markets 
almost every time, and bad economic policies. In a democratic system, 
governments could not get away with such failures. Even a state with high saving 
accounts and many busy hands still needs a sound financial system working with 
transparency and efficiency.57
Khanna, “Economic Interdependence and Challenges to the Nation-State: The 
Emergence of Natural Economic Territories in the Asia-Pacific,” Journal o f 
International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 433-62.
57 For a recent discussion of East Asia’s economic crisis, see, for example, 
Shalendra D. Sharma, “Asia’s Economic Crisis and the IMF,” Survival, Vol. 40, 
No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 27-52; The Economist, 18 October, 15 & 29 November 
1997, np. 93-4, 25-27, 85-7; Time 8 and 22 December 1997, pp. 21-4 and 26-8; 
Asian Wall Street, 30 April and 16 June 1998.
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Japan, which was said to be the main fire wall against a regional economic crisis 
due to its huge foreign currency reserves ($205 billion), its role as a principal 
source of investment in the region, and a big appetite for exports, unfortunately 
could not help pull regional states out of their slump owing to its own prolonged 
economic recession. Moreover, Japan’s financial problems arose largely from the 
overall weakness of its economy, which has made people want to unload yen and 
buy US dollars. Nevertheless, a Japanese proposal for regional monetary fund 
(Asian Monetary Fund AMF) to bail out was rejected by the US.58 The PRC, in 
this sense, might become the best hope for economic recovery in the region, 
because it is the only currency in East Asia that has not fallen in value since the 
crisis started in mid-1997. And no one doubts that if the reminbi (the PRC 
currency) did slip, that would launch the rest of the region into a new round of 
crisis. Its constructive role has thus contributed to regional as well as global 
economic stability. But it is still too early to tell whether the renminbi could last 
long enough to pass the crisis under the PRC’s present banking system and 
financial management.
Although the Asian economic crisis is far from over and the impact of the IMF 
“bailout” programmes is not yet clear, many observers argue that Asia’s economic 
future is still optimistic. The likely outcome is merely a slow down of economic 
growth in the region rather than something worse. For example, Ross Gamaut, an 
economic professor at the Australian National University, notes that this is a 
financial, not a fundamental, crisis, and the so-called ’’fundamentals” of Asia’s 
economies remain hard to beat because of high saving rates, billions in direct
51 For a detailed discussion of the Asian Economic Crisis, see Richard Higgott,
“The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment”, New 
Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1998, pp. 333-53.
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investment from abroad, plenty of relatively inexpensive workers to chum out 
exports.”59 Even the IMF believes that Asia’s “fundamentals” are sound and the 
crisis is based on the internal roots of the problem, such as the failure to control 
large balance-of-payments deficit, the explosion in property and financial markets, 
mismanaged exchange rate regimes, rapidly expanding financial systems, and an 
unwillingness to act decisively once confidence was lost.60 Apart from this, it may 
also be true in terms of the theory that currency depreciation could translate into a 
surge of overseas sales, which would lift the battered economies back to life. 
However, in the real world, as these states attempt to improve their industrial 
structures by importing materials, great recession, depreciation of currency in 
particular, could mean that fewer imports might translate into fewer exports. In 
this respect, Asia’s economic crisis may not be very easy to resolve in the short 
term. Moreover, in a state of economic interdependence in the region, the danger 
is that a collapse of one economy could trigger a loss of confidence of others. Such 
a contagion effect may cause a meltdown across the region, which is the most fear 
of the IMF and rich states in other regions.
In fact, the political nature of these states, stresses Paul Dibb, has contributed to 
the current economic crisis because political leaders are reluctant to make 
structural reforms, especially for those regimes that depend for their legitimacy on 
economic growth. This highlights the conflict between economic and political 
imperatives. Dibb predicts that the crisis will lead to strategic consequences in the 
region and reshape the regional strategic order, including a shift in the balance of
” Quoted in Time, 22 June 1998, p. 45.
“ Devesh Kapur, “The IMF: A cure or a Curse?” Foreign Policy, No. 11 (Summer 
1998), pp. 114-28.
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power. The PRC might be the big winner.61 Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the 
PRC has tremendous problems of its own. If the Japanese yen continues to 
weaken, if foreign direct investment continues to fall in mainland China, and if the 
real growth of the PRC drops significantly, then a renminbi devaluation seems 
plausible.
Lessons from East Asia economic crisis thus may be drawn as follows. First, 
the crisis reflects the fact that multilateral institutions such as the IMF signal the 
limitations of the nation-states that created them. Sadly, a regional multilateral 
institution like APEC, one that is supposed to assist in solving regional problems 
by a collective response, has not yet matured and has done very little to relieve the 
crisis. Second, policy interventions that may contribute to growth violate the 
principle of establishing for the private sector, which is viewed as an important 
contribution to long-term stability. Third, the economies, such as those of Taiwan 
and Singapore, with solid financial structures and good management could be in a 
better position to weather the storm. Fourth, an economic crisis could cause 
political regime change, and the principle of the so-called on-interference in each 
other internal affairs” is virtually impossible in the real world.
However, the above-mentioned lessons do not necessarily justify the failure of 
“Asian value.” Just as some would mistakenly see consistent economic growth in 
East Asia as the victory of “Asian value”, so too would it be mistaken to view the 
current crisis in regional economies as some kind of failure of “Asian value.”62 
The Asian economic crisis has demonstrated that further regional co-operation and 
more advanced economic institutions are necessary, although the efforts of
61 Paul Dibb, David D. Hale and Peter Prince, “The Strategic Implications of Asia’s 
Economic Crisis,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 5-26.
42 Ibid., p. 13.
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governments to promote co-operation should not be underestimated. It should also 
be noted that economic co-operation will be determined more by market forces 
than by the will and arrangements of governments, particularly in a region with 
complicated political situation. There is little doubt that the region has attained 
closer ties through trade and capital flows without institutional arrangements. But 
this is not to suggest that a multilateral institution like APEC is unnecessary. In 
fact, APEC, as noted in chapter 2, was created to promote economic co-operation 
by open and free trade in the region. Despite the perception of its role during the 
crisis as a “talking club”, if operated properly, it could motivate governments to 
behave efficiently, and regional co-operation could smooth development processes 
and even accelerate them. In this respect, even a multilateral forum such as APEC 
could be some use in coping with economic problems, and the experiences of this 
crisis simply suggest that it would be realistic and beneficial for the region as a 
group to support and advance freer trade. The aspiration to establish an economic 
community in the region may now be seen a premature idea, but its future could 
still be optimistic.
Besides, it should be noted that Taiwan’s performance during the economic 
crisis has been commendable. From a regional perspective, Taiwan is unique 
within the region, for it is not a member of IMF, nor is it formally recognised as a 
state. For that reason, its successful experience in weathering Asia’s crisis has 
been characterised not only as a model for ASEAN states to follow but also as part 
of a “second line of defence” envisaged by the Asian leaders.61 For instance, in 
order to help ASEAN states to weather the crisis, Taiwan’s Vice President Lien 
Chan and Director of Economic Construction P. K. Chiang made a visit to
41 The Economist, 6 December 1997.
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Southeast Asian states in the late 1997 and early 1998, and they were allowed to 
negotiate bilateral assistance.64 Dr. Mahathir, the Philippine President Ramos, 
Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, and Indonesian President Habibie, 
either coming to Taipei or acting as a host, found themselves compelled to seek 
further co-operation with Taiwan in the hope that Taiwan would be coming to the 
aid. In view of this, Taiwan, though it may not necessarily be the most important 
actor, should be regarded as an important pillar of a regional architecture for 
stability as well as prosperity.
In short, if ASEAN states could successfully weather the economic storm with 
the help of the IMF and rich countries, they might have a chance to create another 
economic miracle. But this could best be done within a civil society that follows 
the rules of a market economy. A fair and freer society thus may be introduced. If 
so, it may be said that Asia’s economic crisis provides an ideal opportunity for 
ASEAN states to rejuvenate themselves. And the characterisation of East Asia’s 
crisis as one of “creative destruction” in an opening speech delivered by Malaysia’s 
Deputy Premier Anwar Ibrahim in the 12th Asia-Pacific Roundtable could be seen 
to point to the prospect of the regional states constructing a sound society in the 
face of the next wave of challenge.
6. 3. 2 A COMMON SECURITY OR A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY?
As economic and political factors have assumed significant roles in both shaping 
the structure of the emerging security framework in the region and determining 
important aspects of regional behaviour with regard to security matters, the concept
64 Central Daily News and South China Morning Post, 5, 13, and 21 January 1998.
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of security has changed accordingly. A traditional approach to international 
security, in which high security requirements make it difficult to form a common 
interest and run the risk of setting off arms competition, focuses more on war than 
on co-operation. A balance of power system, a scheme arising from the self- 
interests of the individual states, requires alliances to maintain international 
security. In contrast to the conventional approach to international security, two 
new security concepts, “common security” and “comprehensive security”, are now 
widely endorsed in the region.
“Common security”, 45 involving seeking security with other states rather than 
against them, represents a significant departure from the realist security paradigm, 
a zero-sum notion of deterrence and power. Although there is no agreed definition 
of “common security”, it is generally accepted that it refers to co-operation, 
dialogue and confidence-building. It suggests many measures such as 
strengthening international institutions and revamping the customary code of 
international conduct so as to manage the pressing economic, military and 
environmental problems that no national government can handle separately. Such 
a concept is rooted in the recognition that all states, even the most powerful, are 
dependent in the end upon the good sense and restraint of other nations.”46 
Obviously, a sufficient understanding of security in the modern era must 
encompass not only one state and its allies but its adversaries and neutral
Also in United Daily News, 7, 8 March 1998.
*’ The new security concept of “common security” involves a transformation of 
views on the role of military power. Such a concept was formulated by such 
leaders as Willy Brandt of Germany and Olaf Palme of Sweden, and reflected in 
reports of the four well-known international commissions that they, and later Fro 
Harlem Brundtland of Norway and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, headed the Palme 
Commission in 1982.
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bystanders as well. Even if the adversary lacks an equivalent power, it is said to 
resort to other methods, such as unorthodox guerrilla warfare. That is, insecurity 
for one’s adversaries eventually rebounds into insecurity for oneself, and more 
armaments do not lead to more security. Thus, in Gareth Evan’s view, common 
security means achieving security with others, not against them.”67 This approach, 
basically, rejects the concept that long-term security is attainable through an arms 
race.
Furthermore, unlike the realist paradigm, in which security is achieved by 
essentially unilateral means, the common security approach adopts a much wider 
view, seeing security as a function of economic as well as political relationships. It 
also assumes that states share a common interest in avoiding war and the security 
dilemma”. War could thus be avoided through strategies that emphasise co­
operation and reassurance, and minimise the need for deterrence and confrontation. 
Indeed, recognition of this interdependence implies that states have to adjust their 
security policies to a more co-operative stance with others. In this respect, 
common security instead sees security as a problem which has to be approached 
through co-operative rather than confrontational means, and by the promotion of 
the common good.
Nevertheless, a common security approach, a non-provocative defence in nature, 
does not rule out the possibility of using military force. Although common security 
strategies seek to enhance security by increasing defensive deterrent capabilities, 
reassurance takes priority over deterrence in determining strategy and force
“ The Palme Commission on Disarmament and security Issues, A World At Peace: 
Common Security in the Twenty-first Century (Stockholm: The Palm Commission, 
1989), pp. 6-7.
67 Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and 
Beyond (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, NSW 1993), p. 15.
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structure because the “security dilemma” is a far more probable cause of war than 
aggression. The assumption that a common security can be achieved by 
“deterrence” is therefore based on a reassurance. Nevertheless, critics argue that a 
common security approach neglects the principle of “peace through strength”. As 
security perceptions are usually subjective, the ideal of common security at best 
can temporarily remove incentives for an enemy to resort to pre-emptive strike, but 
it still can not avoid a security dilemma because every individual state has the right 
not to be overwhelmed by the military forces of the other.”68
The reduction of tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, undoubtedly, is conducive 
to a growing interest in building co-operative connections among states. But it is 
highly questionable whether a common security approach can be materialised in a 
region with many potential dangers. In theory, it is logical that if the PRC, which 
presents a potential security threat to the region, is to enhance its security by 
increasing military expansion and building up its military power that increases the 
threat, even inadvertently, to an adversary, the latter will usually try to develop 
more military power to increase the threat to the PRC. East Asia’s increasing 
military expenditures in the past several years in part explain such causality. But, 
in practice, there is no security mechanism like NATO in the region, nor is there a 
collective security system to cope with any possible threats posed by potential 
aggressors. Even the US-Japan and US-Korea mutual defence treaty agreements 
are on a bilateral basis and cover mainly Northeast Asia. The ARF, though its final
61 Stan Windass, ed., Avoiding Nuclear War: Common Security as a Strategy for 
the Defence o f the West (London: Brassey’s, 1985), p. 120. See also Colin 
Mcinnes, “NATO Strategy and Conventional Defence,” Ken Booth, ed.. New 
Thinking about Strategy and International Security, pp. 171-3; Buzan, An 
Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations, 
pp. 276-88; and Robert C. Johansen, “Building World Security: The need for
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purpose seems to be to develop a reassurance with the full support of the US, 
Japan and the PRC in the region, has so far been seen as a “talk shop” without any 
substantial problem-solving measures. In view of this, a common security 
approach may be a model for regional states to pursue in the future, but it is 
unrealistic for the moment.
In contrast to a Western-oriented concept of common security, a “comprehensive 
security” approach (see chapter 3) focuses on non-military means of attaining 
security. Such an approach stresses that economic, political and social connections 
are far more important than the military means in pursuit of national security and 
international security. ASEAN’s remarkably successful example over the past 
thirty years testifies to the feasibility of this approach. However, a successful 
example in the ASEAN region, as argued earlier, may not necessarily be true for 
other parts of the region. The ARF, without doubt, is an audacious trial of ASEAN 
in an attempt to extend a comprehensive security approach to the rest of the 
region.69 Pessimists contend that military buildup in the region could have a 
negative impact on this approach, and the PRC’s uncertainty and the area’s 
geographic diversity have made it more difficult to realise. Under these 
circumstances, a collective identity, a prerequisite for the achievement of a 
comprehensive approach, would be virtually impossible. In that case, a 
comprehensive security approach beyond the scope of ASEAN would not be seen 
feasible. The situation, argue some analysts, is that military deterrence and defence 
will be necessary in the [Asia-Pacific] region for the foreseeable future because
Strengthened International Institutions,” Klare and Thomas, eds.. World Security: 
Challenges for a New Century, pp. 374-5.
M For a detailed discussion of the ARF, see chapter 4.
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“revisionist’ aggression, even if of declining importance among developed 
states.”70
In fact, this is not completely the case in the region. Despite scepticism about 
the success of the approach, there is an increasing awareness that all the activities 
surrounding the fora are leading towards a gradual engagement of the reluctant 
parties. Although it may seem slow, it is better than doing nothing. Whether a 
comprehensive approach would succeed or not in a region larger than that of 
ASEAN is not certain. However, structures are always being reproduced or 
transformed by practice and thus are not static background conditions for collective 
identity formation,” argues Alexander Wendt. And as the degree of common fate 
increases, so does the incentive to identify with others,” he stresses.71 In this 
regard, it is logical that structural transformations are embedded in interactions 
between actors. The rise of institution-building in the region to some extent 
reflects a shared sense of pursuing the common good. But this is far short o f a 
sufficient condition for a fear-free community. However, the prospects could be 
increased if a comprehensive security approach could proceed with more 
sophisticated policies. To make this work, one possibility is to use the US-Japan 
and US-Korea alliances as a framework for the ARE to enter into a constructive 
dialogue with regional states, the PRC in particular. In so doing, the region could 
move steadily toward the creation of effective institutions, with APEC promoting 
open and free trade, on the one hand and the ARF evolving into a conference on 
regional security co-operation on the other. Territorial disputes in this regard 
might not be crucial drivers in most crises for the region.
70 Paul Kerr, Andrew Mack and Paul Evans, “The Evolving Security Discourse in 
the Asia-Pacific,” in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds.. Pacific Cooperation: 
Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 250.
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As for Taiwan, its ability to participate in regional affairs is clearly constrained 
by the PRC. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of Taiwan and ASEAN to pursue a 
collective approach in dealing with regional affairs, and its close ties with ASEAN 
and other states in the region do still provide some advantages. For example, both 
CAPS (the Chinese Council for Advance Policy Studies), an institute involved in 
Taiwan’s regional diplomacy and security policy, and HR (the Institute of 
International Relations), a think tank for government policy-making, have become 
key research institutes for building up links with like-minded think tanks in the 
Asia-Pacific region and have developed a working relationship with academics in 
ASEAN states by constant participation in conferences with the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies in Jarkata, the Institute of Security and International Studies in Bangkok, 
and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur. 
Although both are “non-official” academic institutes, they have close links with 
government agencies. Andrew Yang, the Executive Secretary of CAPS, and Shaw 
Yu-ming, later the director of the Government Information Office, have been 
invited to attend the ASEAN ISIS Roundtable talks in Kuala Lumpur since 1992. 
Through such a channel, Taiwan's security concern could still be addressed. 
Moreover, the non-official European example of the Wehrkunde Conference, 
suggests Douglas H. Paal, President of the Asia Pacific Policy Centre and a former 
Bush White House official, could also serve as a useful model for the Asia-Pacific 
region.71 2 In that case, Taiwan would be in a better position to exchange views with
71 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” p. 389.
72 The Wehrkunde Conference, held every Spring since the early 1950s, is a 
privately organised conference, including representatives drawn primarily from 
NATO countries. It mainly discusses European security issues. See Douglas H. 
Paal, “Emerging Security Frameworks and Mechanism in the Asia-Pacific: The
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practitioners of security policy in the other states in the region. Such a proposal 
should be given a serious consideration.
In sum, ASEAN and Taiwan are very important pillars, both economic as well as 
security, for regional prosperity and stability. Their close relationship through 
economic co-operation has provided them with the dynamics to pursue both 
common and regional interests. The meaning of increasing interdependence in the 
region is two fold: increasing a state’s sensitivity and vulnerability, on the one 
hand, and strengthening a state’s security on the other. Which logic obtains 
depends on one’s particular interpretations. However, the pace of economic co­
operation does suggest qualified optimism. What is not clear is whether ASEAN 
and Taiwan’s co-operation will pave the way for an internationalisation of the 
state. But what is evident is that co-operation between Taiwan and ASEAN is not 
only one of Taiwan’s main security options, apart from self-reliance, ties to the US, 
and continued caution in dealing with mainland China, but is also one of the main 
way in which ASEAN can contribute to political as well as economic stability.
Conclusion
The information presented in this chapter has shown that there has emerged 
complex links and networks between ASEAN-Taiwan relations. The cases 
examined in this chapter also reveal that the possibility of a spillover effect from 
economic sector to political-related sphere through functional co-operation is very 
high. However, it is still uncertain that improving substantive economic ties with 
ASEAN could enhance Taiwan’s position in the regional security system and it
Political and Economic Aspects of Regional Security and Defense Programming,”
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should not be exaggerated because economic co-operation between states is not an 
especially common or powerful cause of alignment. It may reinforce commitments 
that are made for some reasons, but it rarely leads to such commitments in the 
absence of political incentives. The lesson of this chapter is that economic co­
operation can help states achieve their various aims efficiently and smoothly. But 
when confronted with the problem of sovereignty and when interests diverge, it is 
unlikely to overcome the durable political constraints that states inevitably face.
in Pfaltzgraff, and Lee, eds., Taiwan in a Transformed World, pp. 53-4.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have tried to do two things. First, I have sought to examine the 
reasons why Western international relations theory, when applied in the Asia- 
Pacific region, is, to a certain extent, explainable. Second, I have put forward a 
substantive normative theory which is dubbed international co-operation, in 
seeking to show that co-operative policies between ASEAN and Taiwan may 
strengthen ties of interdependence or help create spillover effect for optimal results. 
Three schools of thought thus coexist in the study of international co-operation in 
this thesis. Each of these schools focuses on a specific variable which helps to 
define its identity. Neo-realists believe that power and considerations of relative 
power position affect the content, and circumscribe the effectiveness and 
robustness, of international co-operation. Neo-liberals point out that egoism (self- 
interest) can be a motive for international co-operation among states and likewise 
for the creation of, and compliance with, international institutions. Functionalists 
argue that societies are composed of sectors that can be separated from one another 
for initial co-operative purposes, and that initial successful co-operation in the 
economic and social sectors can be transmitted to other related sectors. This 
suggests that juxtaposing these three schools of thought is a convenient way of 
classifying the ever-growing literature about international co-operation. Such a 
paradigmatic pluralism, in fact, does not entail the reality of continuing to invest 
large amounts of each school’s intellectual resources into sharpening differences 
and hamper our understanding of international co-operation. However, theories 
inherently have their own weaknesses. As Marysia Zalewski argues, they may not
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have instrumental power to cover every aspect of social phenomena. In other 
words, theories, based on the assumptions of power, interest and knowledge find it 
really difficult to maintain a coherent whole picture of the nature of actors and the 
international system. 1 An interdicipline, under these circumstances, is necessary. 
This also implies that to be useful analytically and prescriptively, theories should 
strive for inclusiveness instead of isolating parts from the wholes, and should 
become integrative, both in explanatory and normative purposes. We therefore 
conclude this study with some considerations about the prospects for synthesis of 
three or even more schools of thought in contemporary international co-operation 
analysis.
In a real world, present economic co-operation between Taiwan and ASEAN has 
demonstrated some ambivalent characteristics. The growing amount of trade, 
together with capital outflow from Taiwan, has further upgraded Taiwan-ASEAN 
ties into some form of quasi-diplomatic relations. While this provided a sound basis 
for arguing that an adjustment to ASEAN’s Taiwan policy was necessary and 
desirable. However, the argument was effectively neutralised because of growing 
threat of the PRC to ASEAN. ASEAN could not ignore the strategic significance or 
the enormous economic and military potential of the PRC. Nor could ASEAN 
ignore Taiwan when it has become a major investor in the region. The problem has 
always been to find a formula that allowed ASEAN to work both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits.
So what conclusions can be drawn from the thesis as a whole? Our principal 
conclusions can be discussed under four main headings, according to their prospects
' See Marysia Zalewski, “All These Theories yet the Bodies Keep Piling Up:
Theory, Theorists, Theorising,” in Smith, Booth and Zalewski, eds.. International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond, pp. 340-353.
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for future co-operation, major findings, contributions and limitations, and agenda 
for future research.
7. 1 PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CO-OPERATION
In the Asia-Pacific regional context, co-operation refers to co-ordinated policies 
designed to maintain economic prosperity and political stability, while competition 
refers to military buildups, which are likely to generate arms races and the 
formation of alliances. The implications of the development of institution-building 
in the region have shown that regional states are attempting to mitigate the problems 
that are caused by anarchy. Optimistically, learning by repeated co-operation 
among regional states under these mechanisms could make structure reproduced and 
induce certain rules and norms that bond the states together. Although it is true that 
states’ choice between co-operation and competition is highly conditional, there is 
clearly no preference for competition. A collective identification of common fate 
could thus be formed to minimise the possible constraint of an anarchical structure. 
As a result, the “internationalisation of the state”, to use Alexander Wendt’s term,’ 
can be obtained.
However, this is not to imply that state-centric systemic international relations 
theory fails to explain a gradual structural transformation of a regional system and 
so ought to be abandoned. In fact, a structural change may mean nothing more than 
shifts in polarity that may not actually end the cycle of historical conflict and 
despair. International co-operation will thus be retarded by the consideration of a 
distribution of power in the region; and a realist PRC increases such a possibility. 1
1 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” pp. 391-94.
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However, history may not necessarily repeat itself again in terms of an emerging 
transition in the Asia-Pacific region, and a prevalent global trend may lead the states 
to break this vicious fate. In this sense, APEC and the ARF, though arguably in 
their early stages and still immature, may be viewed as offering a better start for 
regional states to make a constructive engagement.
In the case of ASEAN and Taiwan, there can be no doubt that the problem of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty has hampered co-operation. In theory, the problem of 
recognition implies a problem of social identity and may limit the effective resort to 
reciprocity. A state, by being recognised as a sovereign entity, increases its 
confidence that others will respect its individuality. The reward of recognition by 
others could thus promote collective conceptions over egoistic interests. But two 
different possibilities are likely to appear. One is that when an egoistic sovereign is 
recognised, the state will resist a collective form of co-operation due to its security 
considerations. The other is that a state tends to be more egoistic than co-operative 
when it is unsure whether its rights and interests will be acknowledged by others, 
especially when its sovereign status has not been fully recognised.
In practice, the major constraint to Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation comes from the 
third party—the PRC, whose irredentist behaviour has prevented ASEAN states 
from formal recognition of Taiwan. Moreover, the PRC’s strong political stance 
has ensured Taiwan’s exclusion from important international institutions such as the 
UN and World Bank, and a newly formed regional body, the ARF. All this 
demonstrates that the problem o f recognition of an actor by others will certainly 
affect the latter’s role in the international system. Nevertheless, a de-recognition of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty by Beijing could not diminish Taipei’s efforts to seek 
international co-operation with the outside world, including the ASEAN states in
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the recent economic crisis. Furthermore, because both Taiwan and ASEAN pose no 
security threat to each other, there should be no motivation for mutual exclusion. In 
this respect, the problem o f co-operation seems one of a security concern rather than 
the recognition of sovereignty. Taiwan’s attempt to shift its trade focus from 
mainland China to ASEAN reflects such a fact. For that reason, although Taiwan 
itself is a unique example with respect to its foreign relations in international 
society, its co-operation with ASEAN has demonstrated that the question of a 
state’s isolation depends on how it acts rather than on others. Accordingly, Taiwan 
will certainly continue its co-operation with not only ASEAN states but with other 
states, just as the PRC will continue its opposition to the international recognition of 
Taiwan. Indeed, for Taiwan, any co-operation must begin with, and overcome, that 
political reality.
7.2 MAJOR FINDINGS
As noted in the introduction to the thesis, the primary objective has been to take a 
broader view, beyond realism and liberalism, in order to understand international 
co-operation between Taiwan and ASEAN in particular, and to see how their mutual 
co-operation could, to a greater or lesser extent, enhance each others’ security and 
promote regional stability. The major findings from previous chapters can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, a multilateral Asia-Pacific is not what it appears to 
be. This, to some extent, creates a problem for theorists. Much of the scepticism 
about the prospects for establishing multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific 
region has focused on the region’s political considerations, cultural diversity, and 
different security perceptions, particularly compared with the unity of Western
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Europe. The fact that multilateral co-operative economic and security institutions 
like APEC and ARF have emerged in the region underlies the attempts by regional 
leaders to mitigate the above-mentioned problems. Nevertheless, the Asian 
economic crisis has proved that the notion of “regional solutions to regional 
problems” may be impractical. The US-backed IMF, not the APEC, has played the 
key role in the rescue o f the region, but its policies to bail out regional states, 
including Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, have had limited success and also 
seem more problematic as time proceeds. Disappointment in the ineffectiveness 
and the inability of any existing international institutions to solve the economic 
turmoil has caused a resentment of Asian policy makers. This could undermine the 
long-term prospect for further institutionalisation of APEC and increase a sense of 
forming a rigid East Asian regionalism.3 As for the ARF, it has followed the 
example of ASEAN and has been seen more likely as a “talk shop” serving 
particular interest than as a venue for regional problem solving. The Asia-Pacific, 
in this sense, would be an empty notion of artificial construction. This may, 
however, be a turning-point for the region as long as all major powers pay more 
attention to international co-operation than to competition. Indeed, Asian models 
and the rising of so-called Asian identity have raised wide range of debates. Some 
stress that because of the distinctive characteristics of East Asian economies, 
Western-style mechanisms may be inappropriate for the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, 
only through a process based on Asian political culture can international co­
operation in the region be sustained.4 Others, Aaron L. Friedberg for example,
1 Higgott, “The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment,” pp.
333-353.
* See, for example, Amitav Acharya, “Beyond Anarchy: Third World Instability and 
International Order after the Cold War,” in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed., International
282
argue that today’s Europe may be Asia’s tomorrow, especially after the economic 
crisis which started in mid-1997. Two implications ensue: (1) “regional solutions to 
regional problems” may be a beguiling simplicity in the face of crisis; (2) 
international co-operation can be a better way consistent with the regional 
imperative. The overall finding is that a multilateral international system is likely to 
be less conflict-prone than a bipolar one, but it is the economic crises that sets the 
agenda for the Asia-Pacific region.
Second, a non-Westem-style institution like ASEAN might have been effective in 
international co-operation in its own way in the past. Traditionally, in assessing the 
effectiveness of international institutions, one should look at the behaviour of states 
not only in responding to the dictates of international institutions on their own 
behalf, but also in implementing the provisions of regimes in such a way as to 
ensure that all members comply with institutional requirements. These criteria are 
fundamentally based on European experiences, according to which a formal 
structure is seen necessary to meet the need. However, ASEAN’s performance to 
some extent reflects the prejudice that Asian states should follow the Western model 
regardless of the consequences. Unlike the European model, which is product- 
oriented and seeks to achieve a formal agreement, ASEAN, as noted in chapter 
three, is process-oriented and emphasises consensus and informality. These 
approaches have become important features of intra-regional relations. This is not 
to imply that ASEAN resists all forms of institutionalisation. Instead, it prefers a 
non-binding and flexible framework of co-operation and avoids excessive 
institutionalisation. Nevertheless, ASEAN is facing a serious challenge 
accompanied by its enlargement and ongoing economic crisis. It remains to be seen
Relations Theory and the Third World (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998), pp.
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whether the ASEAN model can survive the crisis, or whether it may be forced to 
change.
Third, the ARF is unlikely to become a security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific 
region in the near future. The ARP is thought of as an extension of ASEAN model 
in a wider regional context. The fundamental goals and core organising principles 
of the ARF are to build security with others, not against them. In this respect, the 
ARF is seen a long-term process for CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Theoretically, through repeated interactions among members, rules, norms and 
principles will be formed and a collective understanding and identity can be 
obtained. Small states like ASEAN in a post-hegemonic era can be in a better 
position to engage in constructive co-operation by learning and transmitting 
information. In practice, the ARF needs Great Powers support. The US, PRC and 
Japan are the most influential actors in the region. Despite their reservations, 
particularly those of the PRC and the US, they all support a multilateral form of 
security dialogue in the region. The initial development is not without merit, but the 
ARF has yet to develop a remit for regional problem solving. Indeed, if the ARF, 
rather than following the pattern created in Europe as an important regional security 
framework, is seen as “emerging from unique historical circumstances and will 
likely evolve in its own particular way” in the Asia-Pacific region, as Paul Evans 
argues/ then its success or failure depends on whether regional states can mitigate 
conflict timely and effectively.
159-91.
' Paul M. Evans, “The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory 
and Analysis,” in Paul M. Evans, ed.. Studying Asia Pacific Security (Toronto and 
Jakarta: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies 
and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 303.
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Fourth, the démocratisation and de fa d o  Taiwan may be a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, Taiwan’s successful transition both from an authoritarian politics 
to a democratic system and from a poor island to a wealthy state has won it an 
international reputation. On the other hand, despite its distinct achievements, its 
ambiguous and isolated international status has remained little changed. Ironically, 
its struggle for international recognition, which is viewed as a threat to the 
sovereignty of mainland China, has put itself into a dangerous situation. A 
democratic Taiwan obviously increases the chance. Logically, if democracy, human 
rights and the right of people to self-determination are seen as universal principles, 
then it is reasonable to say that Taiwan has long been an independent state. 
However, international reality denies such a fact. So, is Taiwan a part of China, like 
Hong Kong? Or is it an undefined entity that is both state-like and a non-state, both 
Chinese and Westernised, both independent from China while nominally part of it? 
Or does it really matter in an age when globalisation has been the trend? Sharply 
defined Taiwan's status and identity would only jeopardise the country’s interests. 
Its survival depends, for the time being, on preserving the ambiguity of its identity.
Unfortunately, such a development inevitably involves the United States, whose 
ambiguous role in the past has made it increasingly difficult to balance its policy 
between Taipei and Beijing. The dilemma is that the US is less likely to win the 
PRC’s friendship at the expense of Taiwan, nor would it wish to confront mainland 
China for the sake of Taiwan. Remaining status quo may seem a better option, but 
the question is: how long can this last?
Fifth, through the initial successful economic co-operation of ASEAN and 
Taiwan, the dynamics to pursue common interests between states will increase. A 
spillover effect will thus encourage ASEAN to take a position of “functional
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neutrality” or as an “honest broker” between Taipei and Beijing, and this might be 
helpful to regional stability. Viewed in this way, ASEAN may become one of 
Taiwan’s security options. On the other hand, if political stability and economic 
prosperity are mutually reinforced, then Taiwan’s evolutionary experiences, both 
politically and economically, may be seen as a good example for ASEAN. “Lesson 
drawing”, whereby one society learns from another, could increase the similarities 
and provide a chance for integration. In this regard, although it is too early to 
conclude that the Asian economic crisis signals a collapse of “Asian values”, there 
is little doubt that a free trade and free market are not natural products, but need 
strong political support, which is hardly ever seen in a non-democratic system. 
Indeed, Asian economic advisers were as capable as anyone else of recognising the 
structural deficiencies created by the very economic success of their states. The 
problem was more one of “denial” by the political elites, who face political and 
social constraints that have been underestimated by the international institutions, 
especially the IMF. In this regard, the economic crisis of ASEAN should be seen as 
a turning-point for reform with the help of regional states as well as international 
institutions.
7. 3 CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Apart from the major findings noted above, it must be stressed that this study is 
actors-specific. The major actors, Taiwan and ASEAN, are basically classified as 
“small” and “weak” states, but exploring the patterns in ASEAN and Taiwan co­
operative interactions can yield a number of contributions, both substantively and 
theoretically. At the same time, some research limitations are unavoidable.
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First, the study of ASEAN and Taiwan co-operation could provide useful insights 
into the broader study of co-operation among small states. In contrast to the 
traditional view, in which international co-operation emerges only with the help of 
hegemons, the emergence of “collective self-reliance” in the ASEAN region and 
their co-operation with Taiwan provide evidence that co-operation does happen 
among a group of small states without the leadership of Great Powers.6 Indeed, in 
traditional international relations theories, international co-operation is based on the 
rise and fall of hegemony and its consequences, and such theories offer little help in 
answering the question of international co-operation between weak states. 
Moreover, even when scholars do refer to small states, they tend to use international 
(or systemic) factors rather than domestic ones. Unlike hegemons, small states are 
usually preoccupied with their survival not victory, and policy choices thus become 
a more powerful influence on the decision-making calculus than gains. In the 
absence of effective understanding, the theoretical values of IR may thus be 
reduced. For that reason, a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics 
underlying international co-operation among small states requires that the actors be 
related both to the international system and to the state system. This suggests that 
the study of small states should focus more on threat analyses and its consequences 
than on hegemons.
Second, international co-operation emerges not only between actors but also 
between adversaries. The neo-realist paradigm assumes that international co­
operation is not impossible, but will be rare between adversaries because of 
structural constraints and its minor contribution to states’ well-being. Viewed in 
this way, neo-realists present a fundamentally pessimistic analysis of the prospects
6 Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political
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for international co-operation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, a substantive 
knowledge of Taiwan-ASEAN and Taiwan-PRC co-operative interactions has 
demonstrated that such a pessimism is unwarranted. Furthermore, the general 
propensity for adversaries to compete is not an inevitable consequence of neo­
realism’s basic assumptions. In fact, under certain conditions, adversaries can best 
achieve their security goals through co-operative policies. This study suggests that 
states’ choices between co-operation and competition are highly conditional.
On the one hand, Taiwan’s “mainland China” policy, to a certain degree, reflects 
its willingness to co-operate with an adversary. Through repeated interactions of 
reciprocal co-operation, Taiwan has achieved both economic and political gains. 
On the other hand, if co-operation will increase its adversary’s security more than 
its own, and if this relative loss would in turn reduce its own security, the state will 
change its co-operative strategy. Taiwan’s “Southward Policy” is logically a 
security-seeking strategy. Thus, although it is correct to state that uncertainty about 
its adversary’s motives provides reasons for a state to compete, it is also true that 
uncertainty about motives creates powerful reasons for states to co-operate. 
Accordingly, it is logical, when the risks of competition exceed the risks of co­
operation, that states should direct their self-help efforts toward achieving co­
operation. And states might change their behaviour if the risks of co-operation may 
exceed their tolerance. From the perspective of Taiwan’s policy choice, co­
operation with its adversary, mainland China, is still possible, but it will probably be 
limited to areas of secondary importance because of Taiwan’s perception of 
vulnerability. In this regard, the neo-realist assumption that the dominant goal of 
states is security since, to pursue whatever other goals they may have, they must
Economy, p. 219.
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first survive, is validated. There is another issue, which is that the Taiwan-mainland 
China interaction is a private-based rather than a government-based form of co­
operation. This might reduce the effectiveness of Taiwanese government’s policy 
in an attempt to divert its economic as well as political risks from continuous co­
operation with its adversary.
Third, a functional co-operation may create the spillover effects that encourage 
states to transcend old differences and accept common interests. Theories, realism 
and neo-realism for example, scarcely explain how states and social actors perceive 
their changing interests. Neo-realism’s explanation of change relies fundamentally 
on power and structure, with preferences remaining constant; while a functional 
approach draws our attention to actors as well as processes. It offers an account of 
states’ changing definitions of interest in the intersection of domestic and 
international processes. Such an approach, according to Ernest Haas and Joseph 
Nye, emphasises the process of learning and directs our attention to the changing 
character of states.7 Indeed, by showing others through co-operative acts, states are 
simultaneously learning to identify with each other. In so doing, functional 
approaches “would well begin to transform the nation-state system into a less 
anarchic world polity,”8 argues Seyom Brown.
Through co-operative interactions between states, as demonstrated in chapter six, 
a functional neutrality has been seen in ASEAN states. Certain norms, rules, and 
patterns thus are induced. To some extent this encourages further co-operation 
between the two sides. It is not clear whether reciprocal co-operation might lead to
7 Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization pp. 
35-71. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism,” World 
Politics, Vol. 40, No. 2 (January 1988), pp. 238-9.
* Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of 
the World Polity, p. 52.
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an evolution of genuine community, as the European experience has shown, but it is 
certain that in the case of Taiwan and ASEAN co-operation, states do change their 
behaviours for the common good. Unfortunately, as argued by neo-realists, the fact 
is that security related issues and political sovereignty still play a dominant role in 
decision-making in ASEAN, despite its attempts to achieve a balance between 
Taipei and Beijing.
Fourth, as the density of interactions among actors is getting stronger, states 
become powerless and the term his is strictly an internal affair”, announced by 
one state, no longer convinces others. This is not to suggest that states are no longer 
important in international society. On the contrary, they do exist and continue to be 
important as source of legitimacy and the rule of law. But their power as 
administrative and policy-making agencies have declined. More importantly, they 
have no real capacity over their economic domain. Two examples, in this study, are 
worth noting. One is that states themselves become powerless when economic 
crisis strikes. In East Asia, especially in South Korea and ASEAN states such as 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, states have needed IMF financial 
support to survive recent economic crisis. Although it is uncertain how long these 
states could rejuvenate their economies, it is clear that states need external supports 
when internal problems are beyond their managements.
Another case is Taiwan. Its survival, to some extent, has made hostage of 
regional states, not only because of its economic capability as one of the major 
sources of investment for ASEAN, but also for its successful political 
transformation from an authoritarian politics to a democratic system that has 
become a model for developing countries. For these reasons, Taiwan’s security 
problem is not purely “an internal affair” of the PRC, but an international one. The
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extent to which regional states would suffer if  there were serious military conflict in 
the Taiwan Strait is not clear. But it is widely thought that the internationalisation 
of Taiwan makes this silence problematic.
Fifth, the case of Taiwan-ASEAN co-operation has revealed that change or 
continuity can be generated at any level in the international politics. The dynamics 
of such change or continuity can also come from or be processed through, structures 
and behaviours not necessarily encompassed only by a political force. The 
economy, ecological environment, and cultural groupings can also be forces. 
Developments in these “non-political” fields may affect, sometimes profoundly, the 
values of states that construct and transform international relations. In this respect, 
the danger may be that through repeated co-operation such a web might seem to 
defy efforts to develop a coherent theory of international politics because of 
constant changes. But if we conceptualise the international system as “any structure 
that exhibits order and pattern”,9 then we have a basis for formulating a theory about 
the cause-effect and continuity-change relationships in international politics.
Indeed, students of international politics tend to pay their attentions to structures 
and actor’s behaviour. The understanding of change and continuity has thus 
become a major source of controversy between neo-realism and neo-liberalism. 
Their current wave of debates facilitates a theory-building exercise and reflects 
contemporary dissatisfaction with traditional realist approaches towards 
international politics. However, the increasing numbers of theorists has not added 
to the credibility of theoretical predictability and prescription. Most theorists are 
still devoted to the explanation and description of present political phenomena 
rather than seeking an useful policy-relevant theory so that a more orderly and just
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international system can be built. In this regard, the rational choice and functional 
approaches, despite their limitations, can be seen to be very useful in beginning to 
move towards that goal.
7. 4 AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The research undertaken in this thesis focuses, as far as possible within the time and 
space constraints, on a number of issues related to international co-operation in the 
Asia-Pacific region in general, and to ASEAN-Taiwan co-operation in particular. 
By Focusing on the themes discussed in the thesis, the aim has been to develop an 
understanding of those particular features of international co-operation that have 
been highlighted. However, there remains a rich agenda for future research. Some 
of the key issues may be summarised as follows.
First, one crucial problem that ASEAN-Taiwan co-operation will continue to face 
is the evolution of the economic crisis that started in the region in mid-1997. Upon 
the completion of this thesis, the economic crisis was not yet finished. There is no 
clear sign of economic recovery in the region. The assumptions made by the IMF in 
June 1997 were that: 1) the economic crisis is a temporary phenomenon; 2) the 
economic crisis is limited to the regional realm; 3) the IMF has the power to solve 
the problem. Although these assumptions have not yet proved totally invalid, they 
seem to be highly optimistic expectations. Risks are always present. The US has 
been determined to use the IMF as the primary agency for managing the crisis and 
imposing numerous policy changes in Korea and some ASEAN states. It also 
rejected Japanese proposals for a regional monetary fund. The US-backed IMF
" Kenneth E. Boulding, The World as a Total System (Beverly Hills: Sage
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would, in a sense, be seen a scheme which satisfied America’s own trade and 
investment needs in the region. For Asian leaders, the incompetence and inability 
of the region’s multilateral institutions, APEC and the ARF to solve regional 
problems, has given impetus by some, Mahathir for instance, to propose the 
reconstruction of a new regionalism. More specifically, if IMF programmes should 
fail or if the PRC’s currency, the reminbi, should be devaluated, the second wave of 
economic crisis could be triggered. Taiwan and ASEAN states might thus suffer a 
huge impact. By that time, we must ask: would they continue to maintain the 
current pattern of co-operation?
Second, another intriguing and important issue is the role of the PRC. Although 
this thesis offers an analysis of the PRC’s influence on regional, and especially 
ASEAN-Taiwan co-operation, some issues still need further exploration. Broadly 
speaking, the region has developed closer ties because of trade and capital flows, 
which to a large extent are conducive to further regional co-operation and 
encourages an outward-oriented co-operation framework. The PRC seems ready to 
play an active role and strengthen its co-operation in the region. There is no doubt 
that Beijing will benefit from its participation in regional co-operation, which 
provides a great opportunity for its development. Its persistence in maintaining the 
reminbi's value during the economic crisis in the region may be viewed as very 
helpful in stabilising the regional economy and facilitating the process of regional 
co-operation. Nevertheless, the PRC itself is a key variable. As its importance 
increases, its policy change poses a serious problem for regional co-operation. 
Therefore, further research on the patterns of the PRC’s decision-making and the 
factors which might cause the PRC to change seems essential.
Publications, 1985), p. 9.
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Third, more consideration should be given to the impact on the changing nature 
of ASEAN of the trends of régionalisation and globalisation. A “non-intervention 
in internal affairs” principle, which used to be cherished by all members, has now 
become problematic. The more ASEAN members push for the modernisation of 
their economies, the more they will face challenges to their regimes. It remains to 
be seen whether a new “constructive engagement” principle raised by Thailand and 
the Philippines’ Foreign Minister at the ASEAN Ministerial Conference in July and 
October 1998 become a new model for ASEAN.
Fourth, there is also a need to conduct further research on Taiwan’s domestic 
politics and its effects on the country’s foreign relations. Although democracy 
seems to have a promising future, the issue of independence is increasing tension 
between Taiwan and mainland China, thereby threatening regional stability. This is 
certainly bound to impact on Taiwan’s security, in which the US is inevitably 
involved. Thus, some key questions need to be examined: will democracy lead 
Taiwan into independence? If so, is the US still committed to the protection of 
Taiwan in case the PRC should attempt to unify China by force? If not, what policy 
is in the best of Taiwan, the PRC and the US?
One final question which needs further research is whether ASEAN’s role in the 
Asia-Pacific region is to steer the multilateral institutional process and move from 
the periphery to the centre. Some related issues are thus raised. Can APEC and the 
ARF be accepted as economic and security regimes in the region? If so, should 
APEC be encouraged to emulate the OECD or should it seek to become an Asian 
version o f the European Union? As for the ARF, should it become an ASEAN-style 
regional security mechanism or should it be a NATO-like military arrangements? 
For all these questions, regional states need to pay their attention to international co-
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